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ABSTRACT 
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON CHILDREN'S LEARNING 
John Gary Bernhard, B.A. Brigham Young University 
M.A. University of California at Los Angeles 
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Horace Reed 
This study is an investigation of learning and human evolution 
and examines material in the areas of evolutionary biology, 
primate studies, archaeological evidence for hominids and early 
humans, and ethnographic data on nomadic foraging societies. 
Three socio-emotional systems common to all social primates 
are identified, and it is proposed that these systems have been 
crucial to children's learning in the course of human evolution. 
It is further proposed that because they are biologically based 
these emotional systems still exert pressure on children's learning 
today. 
The ways in which the young of non-human primates become 
competent group members and the ways in which the social structure 
of the group forms the context of that learning are examined. The 
probable social environment for learning in early human societies 
is described, and the ways in which children in contemporary no¬ 
madic foraging societies learn to become competent group members are 
identified. The connections between what the young need to know, 
the activities of learning, and social relations are examined. 
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The perspective derived is then applied to schooling in the 
United States, and it is proposed that schools are often antagon¬ 
istic to the characteristics of learning common to the human species. 
Principles useful in the evaluation and planning of educational 
programs are offered, and some directions in education that seem 
promising in the context of the evolutionary paradigm are briefly 
discussed. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION . 





I. INTRODUCTION  1 
Problems in the Study of Human Evolution . 7 
Method of Inq iry. 28 
Organizational Framework and Outline of Chapters ... 29 
II. EVOLUTION AND EMOTION, SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AND 
LEARNING: THE PRIMATE BASE. 32 
Axes of Primate Sociality. 38 
Activities of Primate Learning . 57 
Primate Learning and the Emotions of Sociality .... 68 
III. THE HUMAN ADAPTATION. 75 
What is Human?. 77 
Learning in Contemporary Foraging Societies  92 
Learning and Evolution: A Summary . 161 
IV. AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN SCHOOLING . 166 
A Much Changed Environment for Learning . 169 
Skills and Attitudes for Change and Fragmentation . . . 183 
The Environment and Activities of Learning 
in the Schools.190 
Educational Thought and an Evolutionary Perspective . . 213 
V. PUTTING AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE TO WORK.240 
Principles of Education from an Evolutionary 
Perspective.248 
Promising Directions . 264 




"Let it be borne in mind how infinitely complex and 
close-fitting are the mutual relations of all organic 
beings to each other and to their physical conditions 
of life." 
—Charles Darwin 
Origin of Species 
In 1977 when I was the director of an alternative school in 
Fitchburg, Massachusetts, I attended a series of open hearings of 
the North Middlesex Regional School Committee in Townsend, Mass, 
concerning a Humanistic Education program that had been introduced 
in the elementary schools of the district. In the course of three 
meetings I learned that this program consisted of what were called 
"values clarification exercises" in which children were urged to 
explore their deeper thoughts and feelings. On the first night a 
man stood, identified himself as the father of two children in ele¬ 
mentary school and began to read pronouncements on education from 
the conservative Heritage Society. Then, his face red with emotion, 
he clenched his fists and shouted, "Give us back our children!" 
Humanistic Education, the man claimed, was undermining the authority 
of the home and the rights of parents to rear their own children. 
It seemed that the man spoke for many in the audience who did not 
necessarily share his extreme political views but agreed that the 
primary function of the school is to provide children with basic 
skills and basic information — and certifications of achievement- 
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not to probe children's feelings or attempt to influence their atti¬ 
tudes . 
The other side at these hearings was represented by liberal 
parents and teachers who insisted that the schools were already 
committed to doing much more than providing basic skills instruction. 
During the second meeting, a week later, a teacher from one of the 
elementary schools in the district took the microphone and said that 
because children spend so much of their day in school it is foolish 
to think that all they do there is learn how to read, write and do 
math. She maintained that attitudes, beliefs and prejudices were 
being formed and transmitted in school — whether parents like it or 
not — and that by and large the schools were doing a poor job of 
helping children sort through confusing, and sometimes contradictory, 
pressures. 
It seemed to me at the time that compromise for these two sides 
was impossible because their disagreement over the purposes of formal 
education was one of kind. While both groups accused the schools of 
failing with children, their frameworks for the interpretation of 
success and failure were so divergent that one group's description 
of what children need served only to make the other group angry. 
This split between what are usually called "conservatives" and 
"liberals" is, of course, not new, nor is their fundamental agreement 
about the poor performance of the public schools. In 1938 John Dewey 
wrote: 
Conservatives as well as radicals in education are 
profoundly discontented with the present educational 
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situation taken as a whole. There is at least this 
much agreement among intelligent persons of both 
schools of educational thought (p. 89). 
To judge from the North Middlesex School Committee hearings I 
attended the situation has changed little since Dewey's time. The 
only agreement remains the perception that education isn't working, 
and the disagreements are so profound and emotional that there is no 
movement toward a broader understanding of the crucial questions 
surrounding education and children's learning: What should be taught 
in the schools? In what way should it be taught? What relationship 
do (should) the schools bear to other social institutions and to 
communities? What, after all, is the purpose of schooling in a 
modern, industrialized nation like the United States? 
Every year new studies emerge* indicting the schools, the 
teachers, the entire structure of formal education and/or the culture 
that is represented by such a structure, but the premises upon which 
these studies are based usually exclude one another with the result 
that frameworks of educational thought and interpretation rise paral¬ 
lel to one another — like columns in a termite mound — but never 
come together to form an arch. What is needed are new ways of viewing 
children's learning and formal education that enable us to either join 
some of these columns at the top or create a wholly new foundation 
upon which we can begin to build fresh ideas. 
*This has been a particularly prolific year for reports on education 
with the appearance of A Nation at Risk, the report of the National. 
Commission on Excellence in Education; the Carnegie report on Amen 
can high schools; and the Goodlad report. 
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This dissertation is an attempt to describe a new paradigm 
within which the formal education of children may be considered. 
It is grounded in an investigation of human evolution, and its 
primary premise is that a clearer understanding of the ways in which 
human beings learn as a species can provide a more fundamental start¬ 
ing point in our attempts to determine what the schools should or 
should not be doing and what education should be. 
The attempt to better understand contemporary human needs and 
behavior through an examination of human evolution is not new, nor 
has this area of study been free of controversy and polarization. 
Certainly the "nature/nurture" debate, already old by Darwin's time, 
was intensified by the development of a theory of evolution, and 
this debate persists today. However, in the last twenty-five years 
so much knowledge has been acquired in the areas of evolutionary 
biology, animal behavior (especially primate studies), hominid and 
early human archaeology, and the lifestyles and social structures of 
nomadic foraging societies that it now seems clear that the nature/ 
nurture debate is greatly oversimplified. It is pointless to ask 
whether human behavior originates in nature or is developed in a 
child's nurture. It is only somewhat less pointless to ask how much 
of either is responsible for the behavior of human beings. The 
questions being asked today by those who attempt to apply an evolu¬ 
tionary perspective to an understanding of our contemporary world 
revolve around the ways in which the patterns and structures developed 
in the human evolutionary past interact with the environments in which 
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humans grow and learn today. These are difficult and complex ques¬ 
tions, but questions of such significance should be difficult and 
complex. 
In recent years many have become engaged in the study of how the 
human evolutionary past may inform the human present. Some of these 
investigators have been biologists (e.g. Wilson, 1975, 1978; Wad- 
dington, 1960), some have been primatologists (e.g. Lancaster, 1975; 
van Lawick-Goodall, 1971), and some have been ethologists (e.g. 
Lorenz, 1971; Eibesfeldt, 1975). Though the interpretations made 
by these students of human evolution vary considerably at times, all 
share a fundamental premise that human beings as products of the 
processes of evolution are related to other forms of life on earth 
and have characteristics of physiology and behavior that reflect 
this heritage. 
In the realm of children's learning, studies uniting an evolu¬ 
tionary perspective and cognitive development have been made by 
Piaget (1971, 1976, 1980) and Fishbein (1979), and an attempt to 
define a relationship between education, community and human evolu¬ 
tion has been made by Oliver (1976). The study that follows tocuses 
on the relationships between sociality, emotion, and children s le.lin¬ 
ing in human evolution and owes a great debt to the perspectives dev 
eloped by Piaget, Fishbein and others mentioned above. However, in 
its emphasis on the links between the emotional systems associated 
with social living and those associated with children's learning it 
is unique and in fact provides a critical perspective from which 
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previous studies of learning and human evolution may be examined. 
This dissertation will explore the following four ideas about 
evolution, emotion, sociality and learning: 
a. In the course of hominid evolution, humans expanded 
upon and developed unique contexts for certain emotions 
of sociality that are part of life in all primate groups 
and are reflected in primate social relations and organi¬ 
zation. These expectations, needs, responses and reactions 
are still very much a part of what it is to be human. 
b. The purposes of human learning, from an evolutionary 
perspective, are exactly the same as the purposes of 
learning for other social primates: (1) to enable the 
young to survive in the physical environment and (2) 
to help the young become competent members of a social 
group. 
c. The activities of children's learning and the emotions 
of sociality evolved in a feedback relationship to each 
other. An oversimplified example would be that a child's 
need to belong to a social group is fulfilled by parti¬ 
cipating as a full member of a social group, which in 
turn reinforces the need to belong. 
d. If there are species-wide biological constraints involved 
in the way children learn in modern industrial societies, 
they will be more easily observed and understood in terms 
of these emotions of sociality than in terms of cognitive 
activity such as classification, conservation, memory or 
intelligence. 
As intimated above, the fundamental components of the study ot 
human evolution are (1) evolutionary biology, (2) primate studies, 
especially studies of the great apes and old world monkeys, (3) 
archaeological evidence of hominids and early humans, and (A) ethno¬ 
graphic data on nomadic foraging societies.* In this study literature 
*This area of investigation presents particular problems which will 
be discussed below. 
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from these areas is reviewed and an attempt is made to draw some 
conclusions about how children learn as members of the human species 
and how this learning heritage may be affected by modern schooling. 
But before proceeding there are some problems and controversies 
associated with an evolutionary perspective that must be addressed 
here. 
Problems in the Study of Human Evolution 
An evolutionary perspective is a perspective on everything 
related to human beings. It is a way of seeing not only children's 
learning but human interaction, history, psychology, the relationship 
of humans to the natural environment, the effects of technology, etc. 
Assumptions about human nature abound in every aspect of human social 
life and thought, and attempts to define the "nature of children's 
learning" may strike all these chords simultaneously. Indeed, any 
perception about the way children learn as members of the human 
species threatens at every moment to expand into a perception about 
Western society in general, or child-rearing practices in modern 
industrial societies, or male-female relations. Gigantic, unwieldy 
hypotheses thrust themselves forward for consideration, and once 
entertained they tend to force even larger, more generalized hypo¬ 
theses. If an evolutionary perspective on children's learning rep¬ 
resents a "paradigm shift" (Kuhn, 1970) in education — in that the 
framework this perspective affords is substantially different from 
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previous investigative frameworks in education — it is important 
to note that this same paradigm can be applied to every other aspect 
of human life. Needless to say, wherever a controversy is struck 
sparks will fly. 
Human behavior and evolution. All evolutionary processes take place 
in the context of what Waddington (1957) called the "epigenetic sy¬ 
stem," which consists of the genotype (the genetic structure of the 
individual and of the gene pool within the basic reproducing group 
or "deme"), the phenotype (observable characteristics of the indivi¬ 
dual) and the environment in which the organism lives. The genotype 
includes a wide range of potentialities that are not necessarily 
realized in the phenotype, the phenotype includes not only' physical 
attributes but developmental and behavioral characteristics too, 
and the environment for animals that live in groups is social as 
well as physical. 
Evolution is, in its most basic terms, the interaction of these 
three elements in a stochastic* process; that is, a process that 
consists of both random events and regulatory mechanisms which select 
certain events rather than others. If a mutation in the genotype is 
realized in the phenotype, the organism must survive in the environ¬ 
ment with its new characteristic. Darwinian fitness means that if 
*"If a sequence of events combines a random component with a selec¬ 
tive process so that only certain outcomes of the random are allowed 
to endure, that sequence is said to be stochastic." (Bateson, 1979. 
230) 
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a variation in the genome is negative the organism will either die, 
or not reproduce, or produce fewer offspring than individuals without 
the new characteristic. But if the variation is positive the organism 
will be more fit, that is, will reproduce more successfully, and will 
thus perpetuate the mutation in the gene pool of the species. Muta¬ 
tions are random events (or if mutation is ordered we are unaware of 
how it is ordered), and the characteristics of the environment act 
as regulatory mechanisms that eliminate negative or unfavorable alter¬ 
natives that are realized in the phenotype. 
In this oversimplified description adaptation may be viewed as 
the spread and stabilization of characteristics through a population 
in a particular environment. A successful adaptation leads to a kind 
of homeostasis within the deme in a given environment which will hold 
until either the environment changes or some more successful variation 
in the genotype occurs and is reflected in the phenotype. 
A fundamental problem of evolutionary theory since Lamarck has 
to do with the relationship between the behavior of the phenotype 
and the structure of the genome. This question is at the core of our 
understanding of adaptation, is crucial to a study of how the human 
evolutionary past may be related to modern life, and is two-sided. 
On one hand is the question of whether or not the behavior of indi¬ 
viduals has an effect on genetic structure, and on the other is the 
question of how the genotype affects the behavior of individuals. 
Fifty years before Darwin published Origin of Species (1859) 
Lamarck wrote Philosophic Zoologique (1809) in which he postulated 
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direct connections between the behavior of individuals, what he called 
the "inheritance structure" of the species, and the environment in 
which the individual organism lived. Although Lamarck was mostly 
ignored in his own time the "inheritance of acquired characteristics" 
was incorporated into Darwin's later work and has continued to exert 
a certain attraction even today — perhaps because, as Bateson says 
"...the biological world looks like a product of Lamarckian evolution" 
(1979: 160). For Lamarck the demands of the environment forced all 
living things to use some characteristics more than others (the famous 
example is the giraffe which stretches its neck further and further 
to reach leaves higher in a tree as the lower leaves are eaten). 
These exercised characteristics could then be inherited, in their 
developed form, by the offspring. 
The neo-darwinists of the first half of this century (see 
Dobzhansky, 1955) demonstrated that there was no evidence for such 
a connection between the use or disuse of characteristics by parents 
and the inheritance of these characteristics by their offspring. 
According to these evolutionary biologists there was no observable 
communication "backwards" from the phenotype to the genotype. 
But the relationships between genotype, phenotype and environ¬ 
ment are extremely subtle and complex, and in the 1950 s Waddington 
showed in his famous experiments with the fruit fly Drosophila that 
characteristics which appeared in individuals as the result of environ 
mental change could become incorporated into the genetic structure ot 
This was a kind of "internal selection succeeding generations. 
process" which Waddington called canalization. In one experiment 
Waddington subjected flies with a crossvein wing pattern to heat 
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stress at an early stage of development. Most of the surviving flies 
developed wings without crossveins after the stress; however, 99% 
of their offspring developed normal wing patterns when not subjected 
to the heat stress themselves. But if these offspring were subjected 
to the same stress they too developed abnormal wings without cross¬ 
veins. Over a number of generations in which each generation was 
exposed to the heat stress at an early stage of development, the 
characteristic of wings without crossveins became assimilated into 
the genetic structure of the flies so that eventually the offspring 
of unstressed flies developed the abnormal wing pattern (as did their 
offspring). The new characteristic had become incorporated into the 
organism's genotypic structure, or canalized. 
This was not Lamarckian inheritance. The heat stress had not 
produced abnormal offspring immediately (indeed, there had been 
great resistence in the genome), nor had it produced a new genetic 
characteristic. Rather the stress had released a potential that had 
been in the genome all along but had been suppressed in the normal 
phenotype. 
In The Strategy of the Genes (1957) Waddington offers a metaphor 
to illustrate canalization with regard to epigenesis (the development 
of the embryo), a metaphor which has served to elucidate later dis¬ 
cussions of the relationship between phenotypic behavior, the environ¬ 
ment, and genetic structure by Piaget (1976), Fishbein (1979), and 
Wilson (1978). Waddington describes a ball rolling through a landscape 
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etched in a series of channels of varying depth. 
Has the valley a flat bottom and gently sloping sides? 
If so, there will be only rather a slight tendency for 
a developmental trajectory, when displaced from the 
valley centre, to find its way back there again; the 
final adult character will be easily caused to vary by 
minor fluctuations in the conditions under which develop¬ 
ment occurs. On the other hand, if the valley bottom is 
very narrow and the sides steep, it will be more diffi¬ 
cult to push the trajectory away from its normal course 
and it will quickly return there, unless indeed it has 
been pushed over the crown of a watershed wither into 
another valley or on to a plateau which represents some 
aberrant condition intermediate between one organ and 
another (1957: 30-31). 
To apply Waddington's metaphor to his experiments with Drosophila, 
the heat stress the flies were subjected to during epigenesis nudged 
the developing phenotype out of a valley that normally would have 
led to wings with crossveins and into another, shallower, valley for 
the development of wings without crossveins. Repeated environmental 
stress deepened the channel for wings without crossveins to the extent 
that after a number of generations it became the normal developmental 
channel for that population of flies. 
In his investigations of cognitive development in children 
Piaget postulated that the child was an "active organism" (e.g. 1952) 
with innate tendencies towards organization and adaptation through 
which it seeks to achieve equilibrium in its environment. In the 
context of this interchange with the environment the child forms 
strategies which it tries out in an effort to achieve this equilibrium. 
As these strategies meet with more or less success, and as the child 
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matures, the child refines and stabilizes its internal structures so 
that eventually a dynamic balance between the two elements of adap¬ 
tation (accomodation and assimilation — see Chapter 4) is reached. 
Thus cognitive development for Piaget was a complex interaction of 
physiological maturation and these equilibration processes. 
Waddington's experiments showed that profound stress in the 
environment can cause, over time, the incorporation of "new" charac¬ 
teristics into the genetic structure of an organism. But in his 
assumption that an organism seeks experience in the environment, 
Piaget added a new dimension to the epigenetic system. This motiva¬ 
tion to interact with the environment was conceived by Piaget as 
genetically based, and in his later work (1971, 1976, 1980) he 
attempted to describe a correspondence between the cognitive develop¬ 
ment of individual children and the development of human intelligence 
in the course of evolution. According to Piaget both are processes 
in which equilibrium is achieved and disrupted, achieved and dis¬ 
rupted in complex interactions of genetic messages, phenotypic 
behavior and environmental fluctuation which lead to increasingly 
complex organization. Piaget maintains that the intricacy of the 
balances between the three elements of the epigenetic system that 
are observable throughout nature generally and in human cognitive 
development specifically demands a model of evolution that includes 
some communication between the activity of the phenotype and the 
internal environment of the genome. In other words Piaget believed 
that through the development of a phenocopy the behavior of indivi- 
dual organisms could be reflected in some way in that organism's 
genetic structure. 
Of course, new accomodations, and forms of behavior 
brought about by environmental changes will change the 
internal environment to a variable degree. In some 
cases the modification may be superficial, in which 
even the production of accomodats [Piaget's term for 
phenotypical or "somatic" variations] will not necessarily 
be followed by genic transformation. Elsewhere, adapta¬ 
tion to a new external environment, along with new types 
of behavior, can give rise to more or less profound im¬ 
balances capable of changing the internal environment 
at more primitive hierarchical levels. And it is the 
new mutations made possible by such circumstances 
(whether or not they are related to the imbalance...) 
which become subject to selection by the internal en¬ 
vironment, and hence to a sort of endo-adaptation 
(Piaget, 1976: 21). 
Until very recently Piaget's conception of a more or less direct 
biochemical relationship between the behavior of the phenotype and 
the environment in which genetic selection takes place would have 
been considered speculative in the extreme. Yet in recent years the 
work of Barbara McClintock, who predicted the existence of so-called 
"movable genetic elements" thirty years ago, has been substantiated. 
The genome is indeed rather unstable. "Jumping genes" (Lewin, 1981) 
have been identified, bits of DNA in varying sizes that migrate from 
one part of the chromosome to another, and if the relationship between 
the external experience of the phenotype and the internal environment 
of the genotype is not yet known, it is now conceivable that some 
relationship like that described by Piaget might exist. Yet even the 
phenocopy is not Lamarkian, for the incorporation of phenotypic 
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experience into genetic structure is neither automatic nor linear. 
There is no one-to-one relationship between behavior and the effect 
it has upon the environment of the genome. Nevertheless, Piaget 
believed phenotypic behavior to be so important to the processes of 
evolution that he called it the "motor of evolution" (1976). 
What does this complex of relationships between genetic structure, 
individual behavior, and the external environment mean for children’s 
learning? To begin with, learning is a process that is common to all 
animals (and Piaget argues that plants learn as well). Like repro¬ 
duction learning is essential for the survival of the species, and 
each species has evolved physiological and behavioral characteristics 
associated with learning. If Piaget is right we should expect a 
tremendously complex interrelationship between the behavior- of organ¬ 
isms, the environment in which they live and their genetic structure; 
but even if Piaget is wrong and there is virtually no communication 
between phenotypic activity and genic selection, we should be able 
to identify characteristics of learning particular to each species 
which have been incorporated into the genetic structure of that 
species through the processes of canalization and adaptation. Thus 
human beings, as products of these same processes, should have certain 
characteristics of learning in common, and, indeed, Piaget, Bateson, 
and others insist that the processes of learning in humans are what 
they are because they evolved. 
But the complexity of these relationships also urges caution in 
the assignment of behavioral characteristics of learning in modern 
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humans to genetic roots — and particularly in the definition of these 
roots for, as Piaget points out, the behavior of the phenotype (in 
this case the learning child) is not determined by the genetic struc¬ 
ture of that individual but emerges in a complex of interactions that 
involve all three elements of the epigenetic system at any given moment. 
Indeed, the so-called "sociobiology debate" (Caplan, 1975) which pits 
those who insist on a formidable genetic component to modern human 
behavior against those who worry about how a genetic theory of behav¬ 
ior might be misused socially is a kind of red herring in this question 
for it urges the old nature/nurture dichotomy. 
When one uses the term "selfish genes" (Dawkins, 1976), it is 
impossible to avoid connotations of genetic determinism that no dis¬ 
claimers can dispell, and an extremely complex process is.oversimpli¬ 
fied. On the other hand, if human beings have emerged from the same 
processes that shaped the duck's webbed foot or, for that matter, the 
panda's thumb (Gould, 1980) there is no doubt that our behavior in any 
environment has components that are biologically based. It is as 
foolish to claim that the evolutionary heritage of humanity exerts 
no significant pressure upon modern human behavior as it is to claim 
that modern human behavior is determined by genetic structures. 
In this study learning is considered to be a complex of activities 
that reflect both genetically based motivations common to the entire 
species and the demands of the environment in which individuals exist. 
Human beings are cultural beings, and this means that the environment 
in which the young grow and develop is profoundly affected by the 
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language, social organization, ideas, customs, and history of those 
with whom the young live and come in contact with. But the impact 
of the cultural environment on the learning of the young does not 
cancel out biologically-based characteristics of learning, it only 
greatly complicates the context in which these human learning charac¬ 
teristics are located. Indeed, for many the physical evolution of 
the human being and the evolution of the human being's culture are 
processes which were once inextricable (see Chapter 3). This disser¬ 
tation is a search for biologically-based components of human learning 
in chapters 2 and 3 and an attempt to apply the insights derived from 
this investigation to the plight of modern schooling in chapters A 
and 5. But even when the fact of the human connection with the 
processes of evolution and with other life on earth is accepted, 
more specific problems in the development of an evolutionary perspec¬ 
tive remain. 
Primate studies. One difficulty encountered when looking for rela¬ 
tionships between humans and other primates is the question of which 
"correspondences" apply to the relationship and which do not. 1’heie 
are a number of catarrhine (old world monkeys, apes, and humans) 
species that have characteristics which seem to be connected in one 
way or another with human characteristics, and it is tempting to 
pick and choose among them in the creation of hypotheses. These 
similarities look like familiar landmarks in the often bewildering 
complexity of evolutionary relatedness, but it is difficult to tell 
18 
whether such "correspondences" are actually homologous (that is, 
the resemblance is evidence of evolutionary relatedness) or analogous 
(the resemblance is fortuitous and arose independently — perhaps in 
response to similar environmental pressures). 
Gibbons, for example, form monogamous "family" groups (Ellefson, 
1968) of a male, a female, and their young offspring, and one is drawn 
to compare the social life of gibbons to the family structures of 
human beings. No doubt the comparison is all the more compelling 
because monogamous male-female dyads are prevalent in many human so¬ 
cieties, and often these dyads are idealized. Nevertheless, though 
the gibbon pair-bonding bears this superficial similarity to human 
pair-bonding, it is only analogous according to most primatologists. 
"The gibbon 'family' is a common pattern for small birds and mammals 
in the tropics and does not represent a predecessor to the human 
family" (Lancaster, 1975: 34). 
The hamadryas baboon's social organization is based on the 
"harem," that is, a group of females guarded by a single dominant 
male (Kummer, 1971). The baboon is of great interest to those en¬ 
gaged in the study of human evolution because most species are ground¬ 
dwelling, as were ancient hominids, and some researchers have found 
in baboon social arrangements models for human social life. 
Man's latent or overt inclinations for dominance hier¬ 
archies, closed groups, and discrimination against out¬ 
siders suggest that he approached the baboon type of 
society, at least at one stage of his evolution. In 
many respects the hamadryas baboon's society of closed 
but coordinated family units is a better model of human 
social structure that that of the chimps (Kummer,1971:152) . 
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But as with gibbon social arrangements and human family life, 
any correspondences between the hamadryas "harem" structure and human 
"dominance hierarchies" must be examined with great care. Many be¬ 
lieve that the hamadryas harem is "not so much a unit adapted for 
mating as it is for foraging in an environment of scarce and scattered 
food resources" (Lancaster, 1975: 33). 
In the end it seems that the best approach to the study of other 
primates for the light that can be shed on human learning is not to 
match characteristics (either physiological or behavioral) one for 
one but to describe the kinds of relationships, behaviors and activi¬ 
ties that occur relevant to learning in other catarrhine societies. 
Although there is considerable variety between primate species 
in terms of the size of subsistence and breeding groups, the range 
such groups cover in their search for food, and the permeability be¬ 
tween groups of the same species, it is possible to view societies of 
old world monkeys and apes in terms of "axes of social organization" 
which provide a general and flexible framework within which major 
themes of primate sociality, and thus primate learning, may be iden¬ 
tified. Lancaster describes five such axes (1975): (1) dominance and 
dominance hierarchies, (2) the mother-infant bond and the matrifocal 
sub-unit, (3) the sexual bond between males and females, (4) the 
separation of roles by sex, and (5) the separation of roles by age. 
They are like themes which are woven together to form a 
pattern unique for each species. Sometimes certain of 
these axes will be emphasized in meeting the challenge 
of a particular environmental problem confronting the 
species or perhaps only the social group. Sometimes, 
too, a particular social group may have a social tradi¬ 
tion in which one of these themes may dominate whereas 
its neighbors will have another (Lancaster, 1975: 13). 
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With some modification this approach is used in the study that 
follows, and an attempt has been made to demonstrate the connections 
between primate social behavior and organization, and the contexts, 
purposes and activities of primate learning. 
For young social primates of all species, including humans, 
learning means a great deal more than becoming familiar with the 
external environment and accumulating information that contributes 
to individual survival. Primate societies are complex organizations 
in which individual animals must perform complex activities, and 
primate learning has as much to do with sociality as it dbes with 
individual survival. It is no coincidence that survival and social 
competence are synonomous in most primate species. 
Hominid and early human archaeology. The hard evidence for ancient 
hominids, the stones and bones, is unfortunately sparse, and although 
this has not deterred archaeologists and others from forming hypo¬ 
theses around the artifacts that have been uncovered, the dearth of 
hard evidence has always left such hypotheses open to charges of 
"unwarranted speculation." Interpreters of archaeological material 
have so little to work with that they must use other frames of ref¬ 
erence, such as primate studies and the ethnographic literature on 
foraging societies, in which paleolithic hominid bones and stone 
tools can be located. The occasions for error in such a situation 
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are many and have been pointed out many times (e.g. Lee and DeVore, 
1968; Wobst, 1978). Nevertheless, faced with the choice of making 
interpretations that are plausible (given the available evidence) 
but unprovable (until more evidence is found), and withholding all 
interpretation, students of human evolution seem compelled to take 
the risk; for the links between what has been learned from studying 
other primates and the behavior of modern humans may only be forged 
through an interpretation of the archaeological record. 
This is not only sketchy work, it is fraught with political 
overtones as well. In the same way that evolutionary biology has at 
times become polarized by the possibility of unpleasant extensions of 
theories of the genetic basis for behavior, models of human evolution 
built on archaeological evidence may become polarized by extensions 
of the meanings of artifacts. For example, the longer a characteris¬ 
tic of human behavior or social organization has been around in the 
hominid family the more "respectability" it has as a possible adapta¬ 
tion of the species. Bipedalism is an ancient hominid adaptation; 
the fossil evidence indicates that a physiological adaptation for an 
upright posture is at least 4,000,000 years old. But if bipedalism, 
which we know is ancient, is closely connected with the development 
of the human nuclear family, uniquely human sexual behavior, and the 
sexual division of labor (as it is in Lovejoy, 1981); the interpre¬ 
tation acquires political significance, for these elements of male- 
female relations are giving us trouble today. 
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To add to the confusion there have been a number of populariza¬ 
tions of human evolution and our relationship to our primate cousins 
(e.g. Ardrey, 1966; Morris, 1967) and even "historical" novels (e.g. 
Auel, 1980) about what our ancestors must have thought and felt. 
There is indeed a bewildering complexity of variables in human 
evolution. Sometime between five and one million years ago a number 
of significant changes occurred in groups of primates living in East 
Africa: they became bipedal, used and made tools more purposefully 
than their ancestors had, began to eat larger game, and utilized home 
bases. The males and females of these groups evolved a complementary 
division of labor that included the sharing of food regularly. Female 
estrus disappeared, males become bonded to the primary matrifocal units, 
and these families came to constitute the primary units of hominid 
society. The offspring of these .animals were born at an earlier 
state of development than were the young of other primates, and con¬ 
sequently had a longer period of maturation. Finally, this line de¬ 
veloped a large and complex brain. 
Many of these attributes may have been prefigured in earlier 
primate societies in which the animals hunted or scavanged, in which 
there may have been certain specializations of activity according to 
gender, and in which tools of one sort or another were made and used 
(see Chapter 2). But what catapulted these new primates into unique 
areas of behavioral and social complexity, how extensions of primate 
characteristics became differentiated into qualitatively different 
human characteristics, and how these characteristics affected one 
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another's development are extraordinarily difficult questions. That 
we are related to these creatures is assumed by all (as it is assumed 
that we are related to chimpanzees), but the ways in which that rela¬ 
tedness is reflected in our own behavior are open to the wildest 
speculation. It is in the area of the interpretation of archaeolo¬ 
gical data that our evolutionary investigations are most vulnerable 
to personal bias, wishful thinking and logical fallacy. 
Studies of nomadic foraging societies. As with studies of other 
primate groups and interpretations of archaeological evidence, the 
examination of contemporary hunting and gathering societies for the 
light they may shed on hominid or early human societies is proble¬ 
matical. 
Anthropology itself is a relatively new discipline which grew 
haphazardly from the observations of Western travelers in different 
parts of the world. The first anthropologists attempted to bring 
order to these observations and to integrate them into theories of 
human social organization. From the discipline's formal beginnings 
in the late 19th century many anthropologists have operated under the 
assumption that the so-called "primitive1 societies of the world 
reflect, in some way, an earlier state of human social development 
though there has been little agreement as to what this may mean. 
From the perspective of the late 19th - early 20th century 
heyday of the industrial revolution in which anthropology was born, 
it was probably impossible for anthropologists to conceive of nomadic 
foraging societies as anything but curious carryovers from the stone 
^8®• These were, after all, the most primitive people from the per¬ 
spective of technological development and manipulation of the external 
environment. They had somehow been missed by civilization and were 
inferior because of it. They had not progressed, and the theories 
of human social organization that emerged from the study of band 
societies with minimal technology often reflect these essentially 
Western, progress- and property-oriented assumptions. 
The assumptions of anthropologists concerning "primitive" 
societies have undergone wholesale revision in the last 25 years.* 
In the context of an evolutionary perspective — often missing in 
the work of early anthropologists but present in many recent ethno¬ 
graphic studies —nomadic foraging societies have come to be viewed 
not as isolated groups that "time forgot" but as representatives of 
a remarkably successful, stable, and persistent human adaptation 
that cuts across tremendous environmental variation. 
This is not to say that contemporary gatherers and hunters are 
"stone age remnants" or that they are in any way less human than 
any other representatives of the species, but only that the nomadic 
foraging way of life is the ancient framework for human subsistence 
and social organization within which we have evolved capacities, 
abilities, emotional systems and social relationships that all humans 
share. It is now clear that life in nomadic foraging societies is 
*It is conceivable that this revision is related to the perspective 
one is afforded from what might be called the "down side" of the 
industrial revolution as well as to increasingly accurate data. 
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neither nasty nor brutish. Indeed, on the basis of the relatively 
small amount of time and effort devoted to subsistence and the large 
amount of leisure available to all, Sahlins (1968) has called gathering 
and hunting groups the "original affluent society." 
Life in nomadic foraging societies is full of the same kinds of 
human urgencies, difficulties, complexities and satisfactions that 
characterize life in any human group. Of course, these emotionally 
charged activities are played out in different ways, in response to 
different environmental pressures, depending on the particular culture 
involved, but the kinds of social interactions that people in gathering 
and hunting societies respond to with intensity, animation and concern 
are the same kinds of social interactions that command the attention 
of us all. However, these societies have remained within the gather¬ 
ing and hunting framework. 
That framework has all but disappeared from the earth today as 
other, recently developed social systems have exerted pressure on it, 
but there is little doubt that a hunting and gathering way of life 
was the context in which hominids became human and in which we humans 
have spent the overwhelming bulk of our evolutionary history. There 
is evidence that our ancient ancestors lived this way (see Chapter 3) 
and no evidence that they lived in any radically different way. And 
though we may be sure that the nomadic foraging groups we learn from 
today are not the same as the nomadic foraging groups that roamed 
East African savannahs 1,000,000 years ago, it is likely that the 
framework within which they live is not greatly different. 
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The best explanation for the similarities among these 
[contemporary foraging] groups is that within the gathering 
and hunting mode, there is a limited set of alternatives 
to choose from. Any group of people who had to live off 
the land would face similar ecological problems and would 
probably invent a roughly similar system. It seems 
reasonable to suggest, then, that this pattern — or more 
properly, this range of patterns — prevailed in most 
human societies before the agricultural revolution and 
during much of the course of human evolution (Shostak, 
1981: 46). 
In a way the terms "nomadic foraging society," "gatherers and 
hunters," "hunter-gatherers," and "foraging bands" are misleading, 
for the peoples of the earth live and probably have lived for many 
thousands of years somewhere along a continuum which ranges from 
complete foraging and no domestication of animals to a high degree 
of specialization, city dwelling in large populations, etc: Indeed, 
there are societies at various places on the continuum still in 
existence in many parts of the world today, and one would expect 
"slash and burn" agriculturalists who keep few animals and move from 
place to place cultivating small plots of land to have something in 
common with the gatherers and hunters that are described in this 
study. However, the intent here has been to describe the framework 
for social relations and organization that most probably characterized 
hominid and human groups for perhaps 2,000,000 years before the advent 
of agriculture and the domestication of animals. Accordingly, the 
following definition will be used to characterize the nomadic 
foraging societies discussed in this study. 
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We make two basic assumptions about hunters and gatherers: 
(1) they live in small groups and (2) they move around a 
lot. Each local group is associated with a geographical 
range but these groups do not function as closed social 
systems. Probably from the very beginning there was 
communication between groups, including reciprocal visiting 
and marriage alliances, so that the basic hunting society 
consisted of a series of local "bands" which were part of 
a larger breeding and linguistic community. The economic 
system is based on several core features including a home 
base or camp, a division of labor — with males hunting 
and females gathering — and, most important, a pattern of 
sharing out the collected food resources. 
These few broadly defined features provide an organi¬ 
zational base line of the small-scale society from which 
subsequent developments can be derived. We visualize a 
social system with the following characteristics. First, 
if individuals and groups have to move around in order to 
get food there is an important implication: the amount of 
personal property has to be kept to a very low level... 
Second, the nature of the food supply keeps the living 
groups small, usually under fifty persons... 
Third, the local groups as groups do not ordinarily 
maintain exclusive rights to resources... 
Fourth, food surpluses are not a prominent f.eature of 
the small-scale society... 
Fifth, frequent visiting between resource areas pre¬ 
vents any one group from becoming too strongly attached 
to any single area... (Lee and DeVore, 1968: 11-12). 
By this definition groups such as the Northwest Coast Indians of 
North America — who obtained their food primarily from fishing and 
hunting but lived in large, permanently inhabited villages would not 
be considered "gatherers and hunters," and will not be addressed here. 
Neither will slash-and-burn agriculturalists who hunt and/or fish to 
supplement their food supply be included in this study. 
In this dissertation ethnographic data on nomadic foraging 
societies are examined in an effort to identify characteristics of 
learning that are common to all groups and are related to or different 
from characteristics of learning that exist in other primate socxetxes 
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Particular attention is paid to social behavior and organization, 
the emotional systems of sociality, and their relationship to learning. 
Surely there are a great many problems and controversies associa¬ 
ted with an evolutionary perspective on children's learning. However, 
as Dahlberg says: 
Although the evidence on bones and stone tools is very 
solid, it is limited in quantity and by its very nature 
limits what can be deduced about the past. Chimpanzees 
are definitely not the same as ancient hominids nor are 
contemporary human foragers. However, by comparing the 
similarities and differences between other primates and 
humans, we can deduce some features which the putative 
ancestor of both species exhibited five or six million 
years ago (1981: 4). 
Method of Inquiry 
No primary research has been done for this dissertation, though 
it is hoped that the material presented here will help describe an 
original framework within which a great many empirical investigations 
may be made. A range of data in each of the four areas of study that 
constitute an evolutionary perspective has been examined, and an 
attempt has been made to synthesize these relationships in the context 
of the experience of children in modern school environments. 
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Organizational Framework and Outline of Chapters 
This study investigates the relationships between human social 
organization and interaction, biologically based emotional systems 
connected with sociality and the learning of the young, and the ac- 
tivities of learning that have developed in the course of primate 
and human evolution. Therefore, chapters 2, 3, and 4 are organized 
in the following manner: 
a. description of the axes or most prominent elements of 
social organization that serve as the context of learning 
for the young. 
b. discussion of how these elements of social organization 
reflect and fulfill (or, in Chapter 4, do not fulfill) 
the socio-emotional needs of learning offspring. 
c. description of the activities of learning engaged in by 
the young of other primate species (Chapter 2), the 
children in nomadic foraging societies (Chapter 3), and 
children in schools in the United States today (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of the biology of emotion 
and the emotions of sociality, and the primate base for learning is 
examined in the context of social structure and socio-emotional 
relationship. The axes or dimensions of sociality that exist in all 
primate groups are reviewed in terms of what the young must learn in 
order to survive in the physical environment and become competent 
group members, and the motivation to learn itself is integrated with 
these social emotions and the activities of learning. 
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Chapter 3 reviews the archaeological evidence for early hominids 
and humans in the context of the dimensions of sociality identified 
in Chapter 2 and investigates the relationships between social emo¬ 
tions, social organization and learning in contemporary gathering 
and hunting societies. The activities of learning in these foraging 
societies are examined and are compared with activities of learning 
in other primate societies. 
In Chapter 4 the insights gained from an evolutionary perspective 
on learning are applied to formal education in the United States. 
This chapter is in three major sections. The first section is a 
general overview of some of the changes that have occurred in the 
environment for children's learning between our nomadic foraging past 
and today. In this section the relationship between intellectual 
(cognitive) and emotional systems is explored from the evolutionary 
perspective developed in Chapters 2 and 3, and certain new skills, 
demanded by the modern technological environment, are identified. 
In the second section of Chapter 4 the specific environment for and 
activities of learning found in the majority of public schools in the 
U. S. are examined and compared with the environment for and acti¬ 
vities of learning described in previous chapters. In the final 
section of this chapter, the ideas of representative authors con¬ 
cerning the purposes and processes of education are reviewed in the 
context of an evolutionary perspective. 
The last chapter of this study presents a set of principles 
derived from an evolutionary perspective that may be of use in 
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thinking about and planning for the formal education of children 
in a modern technological society and briefly identifies promising 
directions in children’s education from an evolutionary perspective. 
CHAPTER II 
EVOLUTION AND EMOTION, SOCIAL EXPERIENCE AND LEARNING: 
THE PRIMATE BASE 
Since Darwin's landmark study. The Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals (1872) , evolutionists have known that emotional 
motivators of behavior (i.e. reactions, sensations, responses, expec¬ 
tations, etc.) have been incorporated into the genetic structure of 
many animals, including human beings. 
We may see children, only two or three years old, and 
even those born blind, blushing from shame; and the 
naked scalp of a very young infant reddens from passion. 
Infants scream from pain directly after birth, and all 
their features then assume that same form as during 
subsequent years. These facts alone suffice to show 
that many of our most important expressions have not 
been learnt...(Darwin, 1872 [1965]: 315). 
That emotional responses to stimuli from the environment (or 
absence of expected stimuli) represent adaptations within the species 
rather than simple "stimulus-response" relationships in individuals 
is generally accepted by evolutionists (if not by all psychologists), 
but what these responses are in detail, how powerful they may be in 
affecting our behavior, or how they may interact with individual 
learning are questions that are only beginning to be investigated. 
Piaget did not incorporate emotion into his work to any degree, and 
although Fishbein (1979) postulates a connection between empathy and 
the development of human reciprocal obligation, he does not investi- 
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gate the broad range of human emotional systems and their relationship 
to learning. 
It is generally accepted that in all higher animals there are 
strong internal motivations surrounding reproduction, the perception 
of threat, and the protection of prerogatives or territory. When the 
male stickleback is mating, for example, it will attack any red object- 
no matter what shape or size - apparently because the underside of 
male sticklebacks during mating season becomes red, and the fish is 
protecting its territory from potential rivals when it attacks the 
color red (Tinburgen, 1951). Of course, no one knows what a stickle¬ 
back "feels" when it "sees red," but it is assumed that some motiva¬ 
tional system similar to what humans identify as emotion is at work 
in the fish (Eibl -Eibesfeldt, 1971). In many animals, especially 
mammals and birds, there are also particularly strong internal moti¬ 
vations associated with the care of the young. 
Emotional systems may be rather deeply canalized, for there is 
evidence that many of them are mediated by the 1imbic system of the 
brain - the area of the brain underlying the neo-cortex and including 
the thalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, and the pituitary gland. In Mc- 
Clean’s model (1955) the limbic system represents an evolutionary pro¬ 
cess through which the primitive responses to threat and hierarchy, and 
urges to reproduce, generated in the R-Complex (hind-brain) became ela¬ 
borated into emotional systems. These systems mediated activities that 
contributed to the survival of increasingly complex social animals.* 
*The neocortex, according to McClean, is a more recent addition to 
the brain. 
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...emotional processes have served motivational 
purposes in getting crucial jobs done. What crucial 
jobs? Finding food and water, avoiding predation, 
achieving copulation, caring for the young, training 
the young to cope effectively with the specific re¬ 
quirements of a given environment (Hamburg, 1963: 303). 
But the relationship between innate emotional systems and learning 
is very complex, as Darwin knew. A mosquito needn't learn much in 
order to survive long enough to fulfill its reproductive mission, 
but the young of many species, and particularly the primates, must 
learn a great deal in order to survive and thrive. 
...but it is remarkable that some expressions of emotion 
which are certainly innate, require practice in the 
individual before they are performed in a full and 
perfect manner...(Darwin, 1872 [1963]: 351). 
Few would argue that there are not at least some biologically 
based responses associated with the care of the young in mountain 
gorilla mothers, but there is considerable evidence (e.g. Fossy, 1979, 
1983; Rock, 1978) that in order for gorillas to become competent 
mothers they must learn the specific skills of motherhood. This pro¬ 
cess has been noted in observations of vervet monkeys (Lancaster, 1971) 
and, to a lesser degree, in rhesus macaques (Harlow and Harlow, 1965). 
On the basis of this evidence, it is reasonable to suggest that in 
such cases the emotions involved are somewhat generalized and may 
serve primarily to motivate juvenile females to be interested in 
and close to the offspring of other females, form affective bonds with 
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their own offspring when they become mothers, protect them from harm, 
etc. The evidence indicates that before the activities associated 
with these generalized urgings can be completed in a "full and perfect 
manner," they must become focused by what the monkey or ape learns 
of the rearing of the young from observation, imitation, and practice 
(Lancaster, 1971). 
Learning serves to refine, extend or complete activities that 
are originally motivated by emotional systems. But learning is it¬ 
self motivated by emotion. Young monkeys and apes derive considerable 
pleasure from investigating their environment, from playing and imi¬ 
tating adults (see below), and similar observations have been made 
of human children. Although Piaget did not explore the relationship 
between emotional systems and cognitive development, he acknowledged 
that these affective systems are the "driving force" behind the dev¬ 
elopment of cognitive structures (Modgil, 1974; see Chapter 4). 
Children are motivated internally, emotionally, to seek contact and 
interact with the environment. 
It is interesting to refer this discussion of the relationship 
between emotion and learning to the processes of evolution described 
in the preceding chapter. Two of the three elements of the epigenetic 
system are thus far represented: the behavior of the phenotype (the 
learning of an individual) and the structure of the genotype (the 
emotional systems). Their interaction is complex, but the addition 
of the third element of the epigenetic system to the "loop" formed 
by emotion and learning complicates the relationship even more. 
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Emotional responses are largely cued by events in the environment. 
To use the example of the primate mothers above, the emotions of 
care and concern are released by the presence or absence of the 
young in a given monkey or ape group, by the presence or absence of 
threat, etc. Thus learning, a process mediated itself by emotional 
systems, may extend or complete activities motivated by other emo¬ 
tional systems which may in turn have been called forth by particular 
characteristics of the environment. 
This is, of course, a highly oversimplified description of the 
interrelationship of learning, genetically based emotional systems 
and the environment (particularly with reference to higher primates 
for whom learning makes significant modification of the environment 
possible. Such modified environments may alter the character of cues 
that trigger emotional systems). Nevertheless, it may serve as a 
starting point in the examination of human learning from an evolu¬ 
tionary perspective. 
What is inherited [in higher primates] is ease of learning 
rather than fixed instinctive patterns. The species easily, 
almost inevitably, learns the essential, behaviors for its 
survival. So, although it is true that monkeys learn to be 
social, they are so constructed that under normal circum¬ 
stances this learning always takes place. Similarly human 
beings learn to talk, but they inherit structures that make 
this inevitable, except under the most peculiar circum¬ 
stances (Washburn and Hamburg, 1965: 5-6). 
Part of a monkey's "construction," so to speak, is in emotional 
systems that are associated with successful social living. By the 
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same token, the social environment in which a young monkey grows and 
develops provides the cues for these emotional systems. The responses 
and the environmental cues have developed in conjunction with each 
other in the course of primate evolution. The social environment is 
a large part of the context for learning among all primates,* for 
much of what young primates must learn is determined by their relations 
with other animals in a fairly well-defined social group. 
The remainder of this chapter is an investigation of the relation¬ 
ships between the social environment for learning, the activities of 
learning, and the emotions of sociality that exist in higher primate 
societies. Lancaster's concept of the "axes of sociality" described 
in the previous chapter has been used to organize the discussion of 
the social environment in these groups. 
An effort has been made to describe the complexity of the inter¬ 
actions between these dimensions of social experience, for an appre¬ 
ciation of complexity is essential to an appreciation of primate 
learning. The characteristics of the primate social environment 
allow and encourage certain activities of learning among the young. 
These activities are motivated by emotional systems connected directlv 
with the learning process itself and by deeply rooted socio-emotional 
systems that motivate social behavior generally. The primate social 
environment reflects these socio-emotional systems, but also, in a 
reciprocal relationship, calls them forth. Thus, young primates are 
*The other important element of this context is, of course, the 
physical environment. 
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motivated to learn not only as "active organisms" but as social 
beings. 
Axes of Primate Sociality 
Dominance and dominance hierarchies. Dominance and aggression among 
old world monkeys and apes is related to the availability of resources, 
sexuality, and to protection of the group from predators; and there 
is considerable variation in terms of the importance (measured in the 
amount of time spent in display, aggression, etc., and the intensity 
of these encounters) of these behaviors among different species. 
According to Kummer (1971) the ecological function of dominance is: 
...to clarify the situation when the same action cannot be 
carried out by more than one group member. When a resource 
unit — a fruit-bearing twig or a sleeping-ledge — is so 
small that only one animal can use it, the more dominant 
animal will take it (Kummer, 1971: 58). 
For baboons and gorillas, dominance hierarchies and battles over 
resources and females are fundamental elements of social organization. 
Much of the "attention structure" (Chance and Jolly, 1972 see 
below) of the group is centered around the dominant males in these 
societies. In addition both baboons and gorillas exhibit great sexual 
dimorphism which is correlated with the importance of dominance as an 
axis of social organization (Kummer, 1971; Patterson, 1973). 
Chimpanzees, on the other hand, appear to place less emphasis 
ae a society on male dominance (though it is still an important 
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element of social interaction and of the attention structure). This 
may be because chimpanzee males generally do not play as important a 
role in group defense as do gorilla or baboon males. Patterson (1973) 
has noted correlations of sexual dimorphism, the importance of domin¬ 
ance, and terrestrial dwelling. Arboreal species such as the chim¬ 
panzee* do not exhibit these characteristics to the same degree — 
presumably because the group has less to fear from predators if it 
lives in the trees than on the ground. But these correlations are 
somewhat weak for a wide range of primate species (Lancaster, 1975). 
In recent years our understanding of dominance and the role it 
plays in primate societies has grown more complex as more has been 
learned about how groups of monkeys and apes live in the wild. Devore 
(1965) observed the formation of a "coalition" among the baboons he 
studied in which six individuals joined together to increase their 
collective status. In addition, it has become apparent that an impor¬ 
tant component of an individual's rank in most primate societies is 
its mother's rank (Kawamura, 1958 — see below). Although dominance 
is seen at its most flamboyant and potentially dangerous in males, 
females engage in displays of dominance with one another (e.g. Hall 
and Devore, 1965). It is reasonable to say that all the animals of 
any catarrhine group have a certain status in a hierarchy that is more 
or less flexible depending on the species. It may be that in the 
ground-dwelling species such as baboons and macaques the dominance 
rankings are less open and flexible than they seem to be in more 
arboreal species. 
*Though recent evidence suggests that the chimpanzee is 
as was previously thought (Clutton-Brock, 1977). 
not as arboreal 
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Although the status of a particular animal in a higher primate 
group is usually related to the status of its mother, it is possible 
in most species for a male’s status to rise or fall (to a certain 
degree different for each species) according to his individual 
behavior. Jane van Lawick—Goodall (1971) describes the remarkable 
use of empty kerosene cans by Mike, a young male chimpanzee in the 
group she was observing, to enhance his display and, thus, his status 
in the group. This animal was almost at the bottom of the dominance 
hierarchy, according to van Lawick—Goodall, when one day he decided 
to add something new to his display. 
A group of five adult males, including top-ranking Goliath, 
David Graybeard, and the huge Rodolf, were grooming each 
other. The session had been going on for some twenty 
minutes. Mike was sitting about thirty yards apart from 
them, frequently staring toward the group, occasionally 
idly grooming himself. 
All at once Mike calmly walked over to our tent and 
took hold of an empty kerosene can by the handle. Then he 
picked up a second can and, walking upright, returned to the 
place where he had been sitting. Armed with his two cans 
Mike continued to stare toward the other males. After a 
few minutes he began to rock from side to side. At first 
the movement was almost imperceptible...Gradually he rocked 
more vigorously, his hair slowly began to stand erect, and 
then, softly at first, he started a series of pant-hoots. 
As he called, Mike got to his feet and suddenly he was off, 
charging toward the group of males, hitting the two cans 
ahead of him. The cans, together with Mike's crescendo 
of hooting, made the most appalling racket: no wonder the 
erstwhile peaceful males rushed out of the way (pp. 122-123). 
Utilizing and improving this technique, Mike rose through the domin 
ance hierarchy of the group to the foremost position in a short per¬ 
iod of time. 
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Van Lawick-Goodall explains Mike's use of the cans as "an indi¬ 
cation of superior intelligence," and it is interesting to contem¬ 
plate the role intelligence may play in dominance hierarchies. Appar¬ 
ently, a great deal more than simple brute force is involved in primate 
dominance structures. 
In order for dominance hierarchies to be useful rather than 
destructive to a group of primates they must allow the animals to 
predict the outcome of certain kinds of encounters (Kummer, 1971) so 
that time and energy are not wasted in fighting that could lead to 
injury or death (which in turn could, in some species, leave the group 
unprotected). For this reason most aggression between males and 
males, between females and females, and between males and females is 
"ritualized" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971), full of display and threat, 
and it is rare that all-out battles take place. However the intensity 
and danger of these encounters vary from situation to situation and 
among different species. Newly dominant gorilla males have been ob¬ 
served killing the offspring of the previous dominant silverback 
(Fossey, 1979) . 
But in every species of higher primate, as in many other mammals, 
the males not only contend among themselves but also protect the group 
from predators. Among the open-country baboons it is not uncommon for 
a group of males to interpose themselves between a leopard and the 
rest of the troop, displaying their ferocious canines (Kummer, 1971). 
Arboreal species that must fear predation (not including the chim¬ 
panzee who seems to have only humans to fear — Reynolds and Reynolds, 
1965) often use what Kummer (1971) calls the "patas pattern." 
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They do not face an approaching danger as a group. Instead 
the alerted male climbs into the upper branches of a tree 
from which he scans the area. From this exposed vantage 
point, his size and the white color of his thighs make him 
rather conspicuous. His further behavior in the presence 
of a human observer suggests that his role is not only to 
watch for danger, but also to divert attention from the 
group... As the male engages in such distracting displays, 
the females and juveniles silently remain in their places... 
(Kummer, 1971: 52). 
Dominance is also associated with access to mates and with the 
"attention structure" of the troop (see below). 
The matrifocal unit. For many years the characteristic of primate 
social organization most obvious to researchers was male dominance 
and aggression. Lancaster (1975) indicates that this focus was pro¬ 
bably inevitable given the fact that adult male behavior is usually 
the most conspicuous and "attention getting" behavior in a group 
of primates and that until recently field studies were short term 
and tended to miss some of the more subtle elements of primate social 
organization. Later work (e.g. van Lawick-Goodall, 1971; Koyama, 
1970) has shown that perhaps the most pervasive and enduring elements 
of primate social organization are those that revolve around the 
relationship between mothers and their offspring. 
Twenty years ago the Harlows demonstrated the importance and 
strength of the bonds between rhesus macaque mothers and infants in 
a series of laboratory experiments (Harlow and Harlow, 1965; Lewis 
and Sackett, 1980). Infant macaques were raised in varying degrees 
of isolation: with biological mothers, with surrogate mothers made 
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of cloth, with surrogates of wire, and in bare wire cages without a 
surrogate of any kind. In addition to varying the amount of contact 
between infants and their mothers or various mother surrogates, the 
Harlows varied the amount of exposure these infants had to other infants - 
their age mates. The results of these experiments and others in suc¬ 
ceeding years are summarized by Lewis and Sackett (1980): 
Broadly speaking, the degree to which rearing departs from 
situations in which mothers and peers are freely available 
to the developing rhesus monkey predicts the degree to which 
that monkey will be abnormal or deviant in most behaviors 
as a juvenile and adult. Isolate and wire cage reared ani¬ 
mals are abnormal in all areas of behavior, except for the 
ability to perform on standard monkey learning tests. In 
fact, learning performance does not appear to differ between 
rearing conditions ranging from wild-born to total isolate. 
Thus, early rearing experiences involving social privation 
appear not to influence basic "intellectual abilities." 
However, the deprivation-raised animal's willingness to 
perform on learning tasks is markedly deviant. 
Deprivation of maternal contact [but with adequate ex¬ 
posure to peers] during infancy yields rhesus monkeys that 
show heightened self-orality and fear behaviors, although 
play and aggression are fairly normal, as are sexual and 
maternal behaviors. Thus, peer contact appears to be a 
sufficient condition for development of typical rhesus 
monkey behavior, regardless of the presence or absence of 
a real monkey mother. 
Rearing monkeys with mothers but with no peer contact 
produces animals that shy away from physical contact with 
other monkeys, showing hyperaggression toward others when 
touched but apparently normal sexual and maternal behavior. 
Thus, although the mother may provide sufficient stimulation 
for the development of some normal adult behavior, maternal 
stimulation alone is inadequate to produce fully normal 
behavioral development under laboratory conditions (pp. 116-117). 
Field studies have corroborated the laboratory findings concerning 
both the importance of mother-infant contact and the importance of 
contact with age-mates (see below) in the development of young pri¬ 
mates. In many societies the offspring continue to recognize their 
mothers into adulthood. Sexual relationships between mothers and 
sons are exceedingly rare among higher primate groups for which such 
information has been collected, though father-daughter and brother- 
sister relations are quite common (Itani, 1972). Sade (1965) has 
shown that although the very close and often intense relationship 
between mother and infant changes after weaning, it does not end. 
The importance to the group of the complex of relationships 
that revolve around the matrifocal unit in many primate societies 
has been demonstrated by studies of group movements and "travelling 
arrangements." Kummer (1971) reports that although mountain gorilla 
groups appear to be led by a single silverback male, most other pri¬ 
mate groups are "led jointly by several adults" both male and female 
(p. 63). Lancaster (1975) suggests that the greater stability of 
females as members of most primate groups* probably provides them 
with a more accurate knowledge of the group's range than the males 
(who are usually more mobile between groups) are likely to have. 
Rowell (1969) has offered the hypothesis that the usual traveling 
configuration of baboons, in which adult males occupy positions at 
the head of the moving troop and supposedly make the decisions about 
the direction the troop will take, has been misinteipreted. His 
observations have led him to believe that decisions about where the 
*Chimpanzee females do considerably more traveling from group to 
group than do the females of other primate species. 
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troop should go are most probably made by the older, higher ranking 
females in the group's center. These messages are then relayed 
throughout the group by males (usually those closely related to these 
"indicator" females — brothers or sons). 
Long-term studies of primate societies such as those of the 
Japanese Monkey Center (e.g. Koyama, 1970) indicate that the status 
of individual animals in a group is intimately connected with the 
position of large-scale "matrilinear geneologies" that remain rela¬ 
tively stable for long periods of time, and Lancaster (1975) has ob¬ 
served similar relationships among vervet monkeys. Indeed, in most 
primate societies the offspring of high ranking females tend to be 
more dominant (whether male or female), while the offspring of females 
with lower rank tend to remain at that level (Harlow and Harlow, 1965). 
The relationships between dominance hierarchies and the complex of 
ties, recognitions and attachments surrounding matrifocal units are 
only beginning to be understood, but it is clear that: 
matrifocality is a principle of primate social grouping 
which is different from but just as important as a domin¬ 
ance hierarchy, and in many primate societies these prin¬ 
ciples form crosscutting ties which bind individuals into 
the social group (Lancaster, 1975: 31). 
Male-female relations and roles. In most primate species the bonds 
between adult males and females are strong only during female estrus. 
At that time male and female behavior alters dramatically in every 
species, and among the chimpanzee preferences may even develop between 
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males and females that seem to be reciprocal. Van Lawick-Goodall 
describes two such arrangements between males and females (1971). 
However, these pairings apparently last for the length of the estrus 
cycle only, after which the animals go their separate ways. 
The two major exceptions to this generalization were mentioned 
in Chapter 1 — the gibbon and the hamadryas baboon — and, as noted 
there, these forms of social organization seem to be particular adap¬ 
tations to particular environments. It is interesting to note that 
even though these primates live in groups in which the same males and 
females are bound together for long periods of time, nothing resembling 
reciprocal bonds have developed. The hamadryas baboon male jealously 
guards his harem from intruders, but the hamadryas females have no 
"loyalty" to the male and are quite willing to copulate with any 
available male when in estrus (Kummer, 1971).* 
The specific roles that males and females play in primate 
societies vary according to species and, of course, to the environment 
in which the animals live. The male hamadryas baboon bullies females 
into following along and keeps checking periodically to see that 
they're close behind, while the male chimpanzee pretty much goes his 
own way and moves among permeable groups. Macaque females may band 
together against a male if he has frightened an infant, but hamadryas 
baboon females demonstrate no such behavior. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify certain broad male-female roles that occur m 
*The other exception which should be mentioned here is the as yet 
little understood connections between mothers and their male relations 
all primate societies: (1) females have specialized roles in relation 
to the care and welfare of the young and (2) males have specialized 
roles with respect to group protection from external danger. 
The females of any catarrhine society are the primary parents 
of any infants that are born into the group, and interest in the young 
seems to be generalized throughout the female population of any pri¬ 
mate society. 
...strong maternal behavior has been observed in prepubertal 
female monkeys. Preadolescent females, indeed all females, 
show a deep and pervading interest in newborn infants and a 
compulsive desire to make gentle physical contact with them 
whenever this is possible... Furthermore, preadolescent 
females readily assume adult-type maternal responses to 
infants as soon as the mother permits the infant to be taken 
for brief periods of time (Harlow and Harlow, 1965: 303). 
Although males of all species spend time with infants, play with 
them and demonstrate great interest in them generally, they should 
probably be 
...regarded as generalized fathers: they show affectional 
responses to members of their social group but do not show 
them differentially to their own or to other children. The 
dominant males when such exist in fairly large groups, pro¬ 
tect all members of their social group against aggression 
at the risk of their own lives (Harlow and Harlow, 1965: 
330) . 
In spite of occasional instances in which adult males will adopt 
orphaned infants (often their own siblings — e.g. van Lawick-Goodall, 
(1971) and their willingness to play with infants (e.g. Schaller,1965) 
they apparently form no lasting attachments with the young, and their 
interest in juveniles wanes quickly as the latter reach maturity. 
Dominant males easily become short-tempered with juveniles — parti¬ 
cularly other males — and threaten them off. 
The primary specialized role of males in catarrhine societies is 
group protection. Females will aggressively protect their own off¬ 
spring from not only intruders but from other animals — male and 
female in their own group as well, but the male protectiveness 
seems to be generalized to the entire group. 
Although the care of the young and the protection of the group 
may represent generalized role specializations (if such a phrase is 
not too confusing) in primate societies, there seem to be other roles, 
related to dominance and the matrifocal unit, that are divided in 
some degree (but with different emphases in different species) between 
males and females. In many dominance oriented societies, for example, 
dominant males play what might be called indicator roles (Chance and 
Jolly, 1970). They relay information to every member of the group 
through the attention structure. At the same time, as we have seen, 
dominant females may play similar indicator and information dissemin¬ 
ator roles in primate societies, yet the information is relayed to 
other members of the group through a different network. In some 
species the dominant males play a kind of enforcer role in order to 
maintain social order (Harlow and Harlow, 1965), while in other species 
coalitions of females may at times perform a similar function 
(Lancaster, 1975). 
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Part of the complexity of the learning that young primates must 
do is in the gender roles they acquire as they grow. Although these 
roles appear to be rather undeveloped among most species, with the 
females providing primary parenting and the males providing primary 
group protection, there are some remarkable examples of male-female 
role specializations among chimpanzees (and to a lesser extent among 
baboons) that are of particular interest since they may be examples 
of "precursors" of behaviors which for many years were thought to 
be exclusively human: the use and manufacture of tools and the pro¬ 
curement, distribution and eating of meat. 
It has been known for some time that chimpanzees (and other pri¬ 
mates) use tools in various activities. Male chimps and gorillas, 
and occasionally baboons, pick up sticks to brandish in display and 
often throw sticks and stones at.intruders. Since van Lawick-Goodall 
first observed chimps termiting, the behavior has been observed among 
several populations throughout Africa. Not only do the animals use 
sticks as tools to probe into termite mounds, they modify sticks for 
the purpose as well. In other words, chimpanzees make tools with 
what can only be a future knowledge of their use. 
It is only in recent years that what seem to be gender speciali¬ 
zations have been observed in these activities involving tool use. 
The Boesches (1981) observed such a specialization in connection with 
the cracking of coula and panda nuts by chimpanzees in the Tia National 
Park of the Ivory Coast. These animals use stone or wood hammers and 
anvils to crack open the nuts. The panda nuts are so hard that only 
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stone hammers may be used, and the animals carry these hammers rather 
long distances in order to crack the nuts — further evidence for some 
sort of forethought. Sometimes the coula nuts are cracked in the 
trees — a much more difficult task which requires considerable 
agility. 
The Boesches discovered that two techniques — the cracking of 
panda nuts and the cracking of coula nuts in the trees — were used 
almost exclusively by females. Further evidence for a gender special¬ 
ization in activities connected with tool use has been provided by 
McGrew (1979) who noted that female chimpanzees spend more time ter- 
miting than males do. 
The activity that is engaged in more by males than by females 
(and which is also, but weakly, associated with the use of implements) 
is predatory behavior or hunting. 
For the most part catarrhines are independent foragers for fruit, 
nuts, leaves, and other vegetable material. Many species eat insects 
and eggs, but characteristically, the group moves through its range 
at a leisurely pace, each member pausing to eat whatever it finds 
immediately. The very young cling to their mothers, and the juveniles 
play as they feed. There is usually nothing set aside for another 
time or carried from one place to another (although the carrying of 
food by chimpanzees has been observed — Harding and Teleki, 1981). 
However, since first meat-eating and then hunting by chimpanzees were 
first observed by van Lawick—Goodall in the Gombe National Park in the 
early 1960's these behaviors have been witnessed so often that: 
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Whether we postulate that internal psychological or social 
motivations underlie their predatory proclivities, or 
hypothesize that a vacant niche lacking competitive large 
carnivores (except the occasional leopard) is being filled 
by these omnivorous apes, Gombe chimpanzees emerge as com¬ 
petent, skilled predators whose impact on the local fauna 
is greater than anyone expected (Teleki, 1981: 327). 
Teleki (1974) distinguishes between "opportunistic" predatory 
behavior in which a prey animal is flushed and caught by the chimp 
that comes upon it, and deliberate "searching or stalking activities 
[which] precede the capture" (1974: 50). Van Lawick-Goodall (1971) 
describes what seemed to be a remarkably well-coordinated hunt in 
which several males participated. Strum (1981) has observed "simple" 
and "complex" hunting among baboons in Kenya. 
Simple hunting required active searching and either stalking 
or chasing of the prey. It involved only one baboon pre¬ 
dator, pursuit lasted less than 10 minutes, and the distance 
the predator traveled from the troop was less than 300 m. 
Complex hunting involved more than one predator, the pur¬ 
suit lasted more than 10 minutes and the distance the pre¬ 
dator traveled to contact the prey ranged from 300 to 
1,700 m., although the predator might travel up to 4,000 m. 
during the course of the hunt (Strum, 1981: 259). 
Strum reports that adult males, females and juveniles all captured 
prey during the period of her observation, but that only adult males 
engaged in complex hunting. Teleki reports that "less than 4/ of the 
chimpanzee kills documented in Gombe National Park have been made b\ 
adult females and adolescent males" (1981: 335). 
One of the most remarkable aspects of chimpanzee behavior 
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surrounding the consumption of meat is in the way it is often divided 
within the troop. Other animals approach the adult male or males that 
have made the kill and "beg" a piece of the carcass using a character¬ 
istic open-palm gesture (van Lawick-Goodall, 1965, 1971). Other males, 
females, juveniles and even infants have been observed begging in this 
way — often for long periods of time until rewarded — and van Lawick- 
Goodall has concluded that because "meat is a much liked, much prized 
food item" (1971: 207) it elicits from the whole troop a number of 
behaviors that are radically different from usual subsistence activi¬ 
ties: the hunting, the begging gestures, and what may be considered 
the sharing of food. Strum has observed baboons feeding on a carcass 
they have killed move to one side to allow others access, and she 
interprets this behavior as a kind of sharing (Strum, 1981). 
Whether these gender-specific behaviors surrounding subsistence 
actually represent behaviors which existed in pre-hominid primates 
4,000,000 years ago or not is a question we will never know the answer 
to. But of one thing we may be certain: the learning that the young 
of all primate species do is connected with gender identity in some 
way, and in certain species, notably the chimpanzee, the gender 
specific behaviors that the young must learn are quite complex. 
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The importance of the young and the roles they play. The young of any 
primate group provide an intense focus for all the animals in that 
group. As we have seen, adults and sub-adults, both male and female, 
are drawn to infants and play with them; and there is a particularly 
close and lasting relationship between a mother and her offspring. 
Juvenile females are extraordinarily interested in the young no matter 
whose they are, and this interest is an important component of the 
learning these juveniles must do in order to become competent mothers 
themselves. 
The intense focus upon offspring also provides a context in 
which adolescent males, who will eventually protect the group from 
predators, learn their priorities. In order to facilitate this focus, 
the infants of all species look rather different from adults, and 
ethologists see in these visual cues "releasing mechanisms" that 
elicit particular emotional responses from adults. 
In all mammals the young of the species transmit specific 
signals that release cherishing behavior. These can be 
olfactory, acoustic, or optical, although among primates 
optical infant signals acquire increasing significance. 
Young baboons have black coats up to their sixth month. 
The black coat elicits help and friendly interest from 
the adults. Even old males will take a young baboon to 
clean it and help it if it is attacked. Young vervet 
monkeys also have a coat coloration that distinguishes 
them from adults. Male vervets will even attack men who 
lay hands on a young one with this coat. They will not, 
however, come to the rescue if the conspecific caught 
is a young vervet that has lost its baby coat... 
(Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971: 123). 
This extraordinary interest in the young by adult primates and 
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the length of time this interest lasts is probably related to the 
extended vulnerability of primate infants. Unlike many other mammals 
catarrhine young reach maturity relatively slowly, and it is felt by 
many (e.g. Washburn, 1961b, Harlow and Mears, 1979) that this extended 
maturation period is connected with the amount of learning a young 
monkey or ape must do in order to survive and thrive in both the 
natural environment and in rather complex social situations and to 
be a competent member of the group. In this connection it is reason¬ 
able to conceive of the primary role of the young in all primate socie¬ 
ties as that of the learner. 
The social environment for learning as the "attention structure." 
One way to acquire an understanding of the relationship between the 
learning of the young in a given primate society and the axes of 
sociality that exist and are emphasized in that society is to describe 
the "attention structure" of the group (Chance and Jolly, 1970): Who 
pays attention to whom and why? 
Dominance is one important element of this attention structure in 
all catarrhine societies, but this importance varies according to the 
importance of dominance and dominance hierarchies as principles of 
social organization. In baboons and gorillas, for example, 
The dominant male's behavior... suggests that it is designed 
to demand attention when, for example, by standing motion¬ 
less with legs spread, he indicates his readiness to leave 
a nest area... This fixated attention of subordinate ani¬ 
mals would then also be the mechanism by which the dominant 
male determines the character of group activities (Chance 
and Jolly, 1970: 104). 
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The younger or lower-ranking males are particularly aware of what 
the dominant animals are up to in these societies: where they are 
looking, how they move, etc.; and explanations for this behavior 
tend to emphasize the "adaptiveness" of paying attention to dominant 
males (e.g. Lorenz, 1966; Wilson, 1975). The dominant males of many 
catarrhine species are usually the most fit in that they have the most 
offspring. They also bear primary responsibility for group warning 
and defense. Thus it probably is advantageous for every member of 
the group to pay attention to what the dominant males are doing or 
reacting to. 
However, as we have seen, the most pervasive influences in many 
catarrhine social groupings are the relationships of the matrifocal 
unit, and these relationships form another significant dimension of 
the attention structure in any primate group. Infants watch their 
mothers intently at a very early age and begin to learn almost at once 
(first by observation, later, through play, imitation and investiga¬ 
tion — see below) what is good to eat, what is dangerous, who is safe 
to be around, who is dangerous, who is a reliable playmate, etc. As 
infants develop, more and more of their attention is directed outward, 
to a variety of foci including age mates, subadults, dominant males, 
dominant females and so forth, and it is through the complex connec¬ 
tions rooted in the matrifocal unit that the young first learn about 
their world and what is expected of them in it. 
But the attention structure of any group of primates seems to 
be even more complex than the monitoring of the behavior of dominant 
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males by other animals in the group and the reciprocal attention 
between mothers and their offspring. Kummer (1979) attempts to 
expand the notion of primate social interaction by creating a "heuris¬ 
tic scheme" for understanding 
a society’s qualitatively unique elements, which is the 
relationship between two individuals. What are the marks 
of valuable relationships? How do they benefit their 
members? And what can an individual do in order to 
establish and maintain them? (Kummer, 1979: 381-382) 
In order to get at some of these questions, Kummer maintains that the 
value of a social partner may be ascertained in terms of his or her 
qualities (i.e. sex and age, strength, skill, experience); tendencies 
(i.e. tendencies to perform acts that increase or decrease another 
animal's success such as fighting against or with another animal, 
etc.); and availability (i.e. external factors that influence the 
interaction such as distance separating two animals or the presence 
of third parties) (Kummer, 1979: 384). 
Kummer's scheme suggests that while the attention structure of 
all primate groups is probably connected in some way to both the 
behavior of dominant males and the matrifocal unit, it is also likely 
that one individual animal may pay attention to another for a variety 
of reasons. Further, primate social interaction includes a kind of 
"feeling out" process in which the behavior of one animal is monitored 
by another and certain assessments are made in the course of daily 
encounters, whether or not these encounters take place speciticall> 
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in the context of the dominance structure or the matrifocal relations. 
Perhaps this accounts for the chimpanzee preference pairings observed 
by van Lawick-Goodall or for the dramatic rise by the young chimpanzee 
Mike in the dominance hierarchy. Indeed, the environment for learning 
in all primate societies is exceedingly complex and demands a great 
deal from the young. Social competence among primates is much more 
than reacting to stimuli or simply following a genetic behavior pro¬ 
gram, and learning is the key to this competence. 
Activities of Primate Learning 
The young of all primate species learn by doing — by observing, 
trying out their observations (imitating) and testing their abilities 
in play, and by purposefully investigating the environment in which 
they live (including the qualities, tendencies, and availability of 
other members of the group) . 
Shortly after the "reflex period" (Harlow and Harlow, 1965) of 
infant development catarrhine young begin to look around, first obser¬ 
ving their mothers' behavior, then widening their attention to include 
other members of the group. They begin to focus more intently on 
environmental events and the activities of others. 
But do catarrhines actually learn from this observation? "This 
question has been asked repeatedly since the beginning of animal ex¬ 
perimentation in learning. The answer is that some primates unques¬ 
tionably can learn by observing the actions of others" (Butler, 1965: 
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489). Butler offers an account of an experiment by Darby and Riopelle 
(1959) : 
In their experiment, one rhesus monkey observed another 
perform a long series of two-choice visual discrimination 
problems for food reward. The demonstrator would make a 
choice, the discriminanda would be returned to their 
original positions, and then the observer would be per¬ 
mitted to respond. The performance of the observer im¬ 
proved as the experiment progressed. What is exciting 
about this experiment is that the observer obtained more 
information about a particular problem when the demon¬ 
strator made an incorrect response than when it responded 
correctly. This means that the observing monkey was not 
merely repeating the acts of the demonstrator; it was 
responding to the consequences of the demonstrator's 
behavior (Butler, 1965: 490-491). 
Thus it appears that not only are catarrhines able to learn from 
observing the behavior of other animals, they are able to interpret 
mistakes and inconsistencies in the behavior of others and modify 
their own behavior accordingly. Surely outside the laboratory these 
rhesus macaques would use this impressive capacity in the kinds of 
social monitoring and assessment processes identified by Kummer. 
But the primate infant is far from a passive observer. From 
birth it has engaged in a strong physical and emotional interaction 
with its mother, and as it grows it extends this interaction to other 
members of the group and to the external environment. Young primates 
play ("Indeed, when [young chimpanzees] are two or three years old it 
often seems that they do little else" — van Lawick-Goodall, 1971: 
163). And it is through the activities of play that the young of 
all catarrhine species learn much of what they need to know in order 
to survive and be competent group members. 
Play repertoires of young monkeys contain the origins of 
most adult social behaviors. Patterns of social grooming 
dominance, aggression, and sex are clearly evident in 
monkey play activity, though not at competent adult levels. 
At first clumsy to the point of being ridiculous, months 
and even years of practice at play produce the adult 
product (Harlow and Mears, 1979: 145-146). 
Field evidence (e.g. van Lawick-Goodall, 1965, 1971) corroborates 
the laboratory observations that play includes segments of adult 
behavior that the young are trying out. Play is an endless 
repetition of roughhouse, mounting, aggressive display, etc. in all 
possible combinations. 
Imitation of adults is an important aspect of the play of young 
primates, yet given the complexities of social behavior and learning 
outlined by Kummer (1979) and Butler (1965) it is reasonable to 
assume that young animals develop individualized connections with 
one another as well. 
[during aggressive play encounters] firm peer relations 
establishing dominance position and social status develop. 
Many status relations are formed, primarily among the 
young males and among the young females. Once formed, the\ 
tend to remain stable for long periods of time (Harlow 
and Harlow, 1965: 313-314). 
We have seen that when young macaques are deprived of age-mate 
contact they develop abnormal behavior patterns, and given the 
importance of the relationships that are established and the learning 
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that is done through play this is hardly surprising. Though broadly 
cast in terms of the large-scale axes of social organization — repro¬ 
duction, dominance, and the matrifocal unit — the specific relation¬ 
ships between individual animals appear to be formed in age-mate 
play. Infants and juveniles imitate adults, but, as we have seen, 
they are also capable of learning by not imitating adults. 
Monkey and ape curiosity is legendary, and young primates exhibit 
investigative behavior (Butler, 1965) in common with the young of many 
other mammals. 
Both curiosity-exploration and play behaviors develop along 
similar maturational courses. Social play progressively 
burgeons after curiosity is well under way, and each 
successive stage of curiosity is followed by new social 
developments (Harlow and Mears, 1979: 146). 
The young primate is impelled to seek contact with the external envir¬ 
onment and with other animals in the group. 
Novel sensory input has reinforcement properties for pri¬ 
mates. Although extremely novel stimuli tend to be aversive, 
moderately novel stimuli tend to be aversive, moderately 
novel stimuli have the properties of positive reinforcers 
and can condition higher frequencies of those operant be¬ 
haviors which commonly precede the novel inputs. Explora¬ 
tion, play and innovative behavior all tend to produce 
novel experiences and hence are reinforced by the novelty 
effects. If a primate repeats activity X without variance, 
it produces less novelty and hence will receive fewer 
novelty reinforcers than if it repeats the activity with 
variance. Thus, novelty reinforces animals for varying 
old patterns, for innovating, for creating new patterns. 
Young primates tend to be influenced by novelty reinforcers 
more frequently than older animals because older individuals 
have already explored most of the possibilities in their 
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environments and (due to familiarization) ceased to find 
most things novel. It is the young who still have the 
greatest amount of untapped novelty to explore and who are 
more frequently reinforced by novelty reinforcers for 
further exploration, play, and creativity. Hence, younger 
primates tend to generate a higher frequency of the explor¬ 
ative and playful behavior which may lead to useful innova¬ 
tions. The habits of exploration, play and creativity tend 
to be extinguished and replaced by less variable routines 
by middle or late adulthood (Baldwin and Baldwin, 1979: 103). 
Here are echoes of Piaget and Bateson. A young primate is an active 
organism which is internally motivated to interact with its environ¬ 
ment. Another way of describing the gradual reduction of the explor¬ 
ative and playful behavior might be the "gradual achievement of equii- 
brium." 
It is important to note that nothing that could be construed as 
instruction occurs in the primate learning process. To be sure, pri¬ 
mate mothers seem to control the timing of weaning and the introduc¬ 
tion of solid food to their offspring (Butler, 1965), but in no other 
way do adult primates directly influence the learning of the young. 
Indirectly, however, the environment of learning is influenced greatly 
by adult behavior. In order for primate young to spend as much time 
playing as they do it is important for them to have a safe and secure 
environment. Constant threat either from without the group or from 
animals within will make the kind of abandoned interaction that char¬ 
acterizes primate play impossible (Harlow and Mears, 1979). It is 
only in the context of the protection and security afforded by the 
adults of the group that the young can afford to do the learning they 
must do. 
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The studies made at the Japanese Monkey Center (Itani, 1958; 
Kawamura, 1959; Kawai, 1965; and Koyama, 1970) have been summarized 
by Lancaster (1975) and offer a remarkable example of how learning may 
occur in a primate society and how information is disseminated along 
the axes of social organization through the attention structure of 
the group. 
In 1952 sweet potatoes were thrown on a sandy beach on Koshima 
Island for the Macaques living there, and although the monkeys were 
quite fond of the potatoes they were bothered by the gritty beach sand 
which wore down their teeth and tried to brush it off. Approximately 
a year after the potatoes first appeared, a juvenile female (one and 
one-half years old) acquired the habit of washing her potatoes in the 
sea before eating-them. 
The observers traced the spread of this innovation carefully. 
The first animal to learn the potato-washing trait from the juvenile 
who invented it was her mother. 
This is understandable, since practically the only adult 
animal to be interested in the behavior of a one-and-one- 
half-year old female is her mother. Once the mother had 
adopted the behavior then it passed naturally to all her 
subsequent offspring. An older sibling of the juvenile 
innovator learned the behavior several years later, pro 
bably from watching her young sister. The main line of 
diffusion of sweet potato washing was through the play 
group of the young female. Some of her playmates were 
interested in her behavior, observed the potato washing, 
and began doing it themselves. Their mothers and older 
siblings then learned it and so the habit passed through 
other geneologies. Eventually, through the attention 
structures of the matrifocal units and the play group all 
but 13 monkeys (mostly adult males) had learned to was^ 
potatoes. The adult males were not resistant to the idea 
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on principle; they simply did not notice what was going 
on in a way that would affect their behavior (Lancaster, 
1975: 45-46). 
In this example we see how adaptive flexibility may be enhanced 
through learning. The gritty sand on the potatoes not only tasted 
bad but wore down the animals' teeth and would have reduced their 
ability to include certain foods in their diet eventually. We also 
see an example of the essential conservatism of the attention struc¬ 
ture . 
Several years later piles of wheat were dumped on the same beach 
and the same female discovered a way to remove the sand from it by 
sluicing handfuls of the wheat into pools of water. The wheat floated, 
the sand sank, and the animal could eat by simply skimming the wheat 
off the water. Interestingly enough, this innovation, too, took 
years to spread through the group. After three years only 14 out of 
58 animals had learned the new technique. 
By contrast when wheat was given to another monkey group in which 
the only animal familiar with the new food (and also familiar with 
the sluicing technique) was a dominant male, the innovation spread 
through the group — from the male to other dominant males, then to 
the dominant females, and from there, through the dominance and matn- 
focal pathways to all the animals in the group — within a matter of 
hours (Kawai, 1965) . 
The "monkey genius" of Koshima Island at no time engaged her 
peers or her mother in ways that might be interpreted as demonstration 
behavior. She did not show them how it was done, and at all times the 
responsibility for learning the new technique and modifying their own 
behavior accordingly rested solely with the observers. 
In this example we may catch a glimpse of the complexity of 
primate social organization and interaction and its relationship to 
learning. The importance of dominance and dominance hierarchies to 
the attention structure of this group of macaques is demonstrated by 
the rapid diffusion of the wheat sluicing technique through a group 
of monkeys when the innovator was a dominant male. At the same time 
what might be called the conservative nature of dominance hierarchies 
may be supposed from the inability of the adult males in the original 
group to pay attention to the sweet potato washing technique even 
though it was advantageous for them to do so. One might assume that 
a general lack of.interest on the part of all adults would be related 
to the replacement of novelty with established routines noted by the 
Baldwins (or the gradual acquisition of equilibrium noted by Piaget). 
But on the basis of the Koshima example dominance hierarchies seem to 
affect the attention structure of the group in such a way that informa¬ 
tion can flow through them only in one direction — from top to bottom. 
Only very gradually does information work its way from bottom to top. 
As we have seen, such an arrangement is probably adaptive for 
the group, and it is important to note that there was no resistence 
to the new technique on the part of the adult males who did not pick 
it up. In other words they did not view the new technique as a threat 
to their status and attempt to suppress it. Indeed, there is a good 
deal of evidence to suggest that dominance hierarchies are somewhat 
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self-contained dimensions of primate social interactions which may 
remain relatively unaffected by interactions in other dimensions. 
Lancaster (1975) reports that when coalitions of female vervet monkeys 
chase males away from infants, the males' status in the dominance hier¬ 
archy is unchanged. Van Lawick-Goodall reports that the presence of 
meat in a chimpanzee group may temporarily alter the workings of the 
dominance structure, but the status of individual animals is unaffec¬ 
ted by these events. 
The other great dimension of primate social organization is the 
matrifocal unit, and in the Koshima example we see that although the 
interactions in this dimension seem to be more subtle and long-term, 
they are no less important. The stability of the matrifocal geneo- 
logies in macaque groups suggests another sort of conservatism at work 
in these societies; however, it appears that matrifocal relations 
admit a two-way flow of information. The mother of the juvenile female 
innovator was the first animal to learn the new technique, and all her 
subsequent offspring learned to wash potatoes, presumably from watching 
her. The next animal to learn the potato washing technique was the 
innovator's older sister (a member of the same matrifocal unit) who 
apparently learned the technique by observing her younger sister and/ 
or her mother. It is interesting to note that through the matrifocal 
pathways information could flow from a younger animal to an animal 
of a different generation and to an older animal of the same genera¬ 
tion — even if the elder sister didn't learn the technique for some 
time. 
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The importance of the play group as a context of learning in 
this macaque society is demonstrated by the fact that it was the 
"main line of diffusion of sweet potato washing." Although a play 
group in any primate society exists in the larger context of dominance 
structures and the relations surrounding the matrifocal unit, it 
appears from this example that the young form individual attachments 
and connections. Not all the young animals in the juvenile innova¬ 
tor's play group learned the new technique at the same time, and it 
is reasonable to surmise that this was because some paid more atten¬ 
tion to her behavior than did others. No doubt this differential 
attention was affected by the status of the innovator in terms of 
her matrifocal geneology, but it is also likely that she formed a 
complex of attachments in her play group that affected the attention 
structure, mediated the flow of .information throughout the group, 
and could only be anlayzed in terms of Rummer's heuristic scheme 
(if at all) . 
The juvenile female who invented the sweet potato washing 
technique demonstrated the capacity of primates to explore, to 
investigate their environment and to learn from and regularize 
their experiences. It is significant that the same animal invented 
wheat sluicing, for the repetition of this inventiveness indicates 
an individual capacity different, in some way, from that of her 
peers. It is also significant that the innovator of Koshima Island 
was a juvenile, for as we have seen young animals are more inclined 
to experiment and explore than are older animals. 
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The learning of all primates occurs within a broad context that 
incorporates several axes of social organization, or dimensions of 
collective experience. The relative significance of any one of these 
dimensions varies from species to species, and perhaps from group to 
group within species, but all are present in every catarrhine society 
and all have a certain impact on the social context in which the young 
learn. Without doubt, the social interactions of higher primates are 
very complex, as Kummer suggests, and most likely represent not only 
the blending or intersection of the broad axes of social organization 
but the learning of individuals as well. The net effect of this inter¬ 
action is a dynamic balance that is analogous to (1) the stochastic 
nature of the processes of evolution themselves, (2) the balance the 
subsistence group develops with the natural environment, and (3) the 
learning process of individuals as described by Piaget. 
It is important to note that the potato washing innovation, 
discovered by a young monkey, spread thoughout the group very slowly. 
After ten years there were still animals in the group that had not 
learned the "new" technique. This suggests that the exploratory 
behavior of the young takes place in a context that is fundamentally 
conservative. Matrifocal geneologies change very slowly (Koyama, 
1970), and although dominance hierarchies may respond more readily 
to individual initiative they too are conservative in that information 
flows through them only in one direction. Thus, while the young may 
present the group at large with a great many innovations come upon 
in play or exploration, these are incorporated into the larger group 
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only over time. It is as though elements of the structures of social 
organization and attention had evolved to ensure that before a be¬ 
havioral innovation becomes generalized throughout the group it is 
well tested. 
Primate Learning and the Emotions of Sociality 
Early in this chapter it was stated that learning, and indeed 
all activity, is mediated to some extent and in some manner by 
genetically based emotional systems, and the overview of the social 
context of primate learning presented above makes the identification 
of at least three of these emotional systems possible: 
a. the emotions surrounding attachment, belonging, 
security. 
b. the emotions surrounding status, place, prerogative. 
c. the emotions surrounding the processes and activities 
of learning. 
It is important to note here that although these systems of response, 
expectation, and motivation may be separated for the purpose of analy¬ 
sis, they function all together, interacting according to the situation 
presented by the social and/or physical environment. 
Attachment, belonging, security. Washburn and DeVore (1961a) have 
described the adaptive value of baboon group living in terms of sur¬ 
vival : 
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When the troop moves out on the daily round, all 
members must move with it, or be deserted. We have 
seen sick and wounded animals making great effort to 
keep up with the troop, and finally falling behind. 
At least three of these were killed, and the only 
protection for a baboon is to stay with the troop, 
no matter how injured or sick. In wild primates 
injuries are common...and animals which are so sick 
that they can be spotted by a relatively distant 
human observer are frequent. For a wild primate, 
a fatal sickness is one which separates it from the 
troop (quoted in Hamburg, 1968: 253-254). 
But though the feelings that bind animals to the troop and 
encourage them to keep up and seek security among one another 
certainly have a fundamental connection with survival, they are 
elaborated far beyond simple fear and are apparent in the binding 
processes that go on in all axes of primate social organization. 
The emotional systems connected with dominance and aggression 
play a fundamental role in status and place relations, of course, 
but they also provide motivations toward the protection of the group 
and thus serve as binding agents. Both males and females rush to 
protect the young, and as noted above the appearance of the infant 
is a releasing mechanism (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1971) which elicits highly 
emotional responses in the adults in certain situations. Van Lawick- 
Goodall reports that on several occasions when the chimpanzee troop 
she was observing began to hunt young baboons actively, male baboons 
appeared immediately and engaged in aggressive (though bloodless) 
tussles with the male chimps. Most of the time, the young baboon 
escaped in the confusion (1971). These impulses to protect the 
young offer the great benefit of security. This security, as we 
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have seen, is vital to learning in that it allows the young the 
unencumbered time to experiment, to practice, refine, and to explore 
the world around them. 
Most prominent in terms of the emotional systems of attachment, 
belonging and security are the relations that surround the matrifocal 
unit. We have noted the intensely emotional state of infants separa¬ 
ted from their mothers, the corresponding distress of mothers separa¬ 
ted from their offspring, and the powerful draw that infants have for 
all females of any primate group. These emotional attachments are 
extended, to some degree, throughout matrifocal units or geneologies 
as the infant grows, but an emotional attachment to the mother remains 
well into adulthood. The evidence suggests that when coalitions 
among primates form they develop in terms of matrifocal relationships 
and no doubt these "agreements" are motivated by emotional attachments 
formed in the context of the matrifocal unit. 
The emotions surrounding reproduction draw males and females to 
one another during female estrus, and no doubt this attraction re¬ 
flects deeply canalized responses to internal and visual cues. The 
estrus swelling of the female in all primate species is a releasing 
mechanism that sets off powerful responses in even infant males (van 
Lawick-Goodall, 1971), and within the context of these overwhelming 
motivations other, individual attachments may develop. Even though 
these individual attachments appear to exist only in the context of 
female estrus, they, like the more fundamental attachments of repro 
duction, bind animals together into a social group. 
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Finally, emotional connections are probably developed, in some 
sense, among individuals in a group. There are no neutral observers 
in a primate society; every animal, whether infant, dominant female 
or adolescent male is a participant and is familiar with every other 
animal in the group. Though the emotional connections between indi¬ 
viduals formed in play or in grooming may be considered variations 
on more imperative (i.e. more deeply canalized)emotional systems 
that bind animals together, there is little doubt that they too con¬ 
tribute to the group’s coherence and identity and thus to the learning 
of the young. 
Status, place prerogative. Coexistant with, and to a certain extent 
conflicting with, the emotions that bind group members together 
and motivate them to seek and provide security and stability, are the 
emotions that urge individuals to define their status or place in the 
group and protect their individual prerogatives. These emotions are 
most obvious in primate males, but within the matrifocal dimension of 
social experience females are also engaged in determining status and 
are quite capable of protecting their prerogatives. 
The emotions associated with dominance and aggression, with the 
protection of infants by females against members of the same group, 
and with aggressive play in the young are certainly connected with 
fear, apprehension, etc. But as we have seen these activities are 
mitigated by emotional systems that draw animals together. Thus, 
though these more aggressive emotional systems 
tend to drive indivi- 
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duals apart, they are actualized in a complex environment of large- 
scale biological and social imperatives within which there is a 
certain amount of flexibility. 
It is hard to know what the chimpanzee Mike was feeling as he 
watched the dominant males grooming one another, but van Lawick- 
Goodall makes it clear that this was an intensely emotional moment 
for him. What is interesting is that he didn't have to actually 
fight the other males in his drive to define his personal status in 
the group. The commotion he made with the kerosene cans was enough 
to establish a kind of individuality which (perhaps in complex ways) 
became translated into status. It is equally hard to know what the 
dominant males felt as Mike made his charge with the cans. Surely 
they were afraid, but it is likely that this was not the same sort 
of fear they would have felt at the approach of a leopard. 
The intricacies of dominance and status relationships among 
primates of different species are little known, but if the intricacies 
are not known it is probably safe to say that every animal in a primate 
group is engaged to some extent in the determination, that is to say 
the learning, of individual place in relationship to other animals. 
That this is neither a consistent nor a linear determination is clear 
from the variety of behaviors exhibited by dominant animals toward 
other animals in the group. Mountain gorilla silverbacks and chimpan¬ 
zees are remarkably tolerant of infants, but less tolerant of juven 
iles. Van Lawick-Goodall noted that once the kerosene can banging 
Mike had secured his position as dominant male of the chimpanzee 
73 
troop he frequently shared meat with other animals. 
Much of the early learning of place and prerogative is done in 
the play group in which the young try out adult behaviors oriented to 
the determination of status. While it is difficult to assess the ways 
in which this aggressive play is mediated by emotional responses, there 
is no doubt that play is an activity that is highly charged with feel¬ 
ings. 
The emotions of learning. We have seen that the young of all primate 
groups appear to be motivated internally to seek experience in their 
world. They establish contact with the environment early on through 
observation and later, through investigative behavior and play, explore 
the physical and social worlds available to them. The Baldwins suggest 
that novelty itself provides a satisfying reinforcement that urges the 
young on to further exploration and manipulation of the environment, 
and Harlow and Mears (1979) provide ample evidence of the persistence 
of curiosity displayed by all young primates. It seems that the learn¬ 
ing activities of observation, imitation, exploration and, above all, 
play, are pleasurable for young primates. This is a key evolutionary 
process, for the pleasurable activities of play, etc. help the young 
primate learn what is necessary to survive and thrive in both the 
physical and social environments. 
Young primates are learning as they grow and mature how to be 
members of the group they are a part of. Being a member of the group 
implies sexuality, protection and care of the young, involvement in 
status structures, and many more intricate relationships that are 
set in the context of reproduction, dominance, and the matrifocal 
unit. The various activities of learning — observation, exploration, 
and play — have developed as integral elements of this process. 
Youngsters are bound to the group through innate emotional responses 
and through the activities they engage in as they mature. What is 
learned and the ways in which it is learned are not separable in 
primate societies, for the time and energy spent in play and explor¬ 
ation result in group-living adults who competently fulfill the 
roles that contribute to the survival and well-being of the group 
and to their individual status and well-being as well. Indeed, 
young primates "learn effortlessly" how to function in the physical 
environment and in their societies at least in part because such 
learning is mediated by emotional systems that ensure a secure 
environment for the activities of learning, help create the social 
context in which these activities take place, and reward these learn¬ 
ing activities directly. 
CHAPTER III 
THE HUMAN ADAPTATION 
Sometime during the Pliocene, between four and five million 
years ago, new primates began to emerge in East Africa. These 
were ground-dwelling animals, and from the fossil evidence of their 
pelvic, knee and foot structures it is known that they walked 
upright (Johanson and Edey, 1981). Although there is considerable 
debate as to how many species of hominid existed between five and 
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one million years ago in Africa there is evidence that by two 
million years ago these hominids (probably early representatives of 
Homo) were using stone tools to butcher large animals and were 
transporting tool materials and prey animals to home bases (Isaac, 
1978 [1979]; Bunn, 1981). At least some of these bipedal creatures 
were the ancestors of modern humans, and as they evolved they 
developed, from the primate axes of sociality, distinctly human 
social adaptations common to our species. 
The difficulties involved in identifying the antiquity of 
particular elements of the human adaptation have been noted in 
Chapter I, and a considerable amount of theoretical modeling is 
*The major disagreement today is between the Leakeys (e.g. R. 
Leakey and R. Lewin, 1977) and Donald Johanson (D. Johanson and 
M. Edey, 1981). The Leakeys believe that there were two species of 
Australopithecus (A. africanus and A. robustus) and that Homo did 
not rise from the Australopithecine line but diverged from a common 
ancestor at about the same time. Johanson, on the other hand, makes 
a good case for a third and earlier species, A. afarensis, from 
which both later Australopithecines and Homo emerged. 
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unavoidable in this area. The fossil remains and stone artifacts 
of Homo habilis will not tell us directly how the young of our homin- 
id and early human ancestors learned or what they had to learn in 
any detail. Nevertheless, enough evidence exists to make some good 
guesses about the general social framework and lifestyle of our 
Pr°genitors, particularly when this evidence is located in the 
intersection of the primate axes of sociality and the known social 
relations of contemporary nomadic foraging societies (Dahlberg, 
1981; Tanner, 1981). And if we know something about the way these 
hominids lived and were organized socially we will be able to know 
something about the learning of the young, for it is safe to assume 
that becoming competent in social relations as a member of a group 
was at least as important a function of learning for young group¬ 
living hominids as it is for contemporary social primates. 
The first section of this chapter examines the archaeological 
evidence for hominids that lived from 4,000,000 to 1,000,000 years 
ago and speculates as to the changes that took place in the old 
primate axes of sociality that are implied by this evidence. Par¬ 
ticular attention is paid to the feedback relationship between the 
development of increasingly complex social relations and the evolution 
of the human brain. 
The second section of this chapter locates these probable 
human adaptations in the context of life in contemporary nomadic for¬ 
aging societies. The learning of children in these societies is 
reviewed in terms of the three socio—emotional systems identified 
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in the previous chapter, for, like the social primates described 
in Chapter II, gatherers and hunters (1) are tied to one another in 
many ways and have strong feelings about their attachment to others, 
(2) are at the same time motivated to seek status and individual 
identity in the context of the group, and (3) learn effortlessly, 
largely through the activities of observation, play, and inves¬ 
tigation. In this context we may be able to understand something 
of the purposes and activities of learning among our Pleistocene 
ancestors and thus begin to sketch in some characteristics of the 
human learning adaptation. 
What is Human? 
Bipedalism, as the oldest certain characteristic of hominids 
based on archaeological evidence, provided the framework for the 
interpretation of data and the development of models of "humaniza¬ 
tion" for many years. In the early 1960's Washburn proposed that 
with bipedalism came a series of developments that reinforced one 
another and contributed to the rapid (in terms of geological time) 
evolution of human sociality and the human brain. According to 
Washburn bipedalism gave primates a freedom of activity for the hands 
that had not existed before. The freeing of the hands enabled these 
new primates to carry food and the young from place to place with 
greater ease and substantially increased the animals' range 
(e.g. Washburn, 1960 [1979]; Washburn and Devore, 1961b). At the 
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same time a bipedal posture severely restricted the size of the 
birth canal and forced the birth of the young at increasingly early 
stages of development, which made them dependent for longer periods 
of time. This period of protracted infancy made it possible for the 
offspring of bipedal primates to remain in the role of learner 
(see Chapter 2) for a greater period of time (Washburn, 1960[1979]). 
The freeing of the hands also led to increased competence in the use 
and manufacture of tools, and tool use and manufacture has been 
considered a "prime mover" in human evolution. 
Complex and technical society evolved from the sporadic 
tool-using of an ape, through the simple pebble tools 
of the man-ape and the complex toolmaking traditions of 
ancient men to the hugely complicated culture of modern 
man. Each behavioral stage was both the cause and effect 
of biological change in bones and brain (Washburn, 
1960 [1979]: 21). 
According to this line of reasoning, an outgrowth of tool use 
and increasingly sophisticated technology was the development of 
large game hunting as an important subsistence technique. Hunting 
has itself been viewed as a prime mover of human evolution. 
...the master behavior pattern of the human species. It 
is the organizing activity which integrated the morpho- 
ological, physiological, genetic, and intellectual 
aspects of the individual human organisms and of the 
population who compose our single species. Hunting is a 
way of life, not simply a "subsistence technique" which 
importantly involves commitments, correlates, and con¬ 
sequences spanning the entire biobehavioral continuum of 
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the individual and of the entire species of which he 
is a member (Laughlin, 1968: 304). 
It has even been hypothesized that through big game hunting, and 
the cooperation and organization it implies, human language de¬ 
veloped (Hewes, 1973). 
Until recently the evolution of human beings from bipedal 
primates was viewed traditionally in terms of this more or less 
direct progression from bipedalism to tool use and hunting, to a 
sexual division of labor, complex social organization and language. 
However, more recent thought tends to discredit bipedalism as 
the prime mover of humanization (and, indeed, the notion of prime 
movers in general). For example, there seems to be a rather long 
hiatus between the appearance of fully bipedal primates and the 
appearance of the enlarged cranium associated with early humans. 
(Johanson, 1981). Even the existence of tools does not guarantee 
what we would call "humanness." Wynn (1981) applies a Piagetian 
framework to the interpretation of Oldowan stone tools (1.7 million 
years ago) and suggests that 
the evolution of a uniquely hominid intelligence had not 
occurred by Oldowan times. However, the basic hominid 
morphology of upright posture had been achieved by 3.5 
million years ago. This suggests that selection for a 
complex organizing intelligence was not part of the 
original hominid adaptation. For several million years 
hominids did not rely on some special cleverness not 
possessed by other hominoids. The adaptation may have 
involved diet or locomotion or some other behavioral and 
morphological complex, but selection for intelligence 
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appears not to have been significant until after the 
Oldowan (Wynn, 1981: 539-540). 
Although Wynn's assessment of hominid intelligence on the 
basis of Oldowan tools is highly speculative there is another problem 
with the bipedal—complex hypothesis as the model for human evo¬ 
lution. All the behaviors that have been associated with this 
advantage (i.e. tool use and manufacture, hunting, prodding and 
"gathering" with tools, the carrying of food and the young, etc.) 
have been observed in contemporary higher primates, as noted in 
Chapter 2% 
Buried in much of the controversy that has resulted from the 
rejection of the bipedal hypothesis and the attendant proliferation 
of humanization models (e.g. Tanner, 1981; Lovejoy, 1981; Blumen- 
burg, in press) is the question of what makes a hominid a human. 
All agree that there are qualitative differences between what humans 
do and what other primates do, but if these differences are not 
represented by bipedalism in the fossil record, or by tool use and 
manufacture per se, what are the qualitative differences? Even 
with a time machine, evolution being what it is, we would never 
be able to witness the moment when our ancestors "crossed the line" 
from hominid to human, but it is important to get a sense of some 
of the characteristics that many agree are uniquely human and when 
they may have appeared in the human line. 
One of the most significant developments in the emergence 
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of humans was the remarkable increase in brain size and complexity 
of function from Australopithecus (or early Homo) to Homo erectus, 
who appeared about 1,000,000 years ago. There are a variety of 
explanations for this dramatic development. For example, several 
prime mover theories have been advanced. Falk (1980) examines five 
of these proposed catalysts (i.e. warfare, language, tools and 
labor, hunting, and heat stress) and concludes that there is no 
evidence to justify the identification of any single variable that 
contributed more than other variables to the development of the 
advanced hominid brain. 
The emergence of the human brain is, indeed, located in a 
matrix of social and biological developments. Tool manufacture, 
for example, improves dramatically within the relatively short 
period of time of the brain's development, and there is evidence 
(see below) that early humans lived in cooperative social groups that 
utilized a home base. Lovejoy (1981) locates the origin of these 
social characteristics in a distant hominid past and asserts that 
the emergence of bipedalism was related to the development of bonds 
between males and females which encouraged the males to hunt or 
gather food and bring it back to females who remained with their 
young near a home base. 
...both advanced material culture and the Pleistocene 
acceleration in brain development are sequelae to an 
already established hominid character system, which in¬ 
cluded intensified parenting and social relationships, 
monagamous pair bonding, specialized sexual-reproductive 
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behavior, and bipedality. It implies that the nuclear 
family and human sexual behavior may have their ultimate 
origin long before the dawn of the Pleistocene (Lovejoy, 
1981: 348). 
Although many disagree with the time frame proposed by 
Lovejoy, his association of bipedality with home bases and the 
sexual division of labor, and, particularly, with his identification 
of males as the primary foragers in the hominid past (e.g. Tanner, 
1981; Zihlman, 1981), most paleontologists would agree that when¬ 
ever they occurred the complex social relationships Lovejoy des¬ 
cribes are distinctly human and represent significant departures 
from earlier primate social behavior. Blumenburg (in press) does 
not believe that these social adaptations caused the development 
of the advanced hominid brain but asserts that once certain fun¬ 
damental genetic mutations that affected the brain occurred they were 
subject to selection pressures from the complex of activities already 
present in hominid societies. No doubt after the mutation or 
series of mutations postulated by Blumenburg the bipedal social 
hominids living on the East African savannahs were profoundly 
affected by the feedback relationship between brain capacity and 
complexity and social complexity. The young of these early humans 
were capable of learning more and more — and there was more and 
more for them to learn. 
We saw during the last 2.3 million years of hominid 
evolution almost a tripling in brain size, most of which 
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can be attributed to the massive growth of the neocortex. 
This growth, however, was not equivalent in all regions 
of the brain; rather it was disproportionately greater 
in the regions which mediate the psychological functions 
identified as "social competency" (Fishbein, 1979- 
207-208). 
The Food-Sharing Hypothesis 
As noted above, Lovejoy locates the origin of the loss of 
female estrus, monagamous pair bonding, the utilization of home 
bases and the sexual division of labor in a time frame of four 
to five million years ago. But there is no material evidence for 
this assertion, and many disagree with his model. Tanner, for 
example (1981) believes that the sexual division of labor, while 
associated with sexual selection and the bonding of males and 
females, is a much more recent phenomenon in human evolution and 
was connected with female gathering and selection of males for 
sociability rather than the supposed restrictions of childrearing 
and the male foraging proposed by Lovejoy. 
Although we may never know with any certainty when the dis¬ 
tinctly human social adaptation emerged, or how, it is important 
to see that it was cooperative in nature and was characterized by 
reciprocal arrangements. Isaac (1978) proposes a model for such 
arrangements based on evidence from several sites around koobi 
Fora (East Africa) and maintains that the size and quantity of 
the animal remains at these sites found in conjunction with hommid 
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bones and tools (earliest site: 1.7 million years ago) indicate that 
the hominids who lived at that time had a diet that contained 
considerably more meat than is common in the diet of other primates. 
In addition, cutmarks on the Koobi Fora animal bones (Bunn, 1981) 
indicate that the hominids that camped at these sites used tools 
to butcher the animals they ate—animals as large as a hippopatamus. 
Although Isaac thinks it unlikely that hominids hunted animals as 
large as hippopotami, he offers evidence from other sites which 
suggests that "the earliest meat-eaters might have obtained the 
flesh of animals weighing up to 30 kilograms by deliberate hunting" 
* 
(1978: 122). There are so many animal remains at some of these 
sites that the only possible conclusion, according to Isaac, is 
that prey animals were carried to the site by the hominids for 
consumption there. According to Isaac these data suggest that (1) 
proto-human hominids utilized a home base at least as early as 
1.7 million years ago, and (2) it is likely that, in the context of 
meat-eating (and perhaps hunting) and the utilization of home bases, 
a division of labor in hominid subsistence patterns had emerged 
by this time. 
Zihlman (1981) disputes this conclusion and insists that evidence 
*In an exhaustive examination of the data for hominid hunting. Bin 
ford (1983) concludes that there is no certain evidence that 
hominids hunted at all before the appearance ol Homo erectus. 
However, in view of the data on chimpanzee and baboon hunting 
(see Chapter II) and the high concentration of animal remains in 
some sites investigated by Isaac it seems unlikely that early humans 
did no hunting whatsoever. 
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of increased meat consumption, the transport of food and tools from 
one location to another, and the utilization of home bases does not 
prove the existence of a division of labor by sex — at least not 
in the modern human sense. She emphasizes the "male bias" of not 
only the interpreters of archaeological data but of the archaeo¬ 
logical data itself and proposes a model of humanization which, like 
Tanner’s, emphasizes the importance of female gathering in the 
development of human beings. Digging sticks or slings for carrying 
food or children have not survived in the fossil record, after all, 
and there is certainly no way to tell from a stone tool whether its 
user was male or female. 
This is undeniably true, but in a sense this line of reasoning 
obscures the most important point about becoming human. What is 
significant about the division of labor and the utilization of 
home bases is the cooperative relationship implied, not the specific 
identifications of males with hunting or females with gathering 
(or either of these food-getting processes as prime movers in 
human evolution). The association of a home base with a sexual 
division of labor is probably more significant in terms of the safe 
environment provided for dependent young than it is in terms of 
gender-specific subsistence tasks. Indeed, the Griffins (1981) 
have shown that while Agta women hunt quite capably, the society 
maintains a division of labor which is grounded not in subsistence 
but in child care. 
Isaac himself is aware of the male bias of the fossil evidence 
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and attempts to build a model of human evolution in which the elements 
of hunting, gathering, the division of labor, and the utilization of 
home bases interact in a feedback relationship with the use of equip¬ 
ment and tools and the sharing of food. 
If we compare the food-sharing explanation with ... 
alternative explanations we see that in fact food¬ 
sharing incorporates many aspects of each of the 
others. It will also be seen that in the food-sharing 
model the isolated elements are treated as being in¬ 
tegral parts of a complex, flexible system (1978: 123). 
The key words here, especially for an investigation of the 
human learning adaptation, are "sharing," "complex," and "flexible." 
The hominids of 2,000,000 years ago were apparently already living 
in groups that utilized home bases, they carried tools and tool 
materials from one place to another and, possibly, they had divided 
subsistence and childrearing tasks in ways that made the group as a 
whole more efficient and cohesive. These were significant elements 
of the social environment in which the young grew and learned, and 
the complexity generated by such social relationships required 
increasingly more learning. It is probable that the principles ol 
reciprocity, attachment, and gender identity in the acquisition of 
particular skills and knowledge have been central to human learning 
for at least 2,000,000 years. 
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New Social Relationships 
How did the changes that marked the emergence of humans affect 
the axes of sociality that no doubt existed in pre-hominid primate 
groups in East Africa? If we may assume that dominance, matrifocal- 
ity, rudimentary specializations of activity by sex (including tool 
use and predatory behavior), and a significant focus on the young) 
characterized the primates of East Africa before the development 
of the hominids, what might have happened to these dimensions of 
sociality as non-human primates evolved into hominids and hom¬ 
inids evolved into humans? 
Dominance and dominance hierarchies. It is likely that the char¬ 
acter of dominance began to change towards less emphasis on rigid 
hierarchy with the evolution of distinctly hominid characteristics. 
The fundamental component of this "contextualization" of dominance 
was the attachment of the male to a mother and her offspring to 
form the human family as the primary unit of social life. In 
some imprecise period of time during the Pleistocene (or, if Love- 
joy is right, the Pliocene) a veritable cascade of inter-connected 
characteristics associated with this unique primate adaptation 
evolved. The sexual division of labor, food sharing, mutual 
reciprocity, the loss of female estrus — all imply the gradual 
development of a kind of partnership between adult males and 
females that extanded beyond the urgencies of reproduction 
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(Lancaster, 1975). 
One of the most profound effects of the evolution of the human 
family on the learning of the young was no doubt a reordering and 
complication of the attention structure within the group. As noted 
in the previous chapter, the dominant males in all primate so¬ 
cieties are major foci for the attention of other animals in the 
group. But in a society that consisted of a number of family 
units the attention of the young would tend to be focused not on 
single males, dominant in the group, but on fathers and mothers 
in the family unit or even on a wider array of adults in the 
society (e.g. Turnbull, 1961). One implication of this shift in 
the focus of the attention structure of the group, given the char¬ 
acteristics of information flow postulated for the Japanese 
macaque society described in Chapter 2 is that a more flexible, 
more responsive attention structure evolved in which animals 
paid attention to and were interested in the behavior of an 
increasingly wider range of individuals. 
Male-female relations and roles. In some ways the most dramatic 
changes in the social interactions of the rapidly evolving hotninds 
that lived from 2,000,000 to 1,000,000 years ago took place in 
the context of male-female relations. The loss of female estrus 
suggests that what might have been earlier primate tendencies 
towards pair bonding and specialization of areas of activity 
(see Goodall, 1971) were extended into a totally new system of 
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social organization. For the first time in primate history deep 
and reciprocal bonds developed between adult males and females, 
and the loss of estrus has been interpreted as evidence for selection 
tor this bonding (e.g. Ullock and Wagner, 1980; van den Berghe, 
1979, 1980). In this interpretation sex became such an important 
component of the bond that females with longer and/or more 
fiequent periods of sexual receptivity and males who were more 
sociable with females during and beyond these periods of recep¬ 
tivity (Tanner, 1981; Zihlman, 1981) were more successful reproducing 
than animals without these traits. The overwhelming drives sur¬ 
rounding reproduction in other primates (absent when females are 
not in estrus) became generalized human behavior, contributing 
not only to the survival of the species but to the binding of 
individuals together as husband/father-wife/mother. 
The sexual division of labor that evolved in the context of 
the bonds between males and females formed a subsistence strategy 
new to primates and engendered increasingly elaborate systems of 
reciprocity. We have seen that in some ways there are role special¬ 
izations of males and females in every catarrhine society and that 
in some (notably the chimpanzee) there is definite specialization 
of activity with regard to subsistence. But perhaps as many as 
2,000,000 years ago this role specialization became the central 
theme of hominid subsistence. 
Certainly the complexities of the development of the human 
division of labor will forever be unknown, but it is reasonable to 
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suggest that in the course of its development some kind of relation¬ 
ship evolved between the extension and refinement of the special¬ 
izations of roles identified with gender and increased opportunity 
for sharing, cooperation and reciprocity. It is most likely in 
this way that the separation of roles by sex in hominid societies — 
which may appear to run counter to the great integrating processes 
that brought about the development of the human family — actually 
brought animals closer together and thus contributed to the emergence 
of the family as a social as well as a subsistence unit. 
The young. With the appearance of the family structure among early 
humans the importance of the young in the society probably acquired 
new dimensions. Reciprocal attachments were formed between fathers 
and their offspring, attachments-which may have contributed, in 
turn, to the enhanced survival of the young insofar as they increased 
their access to food and extended the security within which the 
young could learn. It is likely that in the context of these 
attachments the young became shared foci of attention for males 
and females, and this shared focus contributed to the bonds between 
husband and wife. In addition, increased focus of attention on 
the young may have enabled early human groups to gradually become 
more receptive towards (that is, "aware of' in terms of the 
attention structure) useful innovations pioneered by the young in 
play and exploration. 
No doubt the learner role of the young, a common feature of all 
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primate societies, became increasingly important, even crucial, 
to the survival and well being of the young in these early human 
societies. As mentioned above, these infants were born at in¬ 
creasingly early stages of development and were thus more vulner¬ 
able for a longer period of time than the young of pre-hominid 
primates had been. It is likely that the family structure 
provided the greater security needed for these neonates to mature 
* 
properly, provided the attention structure through which the young 
learned, and also provided models of increasingly complex behavior, 
skill, and interaction to be learned. 
But if the social environment for learning changed, there is no 
reason to believe that this learning took place in activities other 
than those engaged in by other primate young. Indeed, it is reason¬ 
able to suggest that these activities of primate learning — ob¬ 
servation, imitation, exploration, play — were intensilied in the 
course of hominid evolution, for they could be engaged in for increas¬ 
ingly longer stretches of immaturity and were stimulated by an 
increasingly complex variety of social interactions represented 
by the sexual division of labor, sharing tool and equipment 
manufacture and use, and reciprocal obligation. With the evo¬ 
lution of language and complex linguistic and material cultures 
the early human societies no doubt became more efficient at sui- 
*For example, with the extension of the male focus on offspring ^ 
that must have evolved as the family unit evolved came the male s 
protection of his own offspring — something done only by temales 
in other primate groups. 
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vival through the great advantage of more sophisticated communication 
systems. In addition, language and culture further reinforced 
the bonds among group members and, at some point, enabled the 
emergence of the idea of the group (see Chapter 5). No doubt the 
young of Homo erectus 500,000 years ago "learned effortlessly" 
how to become competent members of the group they were part of 
in the environment they lived in; however, by this time the com¬ 
plexity of the human learning process, if not the effort of it, 
was astounding. 
Learning in Contemporary Foraging Societies 
It is possible to make speculations about life in Pleistocene 
foraging societies because the gathering and hunting way of life 
has persisted into modern times in many parts of the world. 
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of life in nomadic foraging 
societies (at least for observers from modern technological societies) 
it what might be called its "wholeness," its fully integrated 
nature. 
Every activity, from tool manufacture to healing, is connected 
with every other activity. Life in a foraging society is a great 
circle of relationships in a dynamic equilibrium with the physical 
environment, and wherever the student enters this circle, balances, 
obligations, connections, expectations and symbols stretch 
around in either direction. It is probable that early human so- 
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ci^ties existed in this seme state of integration, and although 
contemporary gatherers and hunters are no doubt very different 
from Pleistocene early humans, the kinds of relationships that are 
necessary for survival and social well being in such societies 
are likely to be similar, as Shostak (1981) indicates, no matter 
what time period they exist in. 
One important characteristic of the hunting and gathering way 
of life is that it exists in an intimate and immediate connection 
with the natural environment for all life processes. All food, 
all clothing, all tools, all shelter are drawn from materials that 
are available in the local environment. Changes in the seasons, 
the weather, in the patterns of animal migration or water avail¬ 
ability intimately affect the life of a foraging group, and the 
movements and cycles of the Australian aboriginies, the !Kung, 
the Eskimo or the Mbuti Pygmies are inextricably woven into the 
cycles of the desert, the arctic, the rainforest. 
In every environment in which gathering and hunting societies 
exist, a stable pattern of relationship between the size of the 
subsistence group and availability of resources has developed, 
and although there is a considerable amount of variation in the 
size of any particular group at any particular time, an upper 
limit on the size of the group is imposed by the physical environ¬ 
ment . 
In nomadic foraging societies, the basic cooperative and 
co-residential unit is the band (Damas, 1969; Lee and Devore, 
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1968). Bands typically consist of groups of 25 to 50 people made 
up of related families that live and travel together. There is 
some evidence that the average size of subsistence groups in 
paleolithic times fell within this range as well (e.g. Birdsell, 
1968). But it is important to note that the "average range" of 
25 to 50 members of a band in no way implies a static band pop¬ 
ulation. The size of these subsistence groups fluctuates constantly. 
Ihere is, in all foraging societies, a pattern of coming together 
and breaking apart that is intimately connected with the cycles of 
the physical environment and the availability of resources. The 
!Kung break into average sized bands throughout the wet season and 
come together gradually into substantially larger groups around 
major water holes during the dry months (Lee and Devore, 1976; 
Lee, 1979). The Netsilik Eskimo, form caribou-hunting and salmon¬ 
fishing groups of 25 to 50 individuals for most of the year then 
come together in groups that may number 150 or more for breathing- 
hole sealing in the deep winter (Balikci, 1970). 
But the fluctuations of the physical environment are inter¬ 
twined with social and cultural needs in the lives of hunter- 
gatherers. For one group of Mbuti — those who hunt primarily 
with bow and arrow — the honey season in the rainforest is a 
time of coming together; while for the Mbuti who hunt with nets the 
honey season is an occasion for the fragmentation of groups that 
have been together for much of the year (Turnbull, 1968). Diffeiing 
"meanings" for the same environmental fluctuation indicate that 
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these movements apart and together are important social as well 
as subsistence activities. When the smaller groups come together 
around a waterhole or on a winter ice floe, old relationships are 
renewed and new ones are begun. Marriages are contracted and rel¬ 
atives are revisited. It is a time for celebration and healing. 
These social activities have developed as they have in association 
with the physical environment, but the Mbuti example suggests that 
the relationship between environmental fluctuation and patterns of 
fission and concentration is not a linear one. Activities of 
tremendous importance to the people of these groups have developed 
in consort with variations in the external environment, not strictly 
because of them. 
Another consequence of living in a direct connection with 
the physical environment for all life processes and materials 
is that there is no question about the value of one's activity. 
Making an arrow, digging out a root, telling a story, etc. all 
have an "absolute meaning" because they are intimately connected 
with individual and group survival and well being. This dimension 
of life in a gathering and hunting band is hard for people from 
a modern technological society to grapple with; we are separated 
in many ways from the physical environment. But it forms the 
"background," so to speak, of all learning in nomadic foraging 
societies and no doubt formed the same background in human societies 
from their emergence in the Pleistocene. 
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The Social Context of Learning: Attachment and Belonging 
The family,_the band, and kinship. At the center of any foraging 
band is the family. Polygyny is common to all hunting and 
gathering societies — though its frequency is generally low and 
its importance in a particular society is connected with both 
environmental and cultural variables. The most common unit in a 
gathering and hunting society is the nuclear family that shares a 
shelter. This group usually consists of a couple and their small 
children. 
From the moment of birth, infants in gathering and hunting 
societies spend almost all their time in direct physical contact 
with their mothers. Whether babies are carried in the amaut of 
the Inuit or the kaross of the I.Kung, they ride in warmth and safety, 
always close to the breast. Even toddlers are frequently carried 
by their mothers until they are weaned to make way for a new sibling, 
and this intense and long-term contact engenders deep and lasting 
bonds between mothers and their children, both male and female. 
So strong is this bond that weaning is usually a most difficult 
time for children in nomadic foraging societies (Shostak, 1981; 
Briggs, 1970; Goodale, 1971). The bonds between mothers and their 
children have an important effect on the visiting patterns of 
people in foraging bands, and mothers may wield a considerable 
amount of influence over both sons and daughters — even into 
adulthood (Goodale, 1971—see below). 
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The mothers in all foraging societies have the primary re¬ 
sponsibility for infant and young child care and early socialization, 
but the fathers take great interest in the welfare of their children 
and spend a lot of time playing with them — especially when they 
are very young. 
!Kung fathers — indulgent, affectionate, and devoted — 
also form very intense mutual attachments with their 
children... Fathers, like mothers, are not viewed as 
figures of awesome authority, and their relationships 
with their children are intimate, nurturant, and 
physically close (Shostak, 1981: 45). 
In all nomadic foraging societies the bonds between children 
of both sexes and their fathers are strong and deep (Briggs, 1970; 
Turnbull, 1961; Meggitt, 1962; Schebesta, 1927). Nevertheless, 
at a certain age range, somewhat different in every society, young 
girls begin to spend less time with their fathers than they do 
with their mothers and, conversely, young boys begin to spend 
more time with their fathers. 
Until his young son or daughter reached the age of five 
or six, the behavior of a father was identical toward 
them. When a newborn infant was in the mother's 
amautaq [carrying sling] the father played fondly with 
it, holding its arms and caressing its cheeks while 
gently talking and teasing the infant with the hope of 
provoking a smile. Sometimes the father would hold the 
baby himself. After the age of three or four body 
contact gradually diminished, while the playful rela¬ 
tionship involving slight teasing continued. The father 
made some of the toys his children played with, such as 
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ice toys or spinning toys of bone. 
After the age of four or five the father-son re¬ 
lationship grew more intense. The boy watched his father 
at work, patiently and silently, observing each gesture 
(Balikci, 1970: 104-105). 
The attachments formed by children to their parents last a 
lifetime. Daughters often express a longing to be with their 
mothers (e.g. Meggitt, 1962), sons and daughters provide for 
elderly parents that are unable to hunt or gather for themselves 
(e.g. Turnbull, 1961), and a young married couple may reside for 
a time with the wife's parents' band in order to ease the separ¬ 
ation (Meggitt, 1962). Often attachments are then formed between 
the son-in-law and father of the bride and her other male kin, and 
the couple continues to reside in the wife's band long after the 
"bride price" has been paid (Lee, 1979). 
The band is made up of several of these smaller family units 
that camp, hunt, and gather together. But the entire band — 
and many individuals in other bands — are "family" in a real way. 
Almost all social relationships in foraging societies are founded 
upon blood or marriage ties, and where these ties do not exist 
kin-like ties are created (see below). Thus a fundamental 
characteristic of the environment for learning in gathering and 
hunting societies is that children are always among their relations. 
In this regard it is interesting to note that most foraging groups 
call themselves simply "The People." 
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This closeness, this deep current of relationship and connec¬ 
tion with virtually every person in the world of the society and 
the physical proximity to them on a day-to-day basis describes an 
interdependence that is difficult for people in a modern industrial 
society to grasp. Among the Mardudjara aboriginies of the 
Western Australia desert 
[Kinship] gives people a strong sense of security and 
well being that stems from their envelopment within a 
universe of kin, with all of whom some feeling of mutual 
obligation and responsibility ideally exists... I have 
never heard Mardudjara express resentment or frustration 
at the restrictions that their kinship system places 
on them. Instead, people talk with satisfaction about 
the good feelings that come from being surrounded by 
so many others who are "one family" and "one people" 
with them (Tonkinson, 1978: 45). 
Kin relations, closeness,and the security they bring are 
fundamental to learning in gathering and hunting societies, but 
it is important to see this context of closeness not so much as 
a rigid dimension of social control (as it is often conceived to 
be in Western society) but as an all-pervading dimension which, 
like the relationship gathering and hunting peoples have with the 
external environment, provides a framework for social life. 
...the !Kung are dependent for their living on belonging 
to a band. They must belong; they can live no other way 
They are also extremely dependent emotionally on the 
sense of belonging and companionship. Separation and 
lonliness are unendurable to them. I believe their want 
ing to belong and be near is actually visible in the way 
families cluster together in an encampment and in the 
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way they sit huddled together, often touching someone, 
shoulder against shoulder, ankle across ankle. Security 
and comfort for them lie in their belonging to their 
group, free from the threat of rejection and hostility 
(Marshall, 1976: 350). 
Since everyone within an ill-defined perimeter is one of The 
People, it is possible for any individual to feel comfortable and, 
in fact, belong in several different bands, and although there is 
usually a stable core of individuals that characterize a particular 
band, there is a great deal of shifting in the population of 
particular bands in the course of a year. It is, for example, not 
uncommon for a dispute between individuals or families in a band 
to be resolved by a separation of the parties involved (see below). 
At the same time there is a great deal of visiting among kin in 
different bands, and the composition of a foraging band changes 
from month to month. It is important to note that this movement 
from one group to another and one set of intimate associations 
to others equally or almost equally intimate is an expected and 
normal aspect of social interaction. 
The implications for the socialization of children in this 
context of closeness are profound. In the sense that all the 
individuals in the group are related through either blood or marriage 
all the adults in the group are, to some extent, mothers and fathers, 
grandmothers, grandfathers, brothers and sisters. Among the 
Mbu t i 
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a sleepy midday camp can become filled in a minute with 
shouts and yells and tearful protestations as a baby, 
crawling around this warm, friendly world, gets into a 
bed of hot ashes, or a column of army ants. In a moment 
he will be surrounded by angry adults and given a 
sound slapping, then carried unceremoniously back to the 
safety of a hut. It does not matter much which hut, 
because as far as the child is concerned all adults are 
his parents or grandparents... He knows his real mother 
and father, of course, and has a special affection for 
them and they for him, but from an early age he learns 
that he is the child of them all, for they are all 
children of the forest (Turnbull, 1961: 127-128). 
A further implication for the learning of the young described 
by Tonkinson will be investigated at length below, but it deserves 
mention here. 
The Mardudjara, realistically, do not expect children, 
especially small ones, to conform to the kinship system. 
Children's lives in the desert are remarkably free from 
restraints and very little pressure is put on them in 
their socialization. But they are born into a world of 
kinship statuses; they hear kind terms in constant use; 
and as soon as they are considered capable of assimi¬ 
lating knowledge, they are taught the should and should-nots 
of behavior towards various kin. They see the system in 
action and thus learn both the ideal and actual patterning 
of social relationships as part of growing up . They 
absorb the system effortlessly, learning the primacy 
of kin category as a behavioral guide... Having learned 
the system, children begin conforming to it in early 
adolescence without any specific directives from their 
elders (Tonkinson, 1978: 45). 
Children and the context of closeness. One of the more striking 
similarities among all gathering and hunting societies is that they 
are all what Tonkinson (1978) calls "child centered." In every 
foraging society the children provide "the emotional focus of the 
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household" (Helm, 1961) but are often expected to provide little 
or nothing in the way of food-getting or even help for parents or 
other adults until well into adolescence. Among the !Kung, the 
Australian aboriginies, the Mbuti, the Malaya Semang, and others, 
males are not expected to begin hunting on a regular basis and 
producing consistently until they are married and have begun their 
own families. This is not to say that adolescent males never hunt 
or do not contribute to the welfare of the group, but only that 
they are not expected to do so by the adult members of the band. 
Females in these societies begin their productive lives earlier 
inasmuch as they are generally quite a bit younger than males at 
marriage. 
The coming of children, even more than marriage, signifies 
full adulthood in nomadic foraging societies (e.g. Shostak, 1981; 
Helm, 1961) , and this is true whether or not there are specific 
ceremonies in the culture to mark the arrival of an individual boy 
or girl at a particular age or state. 
the marital bond was of course further strengthened by 
the presence of offspring. Like all other Eskimo 
tribes, the Netsilik were extremely devoted to their 
children. Family life or better, adulthood, acquired 
a deeper meaning only in reference to procreation 
(Balikci, 1970: 104). 
In all gathering and hunting societies the adults are des¬ 
cribed by ethnographers as "indulgent" with children. Children 
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always "get their way." Meggitt says of the Walbiri of Central 
Australia: 
Until they are initiated, boys are indulged by their 
fathers to an extent rarely observed in our own society. 
Only on two occasions did I see a man strike a young 
son (Meggitt, 1962: 116). 
The central position of children in all foraging societies is, 
as with all other characteristics of the foraging way of life, in¬ 
extricably connected with the closeness of all the people in the 
society to one another and with the direct connection to the ex¬ 
ternal environment. In an evolutionary sense, the children born to 
an extended family represent that family's "wealth." Thus, al¬ 
though the children do not usually become responsible for the 
food-getting of the society until well after they have the physical 
capacity to do so, they are of central importance in the society 
and serve to unite other members of the group. 
In sum, the presence of children, whether natural or 
adopted, united parents closely and further strengthened 
the marital bond. The children were never separated 
from their parents for any length of time. They grew 
up in close association with the adult world, free to 
observe and imitate their parents. They became con¬ 
scious of the respective roles of each parent early, 
as adult activities were easily visible and there was 
nothing hidden in the igloo (Balikci, 1971: 108). 
Similarily, Briggs notes the importance of a little girl in an 
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Utku Eskimo family. "Indeed, in some respects Saarak was more 
important than her father. She was the lodestone not only of her 
household but of her whole kin group" (Briggs, 1970: 107-108). 
A related role of children in gathering and hunting societies 
is what Helm calls "agents of informal social control." Because 
children in these societies are generally unrestrained and rarely 
coerced or disciplined, they usually feel free to spread gossip and 
tell tales without regard for the possible consequences. The 
children’s power 
stems from the fact that they are, par excellence, 
seekers and disseminators of information in general and 
of titillating gossip in particular, and the possibility 
of being gossiped about is, for a Slavey, often an 
effective inhibitory sanction. Of all members of the 
community, the children circulate most actively and freely 
and therefore are often among the first to pick up any 
sort of news. They are quick to communicate to one 
another and to adults, friends and parents. They do 
not exercise the caution toward gossip or expression 
of opinion that the adults do; indeed, they are avid 
to pass it on (Helm, 1961: 112). 
Not only are the children in nomadic foraging societies 
brought into a social environment that is characterized by 
intense family and kinship ties that create a pervading context 
of closeness, they contribute, by their very presence, to that 
closeness and to the identity of the group. They are not super¬ 
fluous to social relations but significant and active social 
Husbands and wives are bound more closely through operators. 
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their children, and entire kin groups may be more closely united 
in their interest in and concern for the children that are born 
to them. 
Other ties that bind. The development of reciprocal obligation and 
food sharing marked an important event in human evolution. Cooper¬ 
ation enabled humans to seek larger and larger prey, and regularized 
patterns of sharing and reciprocity guaranteed that all in the 
group would eat whenever food was available to any. Cooperation 
between males and females insured excellent infant care while 
different kinds of food were being procured and enabled the family 
group to accomplish more than one thing at a time. These qualities 
helped to make the early human of 2,000,000 to 1,000,000 years 
ago a most efficient and flexible creature. 
The reciprocal obligations that derive from the sexual division 
of labor in gathering and hunting societies are vital to the survival 
of not only the core family but the group as a whole. In all of 
these societies the balances between the efforts of males and 
females are crucial, but these balances are rarely one-to-one. 
For example, in all but the foraging societies of the far north 
where plant food is of no consequence in subsistence, gatheit-d 
food accounts for 60% - 80% of the average daily diet (Lee and 
Devore, 1968; Lee, 1979). However, the people of these societies 
*Among the !Kung "there are few divorces after the birth of the 
first child" (Shostak, 1981: 182). 
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seem to be fonder of meat than of vegetable foods. The !Kung 
speak of being "meat hungry" when the hunting has been bad, no 
matter what vegetable foods may be available (Shostak, 1981). 
Meat is shared among the whole group while plant foods are usually 
eaten by only the immediate family. The women have the greater 
responsibility for child care, the men often have greater re¬ 
sponsibility for the ceremonial life of the band. Even among the 
Eskimos and Athapaskan and Algonkian Indians of the Canadian north, 
where women do not contribute to the food supply through gathering 
(although they are often engaged in certain aspects of hunting 
or fishing) reciprocal balances have developed. Women in Eskimo 
societies sew all the clothing and cook all the food. In addition 
they, like women in all gathering and hunting societies, have 
primary responsibility for child care. Men in Eskimo societies 
hunt and, like the men of many other nomadic foraging societies have 
primary responsibility for ceremonial activities. 
In a later section we will explore the subtleties of balance 
in the sexual division of labor in hunter-gatherer societies, but 
the point to be made here is that the relations of reciprocity 
between husband and wife lie at the heart of any foraging band s 
subsistence success. Marriage is a relationship of economic 
interdependence as well as reproductive necessity or social con¬ 
vention. If a couple find that they can't get along they usually 
separate — especially if there are no children. Divorce, particular¬ 
ly in first marriages, is rather common in these societies (e.g. 
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Shostak, 1981; Evans, 1937) and even if kin urge couples to stay 
together, separations based on irreconcilable differences are not 
condemned. Meggitt writes of the Walbiri: 
In this society the sexual division of labour is clear¬ 
ly marked. The men hunt game, the women gather vegetable 
foods and the smaller forms of wild life. The women 
also prepare most of the food, collect firewood, carry 
water, and care for the young children. The people 
assert that, in repsect of these activities, each spouse 
has a claim on the other's services, both on his ( or 
her) own behalf and on behalf of their children. If 
either fails to honour the obligation, the other is 
entitled to penalize the offender (Meggitt, 1962: 92). 
Reciprocity is, of course, extended to all kin relations in 
foraging societies. Although the particular kinds of helping and 
sharing that are expected among kin vary from group to group, each 
gathering and hunting society has developed these reciprocal 
relationships to an elaborate degree. Among the Australians, 
particular kin have special duties during initiation ceremonies, 
and it is expected that these offices will be reciprocated at a 
future time (Meggitt, 1962; Tonkinson, 1978). In all foraging so¬ 
cieties the meat of large animals is distributed along lines of 
kinship (though there are often other sharing relationships in the 
group as well). In addition, the alliances formed by marriage are 
usually managed by kin. 
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...the Gidjingali [Australian aboriginies] had a clear 
notion of reciprocity in marriage. I have referred to 
this as niece-exchange," by which I mean that a 
bestowal placed the reciever under an obligation to 
return in kind (Hiatt, 1968: 174). 
Among the Mbuti sister-exchange" marriages are considered the 
best kind. 
Under this system when a boy chooses a wife he becomes 
obliged to find a "sister" — actually any girl relative — 
to offer in exchange to his bride's family for one of 
their bachelor sons. This can be quite a chore, as it 
may be difficult to find a "sister" who is willing to 
marry the youth his in-laws have in mind as a groom, 
and whom the groom himself will also like (Turnbull, 
1961: 121). 
All foraging societies have generally well defined conventions 
that govern the division of meat after a successful hunt. As noted 
above, these distribution conventions are usually related to kin 
connections, but there are also, as in the case of the Eskimo, meat 
sharing partnerships that do not follow kin lines. 
Independent of kinship ties and the obvious need to 
establish collaborative alignment in subsistence 
acquisition, Netsilik society developed numerous 
patterned dyadic relationship which bound individual in 
pairs and constituted an intricate network of re¬ 
ciprocal ties. ...The internal organization of the 
winter sealing camp is reflected by the seal-meat sharing 
pattern, rigidly maintained at that season. 
Seal-meat distribution during the dark season de¬ 
pended on an interlocking set of sharing partnerships 
involving precise and inflexible rules... 
Sharing partners felt closely attached to each other, 
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conscious of the vital necessity in the dark winter 
months to live, hunt and share communally. And although 
the equitable distribution of the food supply among 
camp fellows constituted the rationale for the partnerships, 
these also had a social aspect evidence in the particular 
naming pattern which stabilized friendship alignment and 
strengthened social cohesion throughout the camp 
(Balikci, 1970: 133, 135-136). 
The !Kung hunter's kill belongs to the owner of the arrow that 
slays the animal, regardless of who shoots it. Arrows are given 
as gifts — women often own them — and the owner of the arrow 
divides the meat among others. 
A hunter chooses which arrow he will use. The owner 
of the arrow — who ipso facto owns the animal — may 
therefore be the hunter himself, who has chosen to use 
an arrow he made or one that was given him, or he may 
be a person who lent the arrow to the hunter. ...A 
man asking another to accompany him might say, "Come and 
help me get a buck," or "Old Gau lent me an arrow and 
asked me to hunt for him. You come too." 
...There is much giving and lending of arrows. 
The society seems to want to extinguish in every way 
possible the concept of the meat belonging to the 
hunter (Marshall, 1976: 359). 
In this context it is interesting to note that often the success¬ 
ful hunter receives the least choice portion of meat (Tonkinson, 
1978; Balikci, 1970), and this convention further diffuses the 
advantages of ownership. No matter what an individual hunter s 
skill, the vagaries of stalking game, the factors of luck, being 
in the right place at the right time, and so on, "there is an 
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unstated conviction that everything evens out in the long run" 
(Tonkinson, 1978: 37). 
The cooperation ensured by husband-wife reciprocity, kinship, 
and meat distribution conventions is enhanced in many other ways 
in gathering and hunting societies. In many groups there are 
formalized, kin-like relationships between unrelated or distinctly 
related individuals, such as the joking, song, and wife-swapping 
relationships among the Eskimo (Briggs, 1970; Balikci, 1970; 
Mowat, 1951; Damas, 1969), act to further extend the social bonds 
of reciprocity and ensure cooperation among a wider group. In 
some societies these relationships may be rather formalized, while 
in others they are informal, but all certainly arise from the same 
desire to cement relations and encourage cooperation. The ITCung, 
for example, give gifts regularly., and according to Marshall 
(1976) there are only two rules for gift-giving: (1) another gift 
must be returned at a later date, and (2) it must be of equal value. 
There is no time limit for reciprocating — indeed there seems to 
be a preference for "long-term reciprocity" (Tonkinson, 1978: 
49) — but everyone knows who gave what to whom when, who is re¬ 
sponsible for what, who owes and who is owed. Stinginess is not 
only frowned upon socially but is brought loudly to the attention 
of group members when it is perceived (Marshall, 1976). 
An interesting aspect of the context of closeness and cooper¬ 
ation in nomadic foraging societies is conversation. People seek 
one another out, keep up on all the latest news, talk before, 
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during, and after the hunt, tell jokes, tease one another; and in 
this way they help make it possible to remain close. The lines 
of communication are always open, and the openness of access permits 
intense closeness. 
The Mardudjara are great storytellers and love to talk 
about happenings seen and those unseen but heard about 
through the desert "grapevine"... Also characteristic 
are a gregariousness, a love of animated discussion and 
repartee, and a keen interest in what transpires in all 
dimensions... (Tonkinson, 1978: 127). 
From the perspective of our modern, technological society in 
which there is so much occasion for novelty, it may seem that people 
living together in such intimacy would have said all there is to 
say to one another long ago, but the talk never flags, the stories 
are always interesting. Marshall's description of conversation 
among the !Kung may almost certainly be applied to every other 
nomadic foraging society. 
[Conversation] keeps up good, open communication among 
the members of the band; through its constantly flowing 
expression it is a salutary outlet for emotions; and 
it serves as the principal sanction in social discipline... 
...The !Kung are the most loquacious people 1 know. 
Converstaion in a !Kung encampment is a constant sound 
like the sound of a brook, and as low and lapping, except 
for shrieks of laughter (Marshall, 1976: 351). 
People in nomadic foraging societies are further tied together 
by the ceremonies that have evolved to mark the important thresholds 
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of life, the common perceptions of the spirit world, and the 
explanations for the unknown they all share. Though these ceremonies 
and explanations are markedly different among gathering and hunting 
groups in different parts of the world, these societies acknowledge 
the same transitions and needs. The way shamans among the Netsilik 
Eskimo (Balikci, 1970) heal members of the band is very different 
from the healing practice of the mabarn of the Mardudjara, and 
the healing ceremonies of these two societies are nothing like the 
!kia of the !Kung. But obviously these activities are all directed 
towards healing (that is, making whole) members of the group, and, 
perhpas less obviously-, all draw their efficacy from the common 
conviction of all the people that they are efficacious. Everyone 
knows and acknowledges the same forces that make the healing-possible. 
The intense closeness, the shared assumptions, the commonly 
understood patterns of the external environment and of social life 
may be understood when one listens to a recording of a !Kung healing 
dance or sees photographs of the activity. 
!Kia and its setting of the !Kia dance, serves many 
functions. It is the SKung's primary expression of a 
religious existence and a cosmological perspective. It 
provides healing and protection, being a magico-medical 
mode of coping with illnesses and misfortune. The !Kia 
at the dance also increases social cohesion and sol¬ 
idarity. It allows for individual and communal release 
of hostility (Katz, 1976: 286). 
The lines of connection and closeness — - to the external environment 
114 
and to other members of the band — in foraging societies are lapped 
and overlapped into networks that ensure the survival of all as long 
as food is to be had and any are able to get it. They also guarantee 
the opportunity for full participation of every member in the life 
of the group. The small size of these societies makes it relatively 
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easy to keep track of these connections, and the absolute meaning 
these connections have for every individual in the group ensures 
their perpetuation. Though the specific ways in which foraging 
societies in various parts of the world support and mandate closeness 
and cooperation are different, the fact of that mandate (and indeed, 
many of the ways) is unquestionable. 
It is within the security of the family, the universe of kin, 
and in the daily presence of conventions of reciprocity and ceremony 
that children in nomadic foraging•societies grow and learn. Children 
in these societies are full participants in the life of the band. 
They have great significance for everyone in the group and con¬ 
sequently easily acquire a high level of self-esteem (e.g. Shostak, 
1981; Turnbull, 1961). Everyone in the band is related to the 
children of the band, knows them well, sees them grow and develop. 
It is likely that human children have grown and learned in en¬ 
vironments of closeness, connection and participation very similar 
to these for most of human existence. 
*1 am indebted to Kalman Glantz for this observation and for many others 
throughout this dissertation. 
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The Social Context of Learning: 
Individual Identity and Status 
The emphasis on closeness and unity in the section above may 
give the impression that people in hunting and gathering societies 
are always in some sort of idyllic harmony, always concerned for 
one another, always connected. However, this is not the case. What 
Marshall says of the !Kung may be generalized to describe other nomadic 
bands: "Their security and comfort must be achieved side-by-side 
with self-interest and much jealous watchfulness" (1976: 350). 
Life in nomadic foraging societies has in common with life in other 
primate societies a dynamic balance between the ties that bind and 
the need of all to establish identity and status in the group and to 
look out for themselves. 
One might say that individuality is "guaranteed" in a nomadic 
foraging society. The size of the group that forms The People is 
small enough to admit no strangers, and everyone is a one-of-a-kind 
because so much is known about everyone by everyone else. 
In a small and intimate community all people 
are known for their individual qualities of personality. 
Few or no strangers take part in the daily life. So 
men and women are seen as persons not as parts of 
mechanical operations, as city people see so many of 
those around them (Redfield, 1953: 9). 
One couldn't escape this individuality if one wanted to, givr: 
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en the context of closeness that marks gathering and hunting bands, 
and it creates another major part of the backdrop against which all 
activities of life in these societies take place. Turnbull des¬ 
cribes a Mbuti family that resided in the band he studied. 
[Ekianga] was a very great hunter... He was hairy, 
broad-chested, and powerful almost to the point of 
ugliness... He always built his huts in a different shape 
from everyone else's and in the Pygmy camp near the 
village his house was the biggest and the smartest of 
them all, sheltering his entire menage. 
His youngest wife was a beautiful girl called Kamikan. 
She was even lighter than most Pygmies, yellowish-brown 
instead of the more usual coffee-brown. Her brother 
and mother also lived with the same hunting group. 
[Her brother] Amabosu was a very temperamental Pygmy. 
He was a fine hunter, but he was particularly renowned 
as the best singer and best drummer and best dancer in 
the area; for these qualities alone his prestige was 
enormous. His skinny old mother, Sau, was not without 
fame of her own. Old and infirm people, amongst the Pygmies, 
are regarded, not exactly with suspicion or mistrust, 
but with apprehension (1961: 35). 
As suggested in the quotation above, status in a gathering 
and hunting band is directly related to the level of one's skill 
in particular areas as well as to personal qualities. It is 
obvious to all, earned in the context of skills all share, and must 
be validated continuously. Ekianga was "a very great hunter, and 
Amabosu was the "best singer and best drummer and best dancer in the 
area." At first these distinctions may seem to imply a paradox, 
for there is little specialization of function in hunter-gatherer 
societies. Everyone hunts, everyone sings and drums and dances. 
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All are engaged in the same activities, more or less, though not 
necessarily at the same time or in the same sequence. 
Every Netsilik Eskimo had to look after his own equip¬ 
ment, make new weapons, and repair the old ones. 
Despite the complexity of articles such as the kayak 
and the composite bow, every man had the skills and 
tools to be technologically self-sufficient (Balikci, 
1970: 4). 
[Among the Mbuti] there was...little apparent special¬ 
ization; everyone took part in everything (Turnbull, 
1961: 110). 
But it is in precisely this context of skill that all share and 
acknowledge as essential that status is gained, leadership developed, 
and power exercised, and it is likewise this context that prevents the 
institutionalization of power and leadership. If a hunter con¬ 
tinually returns with large game, everyone witnesses his success, 
his perfection of the skills all other men must also exercise — 
in spite of any arrangements either by him or the society to diffuse 
his singularity. Each individual in a band is perfectly aware of what 
it takes to excel in a particular activity. Everyone is using 
the same criteria for judgment of performance, so to speak. 
For those of us in a modern society where celebrity is often 
simply a matter of public exposure in the context of unclear criteria 
rather than a reflection of personal merit in the context of agreed- 
upon criteria, this is a foreign notion indeed. \AJhile all the members 
of a hunting and gathering band are engaged in the determination of 
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their individual identity and place within the group, all are 
making their interpersonal assessments on the basis of criteria that 
are shared. There is no room for faking it in such a society; the 
context of closeness won't allow it. 
What specialization of activity that is to be found in 
nomadic foraging societies is in the realm of the ceremonial, the 
medicinal, or the supernatural. Most gathering and hunting societies 
recognize shamans, healers, or ritual leaders, and in most societies 
it is also acknowledged that not everyone can become one. Among 
the !Kung !kia occurs anywhere from once or twice a week to several 
times a week, and while all are involved in the ceremony, either 
dancing or singing, only certain people actually go into the healing 
trance, or receive n/um as the !Kung say. The ability to receive 
n/um and use it effectively for healing is respected by the society 
as an important achievement. Individuals take pride in being 
n/um masters (Katz, 1976, 1982). A Netsilik shaman, or angatkok, 
is "generally respected and feared for his supernatural powers 
Balikci, 1970: 225). Among the Mardudjara of Australia 
men who most often use their special powers for sociall> 
approved ends are termed Mabarn throughout the Western 
Desert; the same term refers to the magical stone or 
shell objects they are said to carry in their stomachs... 
Most Mabarn inherit their special powers from their 
fathers, but Mabarn objects can be obtained from others. 
Almost all are men, and perhaps 10 or 15 percent of 
Mardudjara males are Mabarn (Tonkinson, 1978. 107). 
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One would think it inevitable that, given the importance of 
healing and ceremony in nomadic foraging societies, practitioners in 
these areas would have a kind of generalized status in the group, 
that they would become official leaders. But leadership, influence, 
and status are extraordinarily complex in these societies because 
they are realized in the context of closeness and in the exigencies 
of a direct connection with the physical environment. 
Nothing in their appearance or demeanor distinguishes 
Mabarn from their fellows, and as specialists they 
practice part-time only, since all their other activities 
are the same as those of other men. Their distinct¬ 
iveness lies in their possession of special skill, 
knowledge, and psychic powers that give them greater and 
more effective access to the spiritual realm (Tonkinson, 
1978: 107). 
In daily life the Netsilik shaman "behaved like an ordinary hunter" 
(Balikci, 1970: 225), and a !kung n/um master "remains an ordinary 
person during his non !kia state rather than an intimate of the gods 
or a chosen instrument" (Katz, 1976: 294). 
There are no official positions in gathering and hunting 
societies (though there is certainly leadership, little general¬ 
ization of authority from one activity to another, and no social 
hierarchy that exists outside of personal merit and the organiza¬ 
tional relationships such as kinship described above. Decisions 
are made and status is achieved in this seemingly unlikely context, 
but the process is indeed complex. 
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[Among the Tiwi of Melville Island in Northern Aus¬ 
tralia] influence and career patterns can best be 
compared to a sort of nonstop bridge game wherein the 
scores were never totaled up nor a new game ever started 
on a clean slate. Wherever an observer came in, he 
always entered in the middle of the game and found the 
current hands being played with all the old scores back 
for at least two generations influencing the play of 
the present hands. The game never had a beginning or an 
end; every new player had to start in the middle and 
make the best of whatever assets he had by way of kinship, 
clanship, household membership, and help from older 
players. Similarly, any attempt to describe the oper¬ 
ations involved or the "rules" of the game must perforce 
start in the middle (Hart and Pilling, 1979: 51-52). 
Leadership in nomadic foraging societies is not reflected in 
a structural guarantee of influence; it is an acceptance of 
responsibility. 
[The leader of a Netsilik Eskimo band] was referred to 
as inhumataq, or the one who thinks. In summer he 
gave the signal for the beginning of fishing or caribou 
hunting, and he decided matters pertinent to migration 
and camp selection. Yet all these decisions were taken 
informally and gently, in consultation with the other 
adult hunters of the extended family, involving long 
discussion when everyone present could freely express 
his opinions. In a sense the headman's task was to 
achieve consensus without hurting the feelings and 
designs of the other hunters, whose autonomy he 
respected (Balikci, 1970: 116). 
One has the impression that when leaders do emerge in foraging 
societies they are people who are skillful in many areas and 
embody qualities important to the group. The position of isumataq 
was not automatically bestowed upon the oldest active male in a 
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Copper Eskimo band (Damas, 1969); the position had to be assumed 
or filled by someone. Though isumataqs were in fact often the 
oldest active males in the group, these men rose to the occasion 
in the context of the expectations of the band. If they had not 
been able to facilitate the activities of the group others would 
have had to step in, for the subsistence needs of an Eskimo band 
will not allow incompetence in a leadership role. 
Even though leadership among the Eskimo seems to be more like 
moderating a discussion among peers than telling others what to do, 
most gathering and hunting societies have even less formalized 
leadership than do the Eskimo. 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the balance of power 
[in !Kung society] is the process of leadership and 
decision making. Determining how the !Kung actually 
make important decisions is quite difficult. With no 
formal leaders or hierarchies, and no political or 
legal institutions to convey authority, decisions are 
made on the basis of group consensus. Each group has 
individuals whose opinions carry more weight than those 
of others — because of age, of having ancestors who 
have lived in the area longer, or of personal attributes 
such as intelligence, knowledge or charisma. These people 
tend to be more prominent in group discussion, to make 
their opinions known and their suggestions clear, and to 
articulate the consensus once it is determined. Despite 
their lack of formal authority, they function very much 
as group leaders (Shostak, 1981: 245). 
Turnbull describes Moke, an older hunter of the Mbuti band 
Turnbull travelled with, as a kind of leader who sometimes took 
responsibility for settling disputes and whose opinion carried a 
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certain weight with others, but emphasizes that "Pygmies dislike 
and avoid personal authority, though they are by no means devoid 
of a sense of responsibility. It is rather that they think of 
responsibility as communal" (Turnbull, 1961: 125). 
Every member of a gathering and hunting society is concerned 
with his or her personal, individual place and status in the group. 
But this status is elusive, and while it may be connected in some 
way to kinship relations and ancestral prerogatives it is, in 
practice, apparently more a function of who does best, commands 
the most attention, makes the best case, has the most knowledge, 
etc. Because every skill and area of knowledge is important for 
survival and/or well being in these societies status, power and 
influence are remarkably diffused throughout the members of ■ 
hunting and gathering bands: between men and men, between women and 
women, and between men and women as well. The most successful 
healer may not be the most successful hunter. Among the Birhor 
of Southern India the hunt leader and the ceremonial leader is 
rarely the same person, though there is apparently no formal 
prohibition of this dual leadership (Williams, 1969). Although the 
Mbuti hunter Cephu was roundly castigated by the other members of 
the group for deploying his nets in advance of the others during 
a hunt (see below), he was also recognized as "the finest storyteller 
in the forest" (Turnbull, 1961). 
The balances between the dimensions of status, individual 
significance, etc. and the need to belong and cooperate ensure 
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that everyone in a gathering and hunting group can be competent 
(because the skills that all share are of ultimate importance) 
and that nearly everyone can excel in one area or another. The 
lines of power and status and individuality in gathering and hunting 
societies, like the lines of relationship and reciprocal obligation, 
crisscross and overlap. Like food, there's some for everyone. 
Everyone knows what competence consists of, so it does not have 
to be demonstrated through competition. Hunters do not need to 
vie with one another; gatherers needn't struggle to see who can 
bring in the biggest load. There are so many ways in which to 
distinguish oneself — ways that are recognized by and important 
to all the other members of the group — that everyone is distinguished. 
The Social Context of Learning: 
The Resolution of Disputes 
In the resolution of disputes many of the most important 
characteristics of gathering and hunting societies come together. 
Status and prerogative are often at stake, kinship is prominent, 
temporary leaders emerge, the entire group becomes involved and the 
ties and conventions of reciprocal obligation come to the fore. 
The context of closeness produces friction as well as 
reassurance as individuals attempt to identify themselves in re¬ 
lationship to the other individuals in the group. Tensions develop, 
grudges are held, fights break out. Among the Mbuti, 
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sometimes someone would apparently have a grudge against 
a neighbor, or a dislike for someone who had built a 
hut opposite. I saw several women turning the entrances 
of their huts to point in different directions, toward 
friends or relatives. During the course of any one 
camp women are continually adding to their huts or 
changing the way they face. I found that a good way of 
keeping track of the little jealousies that exist in any 
small community was to make a daily plan of the camp, 
noting which huts were being altered to face in which 
direction (Turnbull, 1961: 68). 
There is little privacy in a foraging band, and sooner or 
later most things come out. Shelters are usually placed so closely 
together that much of the group can hear talk between husband and 
wife, children's questions and cries, arguments, etc. Therefore, 
if feelings are hurt, if someone is insulted, if jealousies and 
suspicions emerge,, they soon become part of the experience of the 
entire group. 
Natually, when there are disagreements between individuals 
or groups of individuals the response of the other members of the 
band varies according to the seriousness of the dispute. When 
Cephu set his nets in advance of those of the other hunters he 
was committing a grave crime as far as the other members of the 
Mbuti band were concerned. 
Ekianga leaped to his feet and brandished his hairy 
fist across the fire. He said that he hoped Cephu would 
fall on his spear and kill himself like the animal he 
was. Who but an animal would steal meat from others? 
There were cries of rage from everyone, and Cephu 
burst into tears... 
I had never heard of this happening before, and it was 
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obviously a serious offense. In a small and tightly 
knit hunting band, survival can be achieved only by the 
closest copoperation and by an elaborate system of re¬ 
ciprocal obligations which insures that everyone has 
some share in the day's catch (Turnvull, 1961: 106-107). 
People in foraging societies are so intimately connected 
with one another that there is, of course, tremendous pressure 
to be part of the group. 
I think that most !Kung cannot bear the sense of 
rejection that even mild disapproval makes them feel. 
If they do deviate they usually yield readily to expres¬ 
sed group opinion and reform their ways. They also 
conform strictly to certain specific useful customs that 
are instruments for avoiding discord (Marshall, 1976: 315). 
It is in the intesest of everyone in a foraging band that things 
run smoothly, because social disintegration also means the reduction 
of the group's ability to acquire food and perform important cere¬ 
monies. Survival in such a society means much more than simply 
obtaining food and shelter, and Turnbull says of Cephu that "it 
was unlikely he would do the same thing again in a hurry" (Turn- 
bull, 1961: 10). 
Nevertheless, ethnographers have expressed surprise at the 
joking that often accompanies even the most serious occasions. 
In many cases an offended party is cajoled out of his her bad 
mood with jokes and jibes. In the midst of the most serious 
denouncement someone might pipe up in the darkness of the night camp 
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and ridicule the denouncer. Ridicule, in fact, is a common mode 
of exchange in gathering and hunting societies and serves to humble 
the arrogant as well as chastise the transgressor. Often small 
disputes are resolved through ridicule and banter with "everyone 
having a good time" (Meggitt, 1962). 
The involvement of all in the resolution of disputes is 
characteristic of foraging societies. In the small space of, say, 
an Mbuti encampment, where everyone is related and loyalty — like 
everything else — overlaps, it isn’t long before everybody joins 
in, and the dispute serves as the focus of an important group activity. 
The interesting thing is that no one seems particularly anxious 
about what is fair or unfair, right or wrong. There is no 
weighing of evidence, no pretense of impartiality, no references to 
higher law: "Disputes were generally settled with little reference 
to the alleged rights and wrongs of the case, but chiefly with the 
intention of restoring peace in the community" (Turnbull, 1961: 
118) . 
A good example of the priority of the reestablishment of 
continuity and peace in the resolution of difficulties is to be 
found in Turnbull's description of the events surrounding one 
family's use of a certain kind of hunting magic that apparently 
brought them extraordinary luck. Envy began to build among the other 
families in the band. 
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It is difficult to say whether this form of magic is 
of Pygmy or Negro origin. I rather think the latter, 
because only a few families practiced it, and they were 
highly criticized by the others as being antisocial. 
They were trying to get success for themselves at the 
expense of the others. On one such occasion a family 
had a long run of good luck, the animals always falling 
into their net, while others had no luck at all. It 
was decided that this must have been due to anjo, as 
the medicine was called, so everyone, including the 
offenders, agreed that the only thing to do was to 
destroy the horns that held the medicine. Everyone 
who had such a magic horn gave it to old Moke and 
promised not to make any more selfish magic (Turnbull, 
1961: 96-97). 
Anyone in a foraging society who disrupts the peace knows that 
something must be done to restore the balance. It didn't matter 
who had the most success in the hunt, since food was shared, and 
the real danger, recognized by all, was the growing envy. 
Often the long and violent-sounding harrangues that involve 
the whole band serve as a kind of catharsis as well as entertain¬ 
ment (Marshall, 1976; Goodale, 1971). Both the dispute and its 
resolution become the property of all. Most often, no formal or 
official decision is made. People think about the problem, talk 
among themselves in smaller groups. Those who have offended usually 
mend their ways. If a gift needs to be given to restore a balance 
it emerges — in a week, in a month — to put things right (Marshall, 
1976). And, of course everyone knows, everyone remembers. 
Inevitably there are situations that cannot be resolved by 
joking, arguing or ridicule, by group participation or even by 
the intervention of kin. People in foraging societies sometimes 
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come to blows. Often these fights are formalized in ways that 
seem to be calculated to restore the peace while simultaneously 
satisfying honor (Goodale, 1971; Balikci, 1970), but sometimes 
they result in separations that may or may not last over time. 
Goodale describes a battle between two Tiwi men, an older man 
with three wives, and the young alleged lover of his youngest 
wife, and in this dispute (and in its resolution) we may catch a 
glimpse of the relationship between the need of The People to 
stay close to one another and the needs of individuals to define 
their status and preserve their prerogatives. 
They circled each other, shaking their clubs violently 
in the air but striking no blows. The lover was then 
handed a sharp metal-tipped mainland-type spear by his 
brother, but immediately the husband's brothers shouted 
that this was not right, and they sent a young boy to 
fetch the superintendent of the settlement. The threat 
of the superintendent intervening immediately resulted 
in the lover's laying aside the spear. The two men 
returned to wrestling, and the messenger to the superin¬ 
tendent was called back. All within hearing had now 
surrounded the two men, and a discordant chorus of 
opinions loudly offered by nearly everyone present 
accompanied the fight... 
Occasionally one of the combatants would be knocked 
to the ground, at which point he would be helped up by 
his wife, in the old husband's case, by his eldest wife. 
Although each man had close brothers among the spec¬ 
tators, they did not come in to help, but I was told 
that they would have done so had the fight reached ser¬ 
ious proportions. 
An old woman threw a bucket of water over the two 
fighters, and they immediately separated, but they con¬ 
tinued with a verbal exchange (Goodale, 1971: 132-133). 
The fight broke out because the old man had learned that his 
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youngest wife and the young man had been seen going off into the 
bush together. His status in the group was threatened (a man with 
three wives ought to be able to ’’take care of them" the Tiwi say) , 
and he acted to protect it. When the fight threatened to get out 
of hand with the addition of spears, kin intervened but did not 
try to stop the fight altogether. Everyone in the village got 
involved in the fracas, and as the two men flailed away at each 
other the other members of the group argued the matter back and 
forth with gusto. Finally, an old woman, no doubt a relative of 
one or both men, stopped the fight in a humorous manner that served 
as a joke for the whole band and, in a sense, ridiculed both 
combatants. 
Because of the constant, expected movement among groups, the 
universal practice of visiting and the importance of this activity 
in the foraging way of life, it is possible to resolve most 
any quarrel, no matter how serious, without a pitched and bloody 
battle — and even without an ultimate loss of face for any 
individual. Goodale concludes her description of the battle with 
these words: "...by next morning the old man had left the settlement 
with his three wives, and he remained camped across the bay for 
ten days (p. 133). 
Those who get along well on a regular basis spend a lot ot 
time travelling and camping together, but everyone has close ties 
with individuals in other bands, and everyone visits or is visited 
frequently throughout the year. In this fashion tensions are 
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relaxed, grudges eased, and disputes resolved by time and separ- 
atIon. 
The Social Context of Learning: 
The Sexual Division ol Labor 
The sexual division of labor as a principle of social 
organization in nomadic foraging societies is an intricately 
balanced system of expectations, duties, understandings and emotional 
ties. In almost all gathering and hunting societies men lull ill 
the primary hunting obligations while women gather vegetable foods 
and have the primary responsibility for child care. As noted 
above, in Eskimo societies, whore there is little gathering to 
he done, women have exclusive rights to sewing and clothing manu¬ 
facture as well as primary responsibility for child care, and the 
Agta, a group in which women regularly hunt, maintain a division 
of labor. In no other dimension of life in nomadic foraging societies 
are the balances between closeness and belonging and status and pre¬ 
rogative more important, or more complex, than in the sexual division 
of labor. 
This division, and the other reciprocal relations that tlow 
out of it, are crucial elements of the environment of learning in 
nomadic foraging societies, and, as we have seen, there is good 
evidence to believe that these kinds of relationships are tund- 
amental human social adaptations. lo the context ol flu scXU,*l 
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division of labor, children in hunting and gathering societies 
identify themselves as individuals and as members of the group. 
Gender identity in these societies is the paramount constituent 
of personal identity. In this context children learn what is 
expected of them and what their prerogatives are, they perfect 
skills and gain knowledge that will enable them to survive in the 
physical environment and live satisfying adult lives in the social 
environment. 
In much the same way that primate studies used to focus on 
dominance hierarchies in monkey and ape societies as fundamental 
principles of social organization, early studies of foraging socie¬ 
ties focused on the political and ceremonial "dominance" of males 
and the conventions of patrilocality (e.g. Service, 1962). Subse¬ 
quent work has shown, however, that as is so often the case, the 
reality of life is a good deal more complex. 
In summarizing the evidence concerning male-female 
relations, we see that women predominate in some 
spheres of behavior and men in others; the overall 
sense of the relations between the sexes is one of give 
and take. Both sexes work equally hard, with men work¬ 
ing longer hours in subsistence and tool making and 
women working longer hours in housework and child care. 
Women's subsistence work is more efficient and productive 
than men's, so they provide more of the food despite their 
shorter work week. In marriage arrangements women 
exercise some control, and they initiate divorce far 
more frequently than men. On the other hand, the fact 
that the men are so much older than their wives at 
marriage may tip the balance of influence within the 
marriage in favor of the males (It should be noted that 
in about one out of five !Kung marriages the woman is 
older than the man — up to 20 years older and in 
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these unions the woman's influence usually predominates)... 
On balance, the evidence shows a relatively equal 
role in society for the two sexes, and the !Kung data 
certainly do not support a view of women in "the state 
of nature as oppressed or or dominated by men or as 
subject to sexual exploitation at the hands of males 
(Lee, 1979: 454). 
Tonkinson reports a similar balance for the Mardudfara aboriginies 
of Western Australia (1978); and Jane Goodale writes of the Tiwi 
of Melville Island: "Although the opportunities for prestige and 
self-expression do not appear to be as great for the female as for 
the male Tiwi, the basic equality of the two sexes as unique 
individual members of the society is stressed in the culture" (1971: 
338) . 
Goodale emphasizes what she calls the "different character 
of the male-female world" (p. 335) and hypothesizes that although 
"personal achievement seems to be the dominant value for which 
Tiwi males and females strive during their existence in the world 
of the living" this achievement comes, and is measured, in different 
ways for males and females. 
This suggests that it is a mistake to compare the authority 
and status of men with the authority and status of women in a 
simplistic fashion. The status of each, and ways of measuring that 
status, may exist (at least partially) in two different dimensions 
much like the axes of dominance and matrifocality in primate groups 
described in Chapter 2. What we observe in gathering and hunting 
bands seems to be a balance that addresses the physical and psycho- 
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logical well being of every member of the group — male and female, 
young and old — even though we may have difficulty understanding 
the elements of that balance from the outside. 
Most modern ethnographers describe women in foraging societies 
as having considerable influence in the decision making processes 
of the group. 
The woman is not discriminated against in Mbuti society 
as she is in some African societies. She has a full and 
important role to play... A man is not ashamed to pick 
mushrooms and nuts if he find them, or to wash and clean 
a baby. A woman is free to take part in the discussions 
of men, if she has something relevant to say (Turnbull, 
1961: 154). 
The sentiments of the Lynx Point Athapaskan society... 
to not rigidify this division of labor between the sexes... 
The day-to-day relations between husband and wife are 
fairly egalitarian (Helm, 1961: 74). 
It is very difficult to separate the lines of "official" 
status (such as exist) which are often more the province of men, 
from the actual workings of authority and influence in a gathering 
and hunting band. Greenway, writing about the Australian abor- 
iginies, reports that "in religious matters women are rubbish' (1972: 
103), and although this has been shown to be manifestly untrue 
(e.g. Tonkinson, 1978; Hiatt, 1968; Goodale, 1971) it nonetheless 
describes what seems to be taking place in the realm of the 
ceremonial as viewed through the eyes of Westerners who are apparently 
expecting linear soc ial relationships. Actually Australian women 
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have their own ceremonial sphere which they view quite differently 
from the men. 
Indeed, is is difficult to assess the character of shared and 
balanced authority and status in the sexual division of labor. 
According to Shostak 
Women's status in the community is high and their 
influence considerable. They are often prominent in 
major family and band decisions, such as where and when 
to move and whom their children will marry. Many also 
share core leadership in a band and ownership of water- 
holes and foraging areas. Just how influential they 
really are and how their status compares with that of 
men is a complicated question: women may, in fact, be 
nearly equal to men, but the culture seems to define 
them as less powerful. In other words, their influence 
may be greater than the !Kung — of either sex — like 
to admit (Shostak, 1981: 13). 
Shostak's assessment may serve as an example of the difficulty 
mentioned above. Are the !Kung playing some kind of trick on 
themselves when they define power in their society? Or is it more 
likely that the definition itself is part of the reciprocal re¬ 
lationship and only seems to represent a contradiction when called 
forth by an anthropologist? 
It is conceivable that a considerable amount of the power and 
status of women in nomadic foraging societies is unvoiced simply 
because it is so obvious to the members of the society. Women in 
these groups are the "life force" (Turnbull, 1961), for they bring 
children into the world. Perhaps the unquestioned importance of 
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children to gathering and hunting societies, and the deep ties that 
accompany mother-child relations, form the foundation of one dimen- 
sion of status and influence while the importance of meat and 
Vc k 
matters ceremonial forms the foundation of another. Shostak 
quotes one of the few female n/um masters in the Dobe area: 
I am a master at trancing to drum-medicine songs. I 
lay hands on people and they usually get better. I 
know how to trick God from wanting to kill someone and 
how to have God give the person back to me. But I, 
myself, have never spoken directly to God nor have I 
seen or gone to where he lives. I am still very small 
when it comes to healing and I haven't made these trips... 
I am a woman, and women don't do most of the healing. 
They fear the pain of the medicine inside them because 
it really hurts! I don't really know why women don't 
do more of it. Men just fear it less. It's really 
funny — women don't fear childbirth, but they fear 
medicine! (Shostak, 1981: 303). 
It is important to see that the specific roles of the sexual 
division of labor in day-to-day situations appear to be more 
flexible than might be expected. The most powerful healer in the 
Dobe region during the time Katz studied the healing ceremonies of 
the !Kung was a woman (Katz, 1982). Of course, there are strict 
divisions too. During certain parts of the male initiation ceremon- 
*As it does in all primate societies 
**There may be a relationship between the greater flamboyance and 
aggressiveness of males in nomadic foraging societies and the 
greater flamboyance and aggressiveness of males in other primate 
societies, but a great deal more study is required before this 
relationship can be described with any confidence. 
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ies among the Australian aboriginies women are forbidden from 
attending (Tonkinson, 1978; Strehlow, 1971; Berndt and Berndt, 1964). 
Netsilik men never sew hides (Balikci, 1970). But in the larger 
context of life in a nomadic foraging society even these strict 
prohibitions and rigid customs become pieces of a great puzzle of 
reciprocity and balance. During other parts of the Australian 
male initiation ceremony females are essential, and women exert 
a considerable amount of influence in the determination of who 
performs what role in all parts of the initiation rites (Goodale, 
1971; Tonkinson, 1978). While Netsilik men do not sew hides, the 
task of thinning them by scraping is theirs (Balikci, 1970). 
Many ceremonies in nomadic foraging societies acknowledge and 
celebrate both the connections and the differences between men and 
women. Among the Mbuti the two most important ceremonial activities 
are the molimo and the elima. The molimo is a kind of multipur¬ 
pose ceremony used for healing, for what might be called 'community 
building," and in general "... the Pygmies call out their molimo 
whenever things seem to be going wrong" (Turnbull, 1961: 91). 
At first Turnbull thought that the mo1imo was exclusively for men, 
but then one night, without any preparation that Turnbull could 
divine, the molimo ceremony was joined by the women of the band and 
an old woman who was visiting the camp. 
There is an old legend that once it was the women who 
"owned" the molimo, but the men stole it from them and 
ever since the women have been forbidden to see it. 
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Perhaps this [addition of the women to the ceremony and 
the resultant binding" of the men] was a way of remind¬ 
ing the men of the origin of their molimo. There is 
another old legend which tells that it was a woman who 
stole fire from the chimpanzees or, in yet another version, 
from the great forest spirit. Perhaps the dance had 
been in imitation of this. I did not understand it by 
any means, but somehow it seemed to make sense (Turnbull 
1961: 154). 
By the same token, the elima ceremony is organized and run by 
the women to mark a girl’s first menstrual period. But the young 
men of the village are important participants in the elima and 
a "father of the elima" is designated from among the girl's older 
kinsmen. 
Though there is "men's work" and "women's work" in nomadic 
foraging societies there are many situations in the context of this 
way of life in which work is combined or in which the lines between 
make-female roles are blurred. When Nisa, the !Kung woman 
(Shostak, 1981) had her first child her husband went out gathering 
and brought the food he found back to the new mother. Surely 
it would have been possible for a kinswoman to perform this task, 
thus preserving a strict division of labor. But no such custom 
has developed in !Kung society. Indeed, !Kung men often gather 
when returning from an unsuccessful hunt, and even more consistently 
they relay information about the location of plant foods to the 
women. At the same time, the women report on the animal spoor 
they have seen while gathering and often take an active and 
influential part in the pre-hunt conversation (Lee and Devore, 1976). 
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As noted above, Agta women do a considerable amount of hunting, 
though hunting is still considered by both sexes to be primarily 
"men’s work," and the society maintains a division of labor by 
sex in other areas of life (Griffin and Griffin, 1981). Mbuti 
women and children beat the jungle to drive animals into the nets 
of that waiting men (Turnbull, 1961), and Eskimo women and children 
help in the spring seal hunt and in the construction of salmon 
weirs. A Netsilik couple builds an igloo cooperatively; the man 
works inside the structure and woman works outside (Balicki, 
1971). 
The sexual division of labor in nomadic foraging societies is 
the basic framework through which the balances between attachment 
to others and personal status are achieved. Associated with it are 
subsistence success, family and kinship structures, and ceremonial 
meaning. In order for the division to have existed over time, it 
must have ensured cooperation, reciprocity, and equality. At the 
same time, the division of labor affords males and females some¬ 
what different kinds of experience within which to identify them¬ 
selves and acquire status. These different dimensions of experience 
enable The People to avoid competition between the sexes, which 
helps make it possible to live successfully together in an extra¬ 
ordinarily (by Western standards) intimate social environment 
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The Social Context of Learning: 
Attention Structure 
While a detailed description of the attention structure of 
nomadic foraging societies and the effect it has on children's 
learning is beyond the scope of this study, there are several 
prominent foci for children's attention that have probably existed 
in human societies for millions of years, for they are inevitable 
consequences of the foraging way of life. Although these descriptions 
of who pays attention to whom in gathering and hunting societies 
seem very obvious when stated, it is important to note them briefly 
here, for they will form the foundation of a discussion of the 
environment of learning in our own educational institutions in the 
next chapter. 
Gender identity and roles. As noted above, the sexual division of 
labor forms a fundamental dimension of the life of these small 
societies, and boys and girls draw much of their personal identity 
and sense of self from this context. Although very young children 
of both sexes are treated pretty much the same by all adults, they 
begin to pay attention to the activities of the adults of the same 
sex more and more as they mature — and the adults begin to treat 
them differently too. 
So a fond [Mbuti] father will make a tiny bow for his 
son, and arrows of soft wood with blunt points. He 
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may also give him a strip of a hunting net. A mother will 
delight herself and her daughter by weaving a miniature 
basket. At an early age boys and girls are "playing 
house." They solemnly collect the sticks and leaves, and 
while the girl is building a miniature house the boy 
prowls around with his bow and arrow (Turnbull, 1961: 
128-129). 
The inevitability of the roles of both males and females in 
nomadic foraging societies makes the question of whether the focus 
of a child's attention on same-sex role models is a result of 
internal motivation or external socialization irrelevant. Boys 
will become hunters, tool makers, fathers; girls will become gather¬ 
ers, makers of their own tools, mothers. These are the things that 
men and women do in life. It is important to note that this 
inevitability is not considered oppressive by the people. What 
men do and what women do is natural for members of a foraging band, 
and it is interesting that the reinforcement for adopting a sex 
role in gathering and hunting societies often contains no negative 
prohibitions (e.g. Shostak, 1981). 
The family. If it is true that as children grow older they tend 
to focus their attention on the things that must be learned in 
order to become a man or a woman, it is also true that men and 
women know each other's work very well indeed. Girls in foraging 
societies know a great deal about hunting from watching their 
fathers, brothers and male kin, from listening to them talk about 
the hunt, from listening to the women's interpretations of animal 
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spoor encountered during a gathering expedition (Shostak, 1981). 
By the same token, boys accompany their mothers on gathering trips 
well into their childhood, and through watching their mothers and 
kinswomen they learn about plants, how to get at them, and how to 
prepare them. 
Through the family structure in which both mother and father 
are important foci for the children's attention, a tremendous 
amount of common information is imparted, and in interactions with 
relations and other adults this information is refined and ex¬ 
tended. In every foraging society three and sometimes four 
generations are almost always represented. Thus, important consti¬ 
tuents of the environment of learning in these societies are grand¬ 
parents. Old folks in these societies, freed from the most ar¬ 
duous activities of subsistence, do have a great deal of leisure 
time and often spend it with children. 
If [Pygmy children] can't find a frog they go and 
awaken one of their grandparents and ask him to play 
at being an antelope. He is then pursued all over the 
camp, twisting and dodging among the huts and the trees, 
until finally the young hunters trap their quarry in 
the net, and with shouts of delight pounce on him 
(Turnbull, 1961: 129). 
[Among the Netsilik Eskimo] relations between grandparents 
and grandchildren were marked by ceaseless fondling 
and joking. As soon as a child entered the dwelling of 
his grandparents he attracted their attention. He was 
given food and immediately became the object of loving 
care, mild joking, and teasing. Although he was visibly 
adored by his grandparents, the child behaved with some 
restraint and considerable respect. In later years. 
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when the grandson became an active hunter, he contributed 
to the support of his grandparents, together with the 
other men of the extended family (Balikci, 1970: 122). 
Though it seems that grandparents do not actively "teach" 
the young or train them in the ways of a foraging existence, clearly 
a considerable amount of what children learn is learned from the 
elder generation. As the old folks talk among themselves in a 
!Kung camp and tell stories (Biesele, 1976), the children watch 
and listen as they go about their play. In addition to important 
information, skills, and the history and lore of The People, children 
learn how it feels to be old. They can see how the elderly struggle 
to keep up with the nomadic band (e.g. Turnbull, 1961; Schebesta, 
1927; Balikci, 197.0) and hear the complaints of those who are not 
well provided for by their children or grandchildren. 
The adult context. A child in a nomadic foraging society is 
constantly exposed to and interacting with adults of many ages and 
degrees of relationship — adults who are all doing similar 
tasks within the gathering and hunting lifestyle but who have 
distinct personalities, areas of expertise, likes and dislikes, 
and amounts of status in particular circumstances. The importance 
of this element of the environment of learning for children in these 
societies cannot be overemphasized, for it is in observing and 
imitating (and learning from the mistakes of) adults in the band 
that children learn the skill, the knowledge and the responsibil- 
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lties of adulthood. They refine and check the things imparted to 
them through the direct family structure and learn what the boundar¬ 
ies of behavior actually are, as opposed to what they are said 
to be, what status consists of and how it is achieved, and how 
problems may be solved in a variety of ways. 
The children of the Mbuti band described by Turnbull witnessed 
Cephu s castigation as a bad hunter but also listened eagerly 
when Cephu the great storyteller told a tale. Neither the battles, 
the arguments, the accusations, the successful hunts, nor the heroic 
solitary birthings can be hidden from the young. All around the 
children, at all times, adults who all have the same skills are 
utilizing them in individually different ways and with varying 
success. The children see that a great hunter may be a clumsy 
dancer, or that a successful shaman may make a poor sealing spear. 
In all foraging societies the children experience, forst through 
observation and then through direct involvement, the confusion, the 
intensity, and danger and the pleasure of sexuality, for "nothing 
is hidden in the igloo" (Balikci, 1970) or in a hut that is part 
of an encampment of 10 or 15 similar huts. 
Without institutionalized positions to flatten out personalities 
and routinize interpersonal relations, adults in foraging socieites 
are, to the young, complex, changable beings who have both success 
and failure, who are at times joyful, at other times depressed, 
who snap and agrue and love and sing and dance. Children in 
hunting and gathering socities are close by way of kinship, marriage. 
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or simply intense daily association to every adult member of the 
band and thus have a range of role models with which they might 
identify or from which they might appropriate bits of skill, 
knowledge and behavior in the formation of their own identities. 
Other children. Just as children in foraging societies learn about 
what it is to be old by living with and observing the old, just as 
they learn about adulthood by watching and interacting with different 
adults, they learn about children (and themselves) from being in 
close contact with other children constantly. 
At Apa Lelo [the children's bopi, or playground] was 
on the shore where the river twisted around an island 
and one branch of it cut in almost between Cephu's camp 
and the main camp. The water was fairly shallow there, 
and all day long the children splashed and wallowed about 
to their heart's content. If they tired of that, they 
had a couple of vine swings in their bopi; one was a 
small one for younger children, and the other was hung 
from two tall trees. Infants watched with envy as the 
older children swung wildly about, climbing high up 
on the vine strands and performing all sorts of 
acrobatics (Turnbull, 1961: 128). 
Children are not segregated by age in gathering and hunting 
societies. If the group is large enough, and there are a number 
of children who are roughly the same age, age-mate play groups form 
(Balikci, 1970; Helm, 1961), but these are by no means exclusive, 
* 
nor are they institutionalized in any way by the adults. 
*One may speculate that the formation of age-mate play groups is 
connected with developmental stages (see Chapter 5). 
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m no case is there any attempt by the adults to match children of 
the same age or keep them together. The children form their own 
relationships in the contexts described above. 
[Among the !Kung] a typical band of children joined 
temporarily in some play in the village might include 
a 5-year-old boy, an 11-year-old girl, a 14-year-old 
boy, and a 1-year-old toddler hanging on the fringe of 
the action (Draper, 1976: 202). 
[Among the Lynx Point Athapaskans] we find the self- 
conscious, seventeen—year—old Eddie playing tag with 
a four-year-old (Helm, 1961: 94). 
Older children provide models for younger children and, of 
course, older children learn about babies and toddlers by observing 
their younger brothers and sisters and those of other families 
directly. It should be emphasized here that the older children 
are never forced or trained to assume responsibility for their 
younger siblings. This is not to say that this responsibility is 
not assumed by older children, for they inevitably become the 
leaders of the play group and thus automatically assume a certain 
responsibility for the younger children. But these older children 
are not held accountable by the adults for either the safety, 
the instruction, or the behavior of the younger children. 
Discipline: compelling attention. The discipline of the young as 
we understand it in modern technological society, is a mode of 
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compelling attention so that children may learn what we would have 
them know and behave in an acceptable manner. Little of what we would 
consider discipline occurs in nomadic foraging societies. As noted 
above, the behavior of children in these societies is rarely 
constrained. Children are almost never beaten and have an ex¬ 
traordinary amount of leeway to do pretty much as they please. 
In many gathering and hunting societies maturation is con¬ 
ceived of as the acquisition of a certain something. The Utku 
Eskimo say that a child acquires ihuma which "refers to all functions 
that we think of cerebral: mind, thought, memory, reason, sense, 
ideas, will" (Briggs, 1970: 375). The !Kung explain the tantrums 
and disobediance of young children by saying that their intelligence 
has not yet come to them. 
There is no doubt in the parents' mind that as children 
grow up they will learn to act with sense, with or 
without deliberate training, simply as a result of 
maturation, social pressure and the desire to conform 
to group values. Since most !Kung adults are cooperative, 
generous, and hard-working, and seem to be no more self- 
centered than any other people, this theory is evidently 
right, at least for them (Shostak, 1981: 149). 
It is likely that parents and other adults in gathering and 
hunting societies are as indulgent and patient as they are because 
the the only option for a child in a foraging society is to become 
an adult in a foraging society: "What else is there for [Pygmy 
children] to learn except to grow into good adults?" (Turnbull, 1961 
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128). Although there is considerable opportunity for individual 
expression in such a society the framework itself is not a matter 
of choice — integrated as it is with the cycles of the physical 
environment and balanced as it is between individual and collective 
needs. Thus many of the occasions for discipline which confront 
parents in modern technological societies simply do not come up 
in foraging societies. Children needn't be forced to comply with 
their parents’ wishes, because at an early age they begin imitating 
(and assessing) their parents' behavior and activity and gradually 
become contributing members of the band themselves. There is no 
need to make children do things "for their own good" in these so¬ 
cieties because there is no difference between what is good for 
them and what is good for everybody else, no difference between 
what they see going on all around them and what their adult lives 
will consist of. The discipline-like activities we do see occasion¬ 
ally in gathering and hunting societies are most often a reflection 
of lost patience or momentary anger on the part of an adult rather 
than demands for some kind of generalized obedience (e.g. Ton- 
kinson, 1978). 
By far the most common form of discipline of young children 
in all foraging societies is joking and ridicule. Children are 
teased and scolded humorously. If they get angry at the teasing 
they are not punished for demonstrating their anger. Among the 
Mardudjara 
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temper tantrums are tolerated with great patience and 
resignation by adult — and less so by older siblings. 
The offended child is rarely disciplined unless it is 
jealously threatening violence against a younger sibling 
or one of its parents at a time when they feel unwell. 
...The usual adult reaction to temper tantrums is to 
cover the face and other vital parts as best one can 
while the assault continues, and laughingly protest 
until the child gets what it want, or forgets and goes 
away (Tonkinson, 1978: 64-65). 
The Netsilik parents' permissiveness, marked by lack 
of bodily punishment or even scolding, was very 
characteristic. The small boy behaved like an all- 
powerful being, doing as he pleased. The parents' 
anger was provoked only when valuable objects were 
broken. Occasionally, however, they engaged in teasing 
and slightly deriding the boy, and mocking came in¬ 
creasingly to be a disciplinary strategy (Balikci, 
1970: 106-107). 
It should be noted that what Balikci refers to as a "disciplinary 
strategy" is a common mode of interaction among all members of 
gathering and hunting societies, regardless of their age. This 
is not a special strategy developed to affect the behavior of 
children only. On the contrary, a mode of social intervention 
and conflict resolution commonly used by all the people in the group 
is simply applied to children as well. 
The Social Context of Learning: 
Summary 
The social environment of learning in nomadic foraging societies 
provides for a remarkably smooth transition from childhood to 
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adulthood. The framework for socialization that is formed by the 
connection with the physical environment, the balances between the 
need to belong and the need to acquire status, and the sexual 
division of labor is an extraordinarily flexible context of learning, 
yet this framework itself is not a matter of choice. Everything 
that children in these societies learn contributes to their 
survival in the physical environment and to their becoming 
competent members of the group they are born into, and it is 
likely that similar environments for learning have existed in human 
societies since the Pleistocene. For as many as 2,000,000 years 
human children have grown to maturity in small bands made up of 
families bound together by kinship and other reciprocal ties. In 
such groups children have, for millennia, acquired personal identity 
and individual status within a context of common skill and activity. 
In all those years the sexual division of labor and different 
dimensions of experience for males and females have characterized 
the social environment in which children learned to identify them¬ 
selves and have ensured the equality of the participants in the 
male-female partnership. No matter what environment the band lived 
in, no matter what its cultural idiosyncracies, children have, until 
rather recently, grown up witnessing adult behavior in a wide range 
of situations, seeing the elderly change and die, seeing babies 
arrive and develop. These are the cues of the human social 
environment which call forth, for completion through learning, 
the socio-emotional responses associated with belonging and 
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attachment, individual identity and personal importance. This is the 
social environment in which the active human organism has made its 
investigations for hundreds of thousands in not millions of years. 
Activities of Learning in Nomadic Foraging Societies 
In Chapter 2 the primary activities of learning in all higher 
primate societies were identified as observation, imitation, play 
and investigative behavior or exploration. These same activities 
occupy the bulk of a young child’s time in every gathering and 
hunting band. 
As with other catarrhines, it is impossible to consider these 
activities separately, for they form a complex of daily activity 
for children that begins just after birth and, in a sense, never 
ends. From the carrying sling close to the mother, infants watch 
the comings and goings of young and old alike, observe tool making, 
storytelling, singing, dancing and arguing. Little is done out of 
their sight, for they are carried everywhere by their mothers. If 
infants do not actually witness the hunt, they surely hear the men 
retell it when they arrive back in camp, and if extra-marital 
liasons are conducted where they cannot be observed, children exper¬ 
ience their repercussions when the lovers are found out by the rest 
of the band. 
As they grow older, are weaned, and begin to spend more of 
their time among their peers, children in foraging societies, like 
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all children everywhere, actively imitate others — adults, older 
children, even animals — and these imitations become games. 
Children play at what they see going on around them, and in this 
fashion they learn the skills and information they will need 
as adults. 
The [Malaya Semang] children were sitting contentedly, 
and very silent, apart in the forest, hidden by the 
undergrowth. "What are you doing there?" I asked 
little Bunga. 
"Making hanya (huts)," he answered, meaning that they 
were playing house. 
They had made little shelters (hanya) in exact 
imitation of the big ones, and sleeping-places of 
bamboo. There they were sitting in families, man and 
wife, all with lighted cigars in their mouths. The fire 
was burning on the hearth and they were going to do the 
cooking. They had all decked themselves with flowers 
and foliage (Schebesta, 1927: 82). 
As her hunting skills increase the kit jina [Tiwi girl] 
beings to join other children of both sexes in inde¬ 
pendent expeditions. The children wander about the bush 
in a gang, playing tag and singing as they go. The boys 
may take pot shots at birds throwing stones high into the 
trees and making a contest of it. The girls collect 
berries, small fruits, and bird's eggs. If anything 
worthy of cooking is found and they are far from camp, 
the gang will make a fire, cook, and carefully portion 
out the food. I once saw one rather small fish divided 
among eight hungry children (Goodale, 1971: 38). 
It is important to note that there is virtually no instruction 
by adults or older children associated with the children's play. 
Indeed, it appears that there is a conscious acknowledgement of the 
value and necessity of learning from experience in nomadic foraging 
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societies. Goodale writes of the Tiwi: 
We have seen that very young children are allowed liter¬ 
ally to play with fire, and never once did I hear a parent 
telling their child, "Now be careful, dear." The 
maxim "experience is the best teacher" seems to be 
rigidly followed... Generally parents or other adults 
will only interfere in their child's activities when they 
become really dangerous to some other younger child 
who cannot fend for itself (Goodale, 1971: 36). 
Draper describes a scene in a !Kung encampment: 
One afternoon I watched for 2 hours while a father 
hammered and shaped the metal for several arrow points. 
During the period his son and his grandson (both under 
4 years old) jostled him, sat on his legs, and attempted 
to pull the arrow heads from under the hammer. When the 
boys' fingers came close to the point of impact, he 
merely waited until the small hands were a little farther 
away before he resumed hammering. Although the man 
remonstrated with the boys (about once every 3 minutes), 
he did not become cross or chase the boys off; and they 
did not heed his warnings to quit interfering. Even¬ 
tually, perhaps 50 minutes later, the boys moved off a 
few steps to join some teenagers lying in the shade 
(Draper, 1976: 206). 
A few pages later Draper adds: 
1 never observed a man who was working at this job 
[dressing an antelope hide] attempted to get help from 
his own or another child. Nor did the man volunteer 
information or advice about how the job was done. He 
simply worked with the children squatting at the edge 
of the hide watching and nibbling with apparent ab¬ 
sorption, then moving on to some other pastime (Draper, 
1976: 212). 
Finally, Blur ton Jones and Konner (1976) provide a good example 
of the kind of relationship that exists 
between the learners and 
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their "teachers" in gathering and hunting societies: 
This indirect adult communication of important infor¬ 
mation seems comparable to the indirect way young men 
acquire information about animals and technology, which 
appears to be quite simply a matter of watching and 
and listening to other people and then trying for one's 
self. There is almost no direct teaching. Indeed, 
Konner witnessed an enlightening argument between some 
younger men who hunt very little and some older and more 
active men. The inactive young men accused the older 
men of having neglected to teach them hunting. The 
older men countered that this was not something that one 
taught anybody, it was something that one just did. 
"You teach yourself" — a very common phrase among the 
!Kung — would be applicable here (Blurton Jones and Konner, 
1976: 338-339). 
As in other catarrhine societies, the connections between the 
environment of learning and the activities of learning in nomadic 
foraging societies are profound in that there is little or no 
separation between the form and content of a child's socialization. 
Most of the daily activities are, simply, things that one does. 
You teach yourself; how should these things be learned except 
by doing them? By playing with fire or with knives and exploring 
their properties children learn respect for them soon enough, by 
playing at sex (e.g. Shostak, 1981; Tonkinson, 1978) a child learns 
its power and its complexity. Everything must be investigated, 
experiments must be made (see Chapter 5). A child in a foraging 
society will become an adult in a foraging society. 
Play, or perhaps more properly "playfulness" does not end 
with adulthood. In all foraging bands in every part of the world 
154 
humor, joking, miming, etc. are important aspects of adult inter¬ 
action as well as children's play. Husbands and wives joke with 
each other and with their children, and grandparents may easily 
become involved in children's games. The importance of play in 
nomadic foraging societies extends through childhood and into 
adulthood because it is not only a way for children to practice 
and learn but for the whole group to keep channels of relation¬ 
ship open and reaffirm social values by "testing them in play" 
(Briggs, 1979) . Formal joking relationships are recognized in 
many foraging societies (Balikci, 1970; Shostak, 1981), and, 
as intimated above, a good sense of humor, a willingness to engage 
in a joke or a game, and a desire to entertain others are highly 
valued qualities. * 
It is in this context of general playfulness and good humor 
that children in nomadic foraging societies learn many of the 
attitudes and values that are most important to the peaceful inter¬ 
action of individuals in an intimate group. 
That first chortle of joy given by the newborn infant 
when it realizes that its new world is, after all, 
just as secure as the old one, is perhaps its first 
lesson in conflict resolution. Chortles quickly be¬ 
come laughter, and this laughter becomes the Mbuti's 
prime weapon against conflict, aggression, and violence 
(Turnbull, 1983: 45). 
Children are rarely, if ever, preached to, and lectures, like 
discipline, are often the results of situational anger on the part 
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of adults rather than a mode for the inculcation of "right" 
attitudes and behaviors. 
If there is little or no formal instruction in the learning 
of day-to-day subsistence activities and fundamental values, 
one might expect that the transmission of the history of The People — 
the tales of former times and myths — would involve some teaching 
behavior. But as with the learning of kinship structure (Tonkin- 
son, 1978) this is apparently not the case. 
Just as there is no formal education among them, no 
formal inculcation of mythology occurs and the telling 
of myths is not given a special place by the Mardudjara 
in the framework of ritual life (Tonkinson, 1978: 94). 
The !Kung seem to have little interest in teaching the 
lore of their forefathers to the children. The story¬ 
telling groups I observed consisted much more frequently 
of a small group of old people getting together for some 
real, grownup enjoyment. The telling of stories among 
San is no watered-down nursery pastime but the sub¬ 
stantial adult pleasure of old crownies over a bawdy or 
horrific or ridiculous tale. Children are not barred 
from listening to the stories, and they do wander in and 
out of a group of storytelling adults as freely as they 
do at a trance dance. They may listen with considerable 
interest for a while (Beisele, 1976: 307). 
Individual magic, good luck charms, spells, etc. are impor¬ 
tant in all foraging societies, yet there is no evidence that child¬ 
ren are taught these procedures by adults. Netsilik Eskimo children 
are given amulets to protect and help them at an early age, and 
continue to acquire them as they grow older, and the adults in 
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Netsilik society practice certain kinds of magic, both black and 
white. But apparently these practices are not passed directly 
from parents or other relatives to children (Balikci, 1970). 
It is likely that in this realm of informal, individualized magic 
the children simply observe their elders and imitate them or, 
since much of this individualized magic is performed secretly, they 
hear tales of how the magic was made and what its outcome was. 
Formal instruction. There are, however, certain areas of skill and 
knowledge which, in some gathering and hunting societies, are 
sometimes transmitted to the young through what we might call formal 
education. These areas are usually the specialized activities 
associated with healing, ceremony, and the supernatural. Though the 
amount and intensity of formal instruction in these areas vary 
between different societies, it is important to note that memor¬ 
ization, rote learning, repetition, etc. were not invented by 
schools in modern societies but have probably served special purposes 
in highly charged learning environments for much of human existence. 
Among the Mardudjara, the Mbuti and the !Kung very little 
formal education of any kind takes place. The shamans or mabarn 
of the Mardudjara are "not required to go through the elaborate special 
initiations modeled on death and rebirth, that have been reported 
for the Eastern Desert regions" (Tonkinson, 1978: 197). The 
!Kung have many trance-dance healers, both male and female, and 
for those who would acquire n/um there although there is support 
157 
appears to be no special instruction in either the acquisition of 
n/UTn or the healing activities one engages in using n/um. 
Teaching is primarily by example. The teacher has been there 
before" (Katz, 1976: 295). 
On the other hand, among the Eskimo the boys who are to become 
shamans are selected by the shamans themselves. 
The angatkoks were in the habit of observing the be¬ 
havior of boys, to discover if some bright young man had 
received the call. Once selection had been made, the 
formal training started. Initially the novice joined 
the household of an elderly angatkok-teacher, where he 
observed a series of special taboos, such as abstaining 
from eating outdoors, from eating liver, head, heart 
or intestines, and from having sexual relations. The 
novice, assisted by a spirit, slept intermittently 
and began having visions. Then he moved to a separate 
igloo where, during a period of several weeks, he was 
taught the secret vocabulary together with necessary 
shamanistic techniques•and obtained his paraphernalia 
(a headdress and a belt) from his parents (Balikci, 
1970: 225). 
During the winter both Kakut and Kakumee began to 
receive instruction in the shaman’s secrets known to 
their father, for long ago it had been decided that these 
two sons of the shaman would follow in the path of old 
Ajut. 
Ajut revealed to his sons all that he himself knew 
of the spirits and demons, and taught them the magic 
spells which are spoken in an ancient language. He 
explained the manner of calling on Kaila, the Wind of the 
Sky and the great God of all men. He warned the youths 
of the dangers of Jaija, Apopa and other spirits, and 
explained how they could master these beings (Mowat, 
1951, 183-184). 
Many observers (e.g. Strehlow, 1970; Meggitt, 1962; Maddock, 
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1972) testify to the elaborate formality of the Australian male 
initiation rites in some aboriginal bands and to the direct 
teaching of initiates that forms an important component of these 
ceremonies. Strehlow repeats the description of a Northern 
Aranda informant: 
The old men took me apart from the other young men of my 
own age at an early date. They showed me many gura 
ceremonies which they withheld from the other members of 
the bandicoot clan because they were still too young. 
My elders kept on repeating these ceremonies time and 
again in my presence; they were afraid that I might 
forget them (Strehlow, 1970: 115). 
Meggitt describes a Walbiri initiation ceremony similarly: 
Each dramatization lasts for about five minutes, and 
several episodes may be enacted in succession. 
The actors retire to the bush to remove their de¬ 
coration; and men of the boys' patriline harangue him 
violently, explaining the meaning of the ritual and 
warning him on pain of death not to divulge the in¬ 
formation to women or children (Meggitt, 1962: 287). 
As we have seen, children in nomadic foraging societies learn 
the bulk of what they need to know in order to survive and thrive 
through the same activities of leaning that are common to all 
catarrhine species. But there are areas of human experience that 
are supercharged with meaning, areas of cultural experience in 
which a significant amount of formal instruction takes place. 
These areas of individual and social experience are vitally im 
portant to The People too, for they serve to extend social bonds into 
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other worlds and different states of consciousness. They give 
The People a sense of continuity with the past and with one another, 
and at the same time they offer individuals the opportunity for 
profound personal experience, status, and identity. 
Formal instruction is most probably not a recent human 
invention, but it is important to note that although the method 
appears to be a departure from the activities through which children 
in nomadic foraging societies usually learn what they need to 
know, the activity is really not very different from those that 
form the primary modes of learning in other areas of living. 
Most of the learning about ceremony and spiritual matters is 
derived through observation and listening, and by imitating what is 
seen. From the earliest age, all children are familiar with the 
fact that ceremonies take place and are important — even if 
children have not been permitted to witness them or do not fully 
understand the conversation surrounding them. Among the Walbiri 
although the youngsters do not attend totemic ceremonies, 
they often sit with their fathers when the latter dis¬ 
cuss ritual matters in all-male company; it is thought that 
the boys are too young to understand these conversations 
(Meggitt, 1962: 116). 
And again: 
One of the most striking things about !Kung education 
for !kia is that it is very much a normal process of 
socialization. Every male tries to become a master of 
n/um, though he may try more or less hard. Many years 
before a person seriously tries to become a n/um master 
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he is playing with !kia. A group of five-and six-year- 
olds may perform a small !kia dance, imitating the 
structure of the dance, the dance steps, and the !kia 
gestures, at times falling as if in !kia. Through 
play, the child is modeling; as he grows up, he is learning 
about !kia (Katz, 1976: 289). 
No doubt young Mbuti girls hear about the elima from pubes- 
cent girls who are either anticipating the ceremony or have gone 
through it, and they witness the assault of the initiates on 
young men at the end of the elima (Turnbull, 1961). By the same 
token, all children in a foraging band have seen a shaman or healer 
at work before they are very old. They may not understand the 
cultural significance or the origin of the words used or the gestures 
made, but they witness the activities and their results. Certainly 
if children get sick, they become participants in healing 
ceremonies. 
Participation is the key to an understanding of learning in 
nomadic foraging societies. If it is true that during an Aus¬ 
tralian aboriginal initiation ceremony the ritual leaders explain 
the significance of the events to those being initiated, it is also 
true that the novices are the central figures in the ceremony. They 
are the reason for the ritual and they know it. The explanation is 
never separate from the meaning. Information is always vital, 
immediate. To use a term coined earlier in this chapter, the 
"absolute meaning" connected with the subsistence activities one 
must learn in a nomadic foraging society and the social dynamics 
161 
one must become competent with, is extended into the interpretations 
of spiritual experience that children must also acquire. This 
k^-n~like relationship between information and participation, between 
learning and doing, between skill and application incorporates all 
activities of learning in gathering and hunting societies. One 
learns to become an adult in a gathering and hunting society 
simply by becoming one. 
Learning and Evolution: A Summary 
In this and in the previous chapter of this study an attempt 
has been made to describe some of the elements of children’s learning 
from an evolutionary perspective. This perspective assumes that 
learning in all animals has been shaped by the processes of evo¬ 
lution. What this means is that the ability to learn originated 
in the context of selection and mutation, and that what is learned 
affects the survival of the individual in the physical environ¬ 
ment and may affect the structure of the genome of the deme. 
Thinking about learning as an evolutionary process has at least 
two important implications: (1) learning, like evolution, is 
a process which consists of random and regulatory elements and 
normally seeks a dynamic equilibrium, and (2) learning, as a product 
of evolutionary processes, is mediated by emotional systems that 
both encourage animals to encounter the physical and social 
environments actively and frame the context within which they 
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seek experience. 
In Chapter 2 learning in higher primate societies was inves¬ 
tigated through the axes of social organization. It was argued 
in this chapter that these dimensions of social organization were 
all related to at least three emotional systems that motivated 
individuals to 
a. belong to a group 
b. identify themselves as individuals in the context of 
that group 
c. learn 
Learning in catarrhine societies serves to acquaint young 
primates with the environments in which they live and the com¬ 
plexities of the social lives they must lead. The learning is 
mediated by emotional systems that draw animals together and 
urge them to acquire status — and motivate them to interact 
with their environments. 
The activities of learning in all higher primate societies are 
observation, imitation, investigative behavior, and play; and these 
activities are admirably suited to the ends of primate learning: 
to become familiar with and competent in the physical and the social 
environments. Young primates learn how to do what adult primates 
do with ease, although there is no instruction in catarrhine 
societies. 
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In this chapter evidence for the transition from ape to human 
has been briefly examined, and it has been noted that the physical 
and social changes that marked the emergence of hominids and early 
humans had a tremendous impact on the learning of the young. The 
old primate axes of social organization were modified significantly, 
and the balances that enabled these animals of 2,000,000 to 1,000, 
000 years ago to live in groups yet acquire an increasingly complex 
individual identity became more refined — and, ultimately, quali¬ 
tatively different. With the development of the sexual division of 
labor, the disappearance of female estrus, the emergence of the 
human family, the contextualization of male dominance, increased 
meat consumption, improved tool-making, etc. the early human of the 
Pleistocene had become a remarkable animal. There was an ever 
increasing amount to learn, and there were more ways of demonstrating 
skill and knowledge than were available to other primates. The 
emotional systems that mediated and were affected by learning became 
more complex with the evolution of the family and male-female 
reciprocity. 
For most of human existence, children were born into small, 
egalitarian societies. The demands of the external environment 
gave an absolute meaning to the activities of living and learning (as 
they had in other catarrhine societies), and the emotions that 
motivated learning were directly connected to what was learned and 
how what was learned should be applied. Learning in such a society 
was effortless because it was as much a part of becoming an adult 
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as the acquisition of motor coordination, language and sexuality. 
Nomadic•foraging societies were closeknit groups of relatives 
who were tied together in ways that are perhaps millions of years 
old (e.g. mother—infant bonds) and ways that are peculiar to the 
specific environment and culture (e.g. the !Kung trance dance). 
At the same time people in these societies were distinct in¬ 
dividuals who insisted on being recognized as such by the other mem¬ 
bers of the group. 
, In all probability the environments for and activities of 
learning described in this chapter remained, in kind, essentially 
unchanged for hundreds of thousands if not millions of years and 
reflect common responses, adaptations, of the human species. This 
evolutionary heritage of human beings forms an important part of the 
human sense of self and the relation of self to community. These 
emotional motivations represent the deepest layers of human identity 
and individuality and the deepest layers of the human need to 
associate, cooperate and organize. Not only are humans motivated 
to get together, they are motivated to do so with the same needs 
to belong, particpate and be important that characterize all human 
societies because these needs have been present in hominid and early 
human societies for at least a million years. 
In the next chapter the ramifications of this heritage for 
children going to school in a modern technological society like 
the United States will be explored. If the associations of human 
learning with fundamental needs to belong and to acquire individual 
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identity are as old as the species itself (and in many cases older), 
it is imperative that we try to understand the impact these emo¬ 
tional systems have on the learning of children in the formal 
educational environments of modern technological societies, for if 
the purposes of formal education for children today are the subject 
of vehement debate, the purposes of learning must still be to enable 
a child to survive and thrive in both the physical and social 
environments in which he or she lives. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN SCHOOLING 
Learning has an ancient evolutionary past, and there are 
emotional systems and activities associated with primate learning 
in general and human learning in particular that are biologically 
based and are common to the entire species. Human learning 
developed as an organic process which prepared children for survival 
in particular physical environments and for competence in a social 
group. But the physical environments of large urban societies are 
very different from those in which nomadic foraging societies 
existed for perhaps 2,000,000 years, and the social context of 
learning in modern technological societies is likewise different 
from the social environments that produced the human learning adap¬ 
tation. In nomadic foraging societies there is no separation 
between what and how children learn and what they will become, but 
this division is quite common in modern societies. 
When confronted with the tremendous gulf that separates life 
in a !Rung band from life in New York City, many doubt the utilit> 
of an evolutionary perspective as a framework for thinking about 
problems and opportunities in modern society. All this about the 
hunter-gatherers is fine, but so what? Things are very different 
now." Certainly this is true. Human beings have changed the 
physical environment radically in much of the world and may have 
upset ecological balances tuned in the processes of evolution loi 
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millions of years. We live in societies of hundreds of millions, 
maintain contact with every corner of the earth through tech¬ 
nological systems, and preserve the information we generate in print, 
on tape, or on film. Indeed, the human species, evolved in the 
context of the social relations of a band in a direct connection 
with the physical environment,has proven to be extraordinarily 
"adaptable." We can survive in slums and ghettos, in suburban 
isolation, in huge organizations, separated from our families. 
And this ability to "adapt" to new or rapidly changing social and 
physical environments is sometimes offered as evidence that there 
are no significant biological constraints on human activity or 
organization. But our ability as a species to develop this astound¬ 
ing range of phenotypical adaptations has also led us into serious 
social and environmental problem's and into great distress for a 
large number of people throughout the world. 
This chapter is grounded in the notion that much of our dis¬ 
tress and many of our problems are related to the difficulty 
(often the impossibility) of fulfilling biologically based human 
needs. The chapter is in four sections. The first is a general 
description of the profound changes that have taken place in the 
environment for the learning of the young since the development of 
sedentary societies approximately 10,000 years ago. Obviously a 
detailed historical account of these changes is beyond the scope 
of this study, but in the context of the socio-emotional systems 
168 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 some sense of the power and the extent 
of these changes may be derived. 
The second section discusses three areas of "new" skill and 
knowledge that are required in a modern technological environ¬ 
ment: encountering and dealing with rapid change, impossible amounts 
of information, and heightened competition. In this section some 
of the difficulties that can arise with the superimposition of these 
new attributes on older needs and expectations are noted. 
In the third section of this chapter, one specific environment 
for children’s learning, the school, will be examined in some detail. 
Certainly children learn in a multitude of environments in modern 
societies—in their homes, in peer groups, church groups, etc.— 
but it is the school that is charged by the society with the 
responsibility of educating children, and in many people’s minds 
education and learning are synonomous. Whatever education is, 
or is supposed to be, children spend a great deal of their time 
in school, and for this reason alone the environment of the school 
has a great impact on their learning. 
The final section of this chapter examines the ideas of 
representative authors in three areas crucial to children's education 
(1) how learning is best done, (2) the role of adults in children s 
learning, and (3) the relationship between the educational 
institution and the larger society. Again, a thorough examination 
of educational thought in these areas in not possible in this study. 
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but in the context of the evolutionary perspective developed in 
previous chapters some insight into these important issues may be 
obtained. 
A Much Changed Environment for Learning 
Attenuation of the Connection with the Physical Environment 
Nomadic foraging societies, and indeed all primate groups, 
are directly dependent upon the physical environment for food, shel¬ 
ter, and tools. The fluctuations of the physical environment are 
intertwined with not only the subsistence needs but also the social 
life of the group.in these societies, and the size of the band 
and its patterns of fission and concentration are determined in 
consort with seasonal cycles, animal migrations, water availability, 
etc. 
The development of agriculture, or more properly the devel¬ 
opment of widespread sedentary living, wrought great changes in 
human society—changes wich grew more rapid and complex with the 
development of more and more sophisticated technology and which 
we are only now beginning to understand. Living permanently in the 
same place allowed the accumulation of material wealth, and an 
assured food supply in association with large numbers contributed 
to specialization. 
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The development of large permanent societies upset the ancient 
social balances of the nomadic foraging way of life dramatically. 
One of the most serious implications of the attenuation of a people's 
direct connection with the natural environment is that what has 
been called in previous chapters the "absolute meaning" of one's 
activity becomes increasingly relative. When a !Kung woman goes 
out to gather food, when men go out to hunt, when children imitate 
their parents and other adults, there is no separation between the 
activity and group and individual survival and well being. But 
in modern technological societies the relationship between daily 
activity and the actual requirements of survival are often extra¬ 
ordinarily abstract. Certainly pushing a cart through a supermarket 
is "food getting," but the activity is devoid of the meaning 
implied by gathering or hunting. There are echos of this gap 
between what we do and the reasons we do it in the satisfaction 
we derive or do not derive from our work, and there are important 
implications of this gap for children's learning. 
A related development of the attenuation of the connection with 
the natural environment has to do with the link between survival 
and well being in a social group. In nomadic foraging societies, 
the organization for subsistence and the organization for sociality 
are one and the same, and there is a direct relationship between 
the well being of the members of the group, the need for cooperation, 
and individual and group survival. As societies have grown largei 
and larger in human history and as humans have refined and extended 
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their abilities to produce food and affect the physical environment 
it has become possible to be assured of survival and have ab¬ 
solutely no assurance of well being. At least one of the results 
of this separation is alienation—from nature, from our own feelings, 
and from the means of subsistence. A good example of this is the 
meaningless job which provides money (which ensures survival) but 
which also undermines well being every day. 
Attenuation of the Ties That Bind 
Throughout most of human existence social groups consisted of 
a relatively small number of people who were related to one another 
either consanguineally or affinally. The individuals in these 
bands were connected to a number, of people in other bands, and in 
all these societies everyone knew everyone else well and people 
interacted with one another in a wide variety of situations and 
on a daily basis. This context of closeness gave the people of 
these small societies a sense of security and belonging, and 
overlapping systems of reciprocity developed in every culture in 
every part of the world to reinforce these ties. 
As human civilizations have become larger, balances that char¬ 
acterized early human societies have become drastically altered. 
A modern society like the U.S. is so large and diffused that it is 
impossible to know more than a few members of any group at a 
time, and most intimate relationships are highly individualized. 
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Although kinship still has some importance in modern societies, 
families are often scattered in different parts of the country— 
or even throughout the world. The nuclear family structure that 
was probably the fundamental unit of human society for as much as 
2,000,000 years still exists, but in a highly abstracted and 
isolated form. Further, the nuclear family in any form is breaking 
down in many societies. 
Reciprocal arrangements still characterize human society, but 
they too have become abstracted and "linearized." Human reci¬ 
procity in modern technological societies is often mediated by 
money, legal systems, and/or organizational arrangements—all of 
which act to reduce the complex, multi-dimensional, emotional 
interactions associated with reciprocity in nomadic foraging societies 
to formal, quantified balances. 
With the abstraction of family life and the general reduction 
of the number of opportunities for closeness, cooperation and 
belonging has come a generalization of social ties. The focus of 
human care, concern and loyalty has shifted, at least in part, from 
kin relations to political, institutional, or special interest 
entities. Hundreds of communities form in large societies, some 
of which have relationships to kindred (extended to include 
ethnicity, for example) or to nationalism (e.g. the American 
*For example, the 1980 U.S. Census shows a dramatic rise in the num 
ber of single parent families from 1970. 
173 
Legion), and some of which have little relation to either. There 
are Hispanic communities, gay communities, academic communities, 
religious communities, scientific communities and so on. But 
the commonality represented by a given designation of "community" 
may or may not be bound by place, may find its connection in a 
particular abstraction (e.g. a religion), or only, as in the case of 
the scientific community, through the processes of abstraction. 
A community may or may not have families at its core and may or 
may not be neighborly. It may be perceived from without and/or 
from within, and it is quite possible for an individual in the U.S. 
to belong to several, sometimes contradictory, communities at the 
same time. Who are The People now? 
One other characteristic of modern life associated with the 
profound changes that have occurred in the ways people are bound 
together should be discussed here: the shift in the place and 
importance of children in modern society. As noted in the previous 
chapter, children are at the center of nomadic foraging societies— 
the "lodestones" of a kingroup—and they serve to bind members of 
the group more closely together. However, in modern societies 
children are often liabilities. Children (and, for that matter, 
the elderly, the handicapped) slow down a society bent on tech¬ 
nological achievement, industrial production and successful com¬ 
petition, and the "child centered" societies of the human past have 
given way in most parts of the world to an "adult centered society 
in which there is little room for children to participate. 
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This is not to say that parents are not attached to or focused 
upon their children in modern societies but only that many parents 
are torn between what they perceive is necessary for success in 
the modern world and what they perceive is necessary for their 
children. The schools in the United States reflect this gap and 
the attendant confusion. Schools have been characterized as 
"holding tanks" where children may be taken care of, taught in¬ 
formation and skill, given every opportunity—and at the same time 
be kept out of the mainstream activities of the society. 
The Triumph of Self-Interest 
Membership in a group is no longer the automatic and obvious 
advantage it has always been in human life. As we have seen, in 
nomadic foraging societies the need of each individual in the group 
to have status and identity is balanced by the need to belong and 
to be secure. As long as the group remained small and in tune with 
the cycles and fluctuations of the physical environment this balance 
was remarkably stable because it enabled people to survive with 
relative ease and offered them opportunities to both belong to a 
social group and be individually important in that group. Self- 
interest is held in check on all fronts through conventions of 
sharing and gift-giving, through duties of kinship and marriage, 
through joking and ridicule of the arrogant and selfish, and through 
the very proximity of people to one another. But in modern tech- 
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nological societies self-interest is held in check only in par¬ 
ticular areas. Many kinds of self-interest are, in fact, encouraged, 
rewarded, and unbridled. 
The very size of modern societies and the profusion of alle¬ 
giances that are necessary for well being in them make it possible 
for people to evade social responsibility rather easily. Cephu, 
the Mbuti hunter who sought to obtain a better catch for himself 
by putting his nets in advance of the other hunters,could not 
avoid the consequences of his transgression. The band was so 
small that once Cephu had been discovered the word passed rapidly. 
Soon all were involved. Life in a modern society is quite 
different. In part because real intimacy is often confined to 
individual relationships (e.g. marriages, friendships) rather than 
extended to whole groups of people, it is possible to remain 
relatively anonymous in many areas of social activity and thus 
pursue one's own ends with little interference from others. At 
the same time, since the criteria for acceptable behavior and skill¬ 
ful accomplishment in a modern society are so unclear, it is 
possible to feign both social and personal competence without getting 
found out. It "nothing is hidden in the igloo" of the Netsilik 
Eskimo, a great deal may be hidden in an inner-city apartment or 
a suburban home. 
Finally, when wrongdoers are uncovered in a modern society 
they are usually referred to an "authority" so that the people who 
have suffered at the hands of the offending individual are 
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separated from that individual's chastisement. They too may evade 
responsibility in that they don't have to deal with the transgressor 
as an individual. It would never have occurred to the other members 
of Cephu's band to refer his case to a regional Mbuti court. 
The Male-Female Imbalance 
Many of the changes that have had a significant effect on the 
development of individual identity and sense of self have taken 
place in the area of male-female relations and the division of 
labor. In nomadic foraging societies the relationship between 
males and females is characterized by a system of balances and 
reciprocities that is formed by two rather different but overlapping 
dimensions of activity and experience. The sexual division of 
labor is a fundamental theme of social organization in every 
nomadic foraging society and is a central element of the environ¬ 
ment of learning for children as they develop a sense of self and 
of how they fit in their world. 
Though the sexual division of labor has persisted into modern 
times the balances that characterized it in nomadic foraging so¬ 
cieties have altered profoundly. The status of women in all the 
world's large societies is substantially diminished from what it was 
in the pre-sedentary stage of human history. In fact, it is not 
entirely facetious to suggest that a "history of civilization" might 
be organized in terms of the accelerating erosion of the impor- 
177 
tance of the female dimension of experience in social structure 
and decision-making. This erosion is related to other changes noted 
above, of course—to increased distance from the natural environ¬ 
ment, to large size and specialization, and to the reduction of the 
central place of children in the life of the society—but however 
it has come about it has resulted in an imbalance of status and 
influence of such proportions in modern societies that a growing 
number of people, both men and women, find it intolerable. 
Not only has the balance itself been eroded but the entire 
framework through which males and females cooperated and through 
which each might obtain a somewhat different but equivalent status 
has broken down. Today there appears to be only one line of achieve¬ 
ment that is recognized by the society at large, and women who 
find their negligible importance.unacceptable are constrained to 
discover their identity in terms described bymale experience in 
the course of rather recent human history. The impact of this 
breakdown of balance on the environment of learning for children 
cannot be over-emphasized (see below). 
Cognitive Systems and Emotional Systems 
One of the most remarkable changes that has occurred in the 
development of large societies and civilization is the ever- 
increasing emphasis on cognitive activities that take place outside 
the context of subsistence and social life. This is something 
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completely unique in human history, for in nomadic foraging 
societies there is no need to abstract cognitive processes from 
the normal processes of food-getting, socializing, healing, cere¬ 
mony, etc. This separation of cognitive skill from other areas 
of human activity and particularly from the emotional systems that 
underlie social interaction—has had a significant effect on how 
modern society views children's learning and consequently on how 
children are educated. 
In a famous study among the Wolof in Senegal, Bruner gave 
Piagetian conservation tests to children who were (1) completely 
unschooled, (2) had attended village schools in rural areas, 
and (3) had gone to French schools in Dakar (1971). Bruner's 
findings indicate, that the performance of these children on the 
Piagetian tasks varied according to the amount of exposure to 
Western culture they had had and, specifically, to the amount and 
kind of schooling in which they had engaged. Thus Wolof children 
who had been educated in French schools in Dakar performed about 
as well as the European children tested originally by Piaget, while 
the Wolof children who had attended the "bush schools" or had 
attended no school at all performed at progressively lower levels. 
Other findings by Price-Williams (1961) and DeLacey (1970, 1971) 
substantiate Bruner's claim that schooling and exposure have a 
significant effect on the development of the ability to perform 
more sophisticated cognitive operations in the Piagetian hierarchy. 
This indicates that while the Piagetian concept of stages of 
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of Washington). To add to the confusion, we have also accepted the 
fact (at least to a certain extent) that if children do not acquire 
attributes that are connected with understanding, tolerating and 
preparing for change, they will be able to obtain neither security 
nor status in the world. Thus it is not surprising to see a 
growing respect in U.S. society for attributes such as "flexibility" 
and "tolerance for ambiguity" even though these are often super¬ 
imposed upon older social attributes such as "firmness of purpose" 
or "loyalty" with which they may at times appear to be at odds. 
"Going with the flow" is said to be different from being "weak 
and wishy-washy," though where the line of demarcation is is 
anybody's guess. Surely "rolling with the punches" in a modern 
society buys a little time to sort out the shifting characteris¬ 
tics of a particular situation or problem (or at least allows one 
to wait with less anxiety while they sort themselves out). Being 
flexible reserves one's energy, and enables one to avoid heavy 
emotional and/or physical investment in something that may prove 
to be ephemeral. It might be said, in fact, that attributes such 
as flexibility and tolerance for ambiguity are vital if an in¬ 
dividual is to maintain any sense of continuity or meaning in a 




Another new dimension of experience in a modern, industrial 
society is the existence of vast quantities of information, accumu¬ 
lated over more than 5,000 years and generated today at an ever- 
increasing rate. It is impossible for any individual to absorb, 
or even have access to, more than an infintessimal fraction of this 
whole, and surely part of the ambiguity we need to acquire a toler¬ 
ance of originates in the insecurity of our irremediable ignorance. 
This ignorance is all the more disquieting because there is every 
reason to believe that much of this information-that-we-cannot-know 
is vital. It serves as the basis for decisions that affect our 
liv&s profoundly but are made by others. 
In the age of the "information glut" it is important for people 
to not only learn to read, write, listen well and do math, but to 
develop organizing skills as well. It is not enough to analyze infor¬ 
mation; one must be able to systematize it too. In the absence of 
a common framework within which information may be interpreted — such 
as existed in nomadic foraging societies — we will be overwhelmed by 
the sheer quantity unless we know how to make connections, fit things 
together into categories, recognize patterns and relationships and 
prioritize them. All normally developed humans have the capacity 
to perform these cognitive activities, but as the amount of infor¬ 
mation that must be organized increases the intellectual processes 
involved become increasingly abstract, divorced from the experience 
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of individuals. 
Is it not possible that like the rhesus macaques described by 
Lewis and Sackett (see Chapter 2) our "willingness to perform" may 
be greatly diminished in such an environment? As with flexibility 
and tolerance of ambiguity, the need for new information processing 
skills is co-existent with the anxiety that is produced by our in¬ 
ability to catch up and by the linearity of abstraction. Perhaps 
it is true that, increasingly, the "successful" individuals in 
American life are people who can respond effectively and with minimal 
anxiety to change and who are able to organize information rapidly 
into useful categories, but it is also true that for others the 
anxiety is overwhelming. For those locked into specialized tasks 
that have become isolated from one another the sense of ignorance 
in all other areas but the specialty is frightening. In the face of 
ever-increasing specialization it is hard to genuinely belong any¬ 
where, and it is often easier to simply "find a niche" than to develop 
broad organizing and synthesizing skills. It may be that it is in 
part this very response that makes it possible for a highly special¬ 
ized and fragmented society to continue to function and to even 
further specialize and fragment. Unfortunately, this tendency is 
easily taken advantage of,and a new "skill" that lends itself most 
effectively to the maintenance of a highly specialized and compart¬ 
mentalized society is obedience. 
*'l’he criteria for the evaluation of success, especially in terms oi 
children's education, will be explored in Chapter 5. 
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Members of foraging bands are never "obedient" in the sense that 
we use the term in our society. Adults do not recognize an unques¬ 
tionable authority in leaders, nor do children recognize such author¬ 
ity in their parents. But people who are buried in inaccessible in¬ 
formation and frozen in specialities may find obedience an important 
"survival technique," and, of course, obedience can assuage the 
anxiety of unknowing. 
Heightened Competition and New Kinds of Self-Reliance 
Competition is muted in nomadic foraging societies, as noted in 
the previous chapter, but it forms a behavioral and philosophical 
cornerstone of modern industrial society. In U. S. society competi¬ 
tiveness demands a certain willingness to take a chance, to risk 
losing, and a new form of self reliance. The "skills" of competition 
range from an ability to assess the possibilities for winning or 
losing in a given competitive situation, to dogged determination, 
to unconscious talent, to ruthless amorality. In our time working 
around the rules, on their edge, or even outside them are skills that, 
like flexibility, are receiving more and more attention and respect. 
But even as flexibility may at times stand in contradiction to 
other important social attributes such as loyalty, the skills of 
successful competition are often in opposition to the need of even 
a highly fragmented society for cooperation. Indeed, self-reliance 
is an important characteristic of individuals in nomadic foraging 
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societies, but that self-reliance is, as we have seen, located in 
an all-pervasive social context. In our society self-reliance is 
simply laid over the need for reliance on others, and there is rarely 
an integration of the two. Although competition is encouraged in the 
schools, cooperation is encouraged too. Children are taught the value 
of team play even as they are urged to, first, measure their abilities 
against those of their teammates and, second, to beat the opposing 
team at all costs. The skills and attitudes of competition and the 
skills and attitudes of cooperation are often taught jumbled together 
indiscriminately, so that the predominant communication must be con¬ 
fusion and uncertainty. 
Adaptation to change, the dynamics of overwhelming masses of 
information, and the demands of competition are not the only new 
areas of skill and knowledge that are required of the human species 
in technological societies, but there is no doubt that these skills 
and attitudes represent unfamiliar territory for us all. We are 
coerced by the inexhorability and obvious speed of change into the 
acceptance and expectation of it, though for most of our past we 
perceived and expected none. We are innundated with perpetually 
novel information that is critical to our well-being but is beyond 
our reach either because it is simply impossible for us to absorb 
it or because we don't have access to it. We are urged towards 
specialization at increasingly early stages of life so that today's 
high school students often "major" in subject areas before they have 
any concept of how one subject may relate to another. 
190 
The schools are in a critical position, for we have asked them 
to not only pass on the skills of reading, writing and computing and 
the history and certain values of the culture, but to keep up with 
every change as well. The same parents who insist that their children 
learn a generalized respect for adults in school insist on computer 
literacy — or at least employability — as a result of their child¬ 
ren's schooling. The need for cooperation does not disappear in an 
environment which increasingly rewards self-interest and -reliance; 
the expectation of change does not supplant the expectation of con¬ 
tinuity and security. The schools are expected to prepare children 
for life in the modern world and at the same time keep them true to 
"basic" values and principles of the culture — even though there is 
less and less agreement as to what these values and principles are. 
This confusion of purposes for formal education and the sheer impos¬ 
sibility of the tasks assigned it become even more apparent in an 
examination of the schools themselves. 
The Environment and Activities of Learning in the Schools 
Attachment, Belonging, Cooperation 
Children bring with them to all social situations a need to 
belong and to be close, but the very size of the school and of 
individual classes makes it difficult for children to fulfill this 
need. American schools have grown in size steadily throughout their 
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history for a variety of reasons (see below). It has been argued, 
for example, that large schools are more efficient, that they are 
cheaper, they they expose children to a larger cross-section of 
society, that the efficiency of size makes it possible to provide 
a larger number of children with sophisticated equipment. So per¬ 
suasive have these arguments been in U. S. society that today in 
many parts of the country there are high schools serving more than 
4,000 students. Certainly there is little opportunity for children 
to belong in a community that may consist of 4,000 individuals who 
meet in changing groups of 30-35 throughout the day. In a school 
of 4,000 it is simply impossible to know everyone, to interact with 
everyone in a way that will provide a sense of belonging and security 
and this would be so even if other characteristics of the school en¬ 
vironment didn't exacerbate a child's isolation and anonymity. 
The emphasis on large size and economy in U.S. schools has had 
another significant effect on the learning environment. It has con¬ 
tributed to standardization and regularity in a kind of closed cycle: 
the move to economy (in this culture) implies larger size, which 
implies standardization, which allows further economy, which implies 
larger size. It may, indeed, be true that collecting as many as 
4,000 students together can make it possible to expose all of them 
to sophisticated learning environments and materials such as well- 
equipped biology labs and computers, but it goes without saying 
that so many children cannot use these facilities all at once, nor 
can they use them in a manner they devise themselves. A schedule. 
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is essential so that all will get a turn, and a formal curriculum 
must be drawn up so that all will have the same kind of experience 
with the equipment. This relationship between size and standardiza¬ 
tion is as evident on the level of the individual class as it is on 
the level of the school or the school system. Many of the rules im¬ 
posed on the behavior of, say, elementary school children originate 
in the sheer impossibility of dealing with large numbers of small 
children effectively on an individual basis. As Schumacher has shown 
(1973) the fact of large size alone demands certain kinds of organi¬ 
zational structures in any social institution, and schools are no 
exception. 
The isolation of children in the school environment in the con¬ 
text of an artificial social situation of impossible numbers is in¬ 
creased by the relative exclusion of the children's families from 
the life of the school. Of course parents are often involved in their 
children's education: they may be members of the PTA or the PAC, 
may serve on the School Committee, or take an interest in their child¬ 
ren's homework. But in no significant way are parents part of the 
day-to-day social interactions of a public school. Sometimes siblings 
are in the same school, but characteristically they are in a different 
grade and are thus not part of the small "community within a commun¬ 
ity" that is formed by a child's class. 
As chidren grow older and go to larger and larger schools their 
ability to participate as full members of the group that is formed by 
the classroom diminishes rapidly. To a certain extent elementary 
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school children may attain a sense of belonging and attachment to 
their class as a group. In a typical elementary school children 
usually have a single teacher and perhaps an aide for the entire 
year. They remain in a particular place for most of their school 
activities throughout the day — their room — which they often 
decorate with their own creations. Elementary schools are usually 
much smaller than junior high schools or high schools and are more 
likely to be set in neighborhoods so that young children are often 
in school with other children who are their friends outside of school. 
At the same time children in elementary schools are more likely to 
be encouraged to try everything rather than specialize. 
Compared to the intense closeness and sense of attachment and 
security that have been described for nomadic foraging societies, 
the life of the elementary school represents rather weak social 
involvement, and, of course, the quality of social life and the 
amount of genuine participation afforded youngsters varies from 
school to school. But being in an elementary school is like being 
in a hunting and gathering band compared to what is to come. 
At the age of 11 or 12 children in the public schools move from 
elementary schools to junior high schools. Suddenly a child on the 
verge of puberty or entering it is placed in unfamiliar teiritory, 
with a new selection of peers and new teachers with new, increasingly 
abstract expectations. One of the most confusing aspects of this 
change from an elementary school environment that provides at least 
some opportunity for closeness and contact to a junior high school 
1h the way in which the ilay is broken into small, usually hourly 
pieces that seem to have no relation to one another: English, Ameri¬ 
can History, Spanish, Gym. Each of these environments is dillorent 
* 
from the others, each remains somewhat unfamiliar throughout the 
year. These specialized, short-term learning environments provide 
few or no cues to help children get a sense of the relationship between 
the chunks of Information being imparted to them In each environment 
much less help them see a relationship between what they're feeling 
as young humans becoming adults and what they're getting in class. 
In many ways, we break down children's convictions 
that things make sense, or their hope that things 
may prove to make sense. We do it, first of all, 
by breaking up life into arbitrary and disconnected 
hunks of subject matter, which we then try to "inte¬ 
grate" by such artificial and irrelevant devices 
as having children sing Swiss folk songs while they 
are studying the geography of Switzerland (Holt, 
1964: 209). 
The tragmentat ion of subject matter is only one ellecl ol the 
specialization that breaks up closeness and community in the public 
schools. The identification by parents of teachers and school admin¬ 
istrators as "experts In education" tends to intimidate many parents 
who might otherwise become more involved in their children's lormal 
learning. Professional specialty gels in the way, and as the schools 
have taken on more and more of the socialization of young people in 
U. S. society a great breech has opened up between home and school 
Though in the sense that they are structured similarly they arc alil^ 
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In a similar way specialization often separates school administrators 
from teachers and some teachers from other teachers. 
In Chapter 3 it was noted that a variety of relationships and 
conventions serve to tie individuals in foraging bands together and 
ensure that cooperation will take place. Children in these societies 
grow in the context of meat-sharing partnerships, or gift-giving 
traditions, and they witness the results of broken reciprocal obli¬ 
gations. No such relations or traditions exist in the school except 
in the most attenuated and abstracted forms. For the most part the 
"exchange" relationships of a public school are one-sided and coercive 
for obeying the teacher and fulfilling the requirements of each class 
children get good grades and/or teacher approval. 
It is true that children are resourceful and resilient, and they 
form peer groups on their own that can and do provide some of the 
needed intimacy. But these groups are often like lifeboats in a great 
storm. They tend to be isolated from one another. Cliques form, 
gangs, clubs, and these groups often draw their identity more from a 
sense of who or what they are not than who they are. Then of course 
there are those who are left out, who have no group and live in per¬ 
petual anxiety. 
'The rift between shop teachers and academic teachers in vocational 
schools is a good example of this separation. 
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Place, Status, Identity 
Children in nomadic foraging societies determine to a remarkable 
extent how they will spend their time, what they will do, whom they 
will be with; and the general impression of children in these socie¬ 
ties is of confident little beings who have free run of the camp. 
Children in a gathering and hunting band have status through the very 
fact of their existence; adults pay attention to them, acceed to 
their wishes. 
In a public school, on the other hand, the children have very 
little control over their time or the direction of their energy and 
attention. Activities are usually closely scheduled, whether in 
elementary school or secondary school, and children have virtually no 
say as to when certain activities are engaged in much less whether 
they will be engaged in or not. A child who is hungry must wait until 
lunch time, a child with high energy — who would be running and 
playing with friends if he or she were outside -- must wait until 
recess, a child who has to go to the bathroom must have a pass. As 
lias been pointed out many times in the literature critical of the 
public schools (e.g. Holt, 1964; Silberman, 1970 — see below), 
all of the power in a school flows one way — from the teachers and 
administrators downward to children. Ihis is more like a gorilla 
dominance hierarchy (see Chapter 2) than a human social group. 
One of the more complicated obstacles for children who aie 
seeking identity and status to overcome is the manner in which schools 
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narrow the range of acceptable knowledge and skill and form them 
into hierarchies. All children have acquired a considerable reper- 
of skill and an extensive library of knowledge before they ever 
set foot in a school, and long after they begin school children retain 
respect for a wide range of abilities in one another. The child who 
can jump rope well acquires a certain status within the peer group — 
as does the child who can whistle, ride a bike or draw. But once 
children arrive at school they are rewarded primarily according to two 
main categories of skill: intellectual skills related to the acqui¬ 
sition and repetition of increasingly abstract information, and 
social skills that make it easier for the adults (e.g. getting along 
with others, keeping quiet, obeying). There is little opportunity 
for children to demonstrate or receive credit for other abilities 
they may have, and over time an official hierarchy of skill and 
knowledge, fostered by teachers and administrators (and often parents), 
is grudgingly accepted by children as they are confronted with it 
year after year. 
For young children reading well, memorizing the multiplication 
tables and keeping quiet may not be particularly important skills. 
There are other things that may attract their attention more force¬ 
fully. But the hierarchical valuation of skill that forms a pillar 
of the institutional learning environment results in an inevitable 
constriction of status possibilities until by the time an adolescent 
reaches high school there are great gulfs of status between, for 
1 skills and academic skills, and significant example, vocationa 
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and internalized differences between children who are in a "college 
preparation" course of study and those who are in a "general" course 
of study. Although there are exceptions,* it is possible to make 
the statement that in general the children with the most highly 
developed academic skills are the children with the most status — 
as far as the school is concerned. If this is not a simple hierarchy, 
given the exceptions and the status that individuals may obtain through 
peer groups, it is an inexhorable one, and it leaves its mark on all 
children who go through formal schooling in the U. S. 
In whatever way the status of an individual child in a school 
reflects the stratum of society from which he or she comes (see below), 
the situation is complicated and confused by the "culture of educa¬ 
tion" itself. Not only are the subject areas of formal education 
specialized but education itself, is a specialty, and many of the 
values that are imposed upon the environment of the school are educa¬ 
tional values — that is, doing well on tests, reading well, writing 
well, doing math, etc. The discontinuities between the educational 
subculture and the culture at large may help to account for the fact 
that everyone is dissatisfied with what the schools are doing. In 
the world of the school making a fine piece of furniture does not 
count for as much as doing well on a history test, and if the cri¬ 
teria for the selection of children for particular educational 
"tracks" reflect many presumptions and biases of the general culture, 
* The most obvious exception is athletics through which a poor stu¬ 
dent can achieve considerable status in the school. However, even 
this status is usually qualified. 
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they also reflect the specific biases of the educational community. 
One critical aspect of status, identity and importance for 
children in the schools has to do with the way in which they may be 
achieved. As noted above, there is a great deal of competition in 
school, and personal achievement is usually measured in terms of how 
one does in comparison with others. This is evident not only in a 
system of evaluation that involves hierarchical grades but in the 
emphasis of most schools in the U. S. on competitive team sports. 
The detrimental effects of grading on children's learning have been 
pointed out by many. 
One may wonder whether the present system of rewards 
and punishments as seen by pupils in school actually 
tends to inhibit the use of intuitive thinking. The 
assignment of grades in school typically emphasizes 
the acquisition of factual knowledge primarily because 
that is what is most easily evaluated; moreover, it 
tends to emphasize the correct answer, since it is the 
correct answer on the straightforward examination that 
can be graded as "correct" (Bruner, 1977: 66). 
One of the most negative effects of grading is that it further 
constricts the ways in which a child may be acknowledged in the school. 
As noted above, children — even through high school — retain some 
of their own notion of status that encompasses a much wider range 
than that approved by the school. But in terms of how children are 
viewed by adults in the school environment the range of achievement 
is narrow indeed. Even though children have their own ideas about 
what is important and who has status, they are heavily influenced by 
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the framework for the evaluation of achievement imposed by the grading 
system of the schools. 
At the same time, it is possible for children to obtain a rather 
different kind of status with adults by being cooperative, obedient, 
etc., regardless of their academic performance, and, as noted in the 
previous section, the double message of competition and cooperation 
easily leaves children confused about what they're supposed to do and 
how they fit with others. 
Well being for humans includes a sense of personal status and 
place in a social context. If this is so we must acknowledge the fact 
that in institutions of formal education in the U. S. we are social¬ 
izing children to learn to live without a complete sense of self. 
Children are being taught to find compensations (and sometimes find 
grotesque compensations) for,or to ignore, emotional systems that are 
deeply rooted in human biology. For some this compensation may indeed 
take the form of subordination to the directives of the adults in the 
school (and by extension to other authorities in the society). For 
others, "success" in school allows a certain status in the culture 
at large. Often this success results in a simple internalization of 
the values of the institution that made positive experiences possible 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1976). For others, the sense of powerlessness 
and anonymity that comes from having the need for status and personal 
identity thwarted results in violence, drug abuse, apathy and mental, 
if not physical dissociation from the life of the school. 
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Now, if children are taught to adopt alienation as a 
way of life, it follows that they must have feelings 
of inadequacy, for nothing so saps self-confidence as 
alienation from the Self. It would follow that school, 
the chief agent in the process, must try to provide the 
children with "ego support," for culture tries to rem¬ 
edy the ills it creates. 
Hence the effort to give recognition... That any¬ 
thing essential was nurtured in this way is an open 
question, for the kind of individuality that was re¬ 
cognized as the children picked titles out of the [song 
book] index was mechanical, without a creative dimen¬ 
sion, and under the strict control of the teacher. 
Let us conclude this discussion by saying that school 
metamorphoses the child, giving it the kind of Self 
the school can manage, and then proceeds to minister 
to the Self it has made (Henry, 1963: 291-292). 
The Attention Structure in the Schools 
Male-female roles and relations. As noted above, the relationship 
between men and women in modern technological society appears gro¬ 
tesquely unbalanced from an evolutionary perspective. This unbalance 
(and the anxiety it produces) is reflected in the schools and is in 
large part perpetuated there. Not surprisingly the gender roles 
presented to both boys and girls in the schools are often abstrac¬ 
tions of the already abstracted roles that exist for men and women 
in the larger society. 
Teachers expect little boys to fight on the playground 
but not little girls. They expect little boys to use 
naughty words, although duty requires teachers to cas¬ 
tigate them for it. But if a little girl uses naughty 
words teachers show deep trauma — a state of agitation 
that can hardly be lost on either boys or girls. So, 
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like parents, teachers foster the idea of protecting 
girls from sin; but tolerating it, even if not grace¬ 
fully, among boys who, according to cultural mandate, 
will all have to go through stages of vulgarity in 
order to develop properly (Hunt, 1975: 409). 
"Sexist" education, as this inculcation of different roles for 
boys and girls has been called, permeates all areas of the school 
environment: sports, dress codes, the curriculum. Boys are often 
required to take shop courses in junior high or high school, but 
are strongly discouraged from taking home economics. For girls, of 
course, it is exactly the opposite. The educational materials them¬ 
selves reflect the general imbalance in the culture. Little girls 
go through school reading stories and hearing tales that tell them 
that it is likely that their achievements in life will not be as 
important as those of boys, and boys are taught, in the same way, 
that revealing their feelings to others is a mark of weakness. 
The primary way in which these attitudes and identities are 
brought to children in the school is through the behavior and demon¬ 
strated attitudes of their teachers and administrators. Through 
elementary school most of a child's teachers are women, but most of 
the administrators are men. fn the cafeteria children witness the 
work of the "lunchroom ladies" and occasionally they catch a glimpse 
of the male janitor in the halls. 
In the gender roles children see adults playing in the school 
environment, in the attitudes of teachers and administratoLs, in the 
specialization of activities and courses for boys and girls and in 
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the subject matter itself, children are commanded to pay attention to 
particular patterns of activity through which a great deal of their 
gender identity, and thus their sense of self, will be acquired. 
The problem is not that these roles are different but that they are, 
for the most part, meaningless botli in terms of whether functions 
defined by the roles may best be performed by males or females, and 
in terms of the reciprocal relations that different roles for males 
and females ensured for most of human existence. 
Feminist research has helped to elucidate the kinds of imbalances 
that occur in the education of the young for gender roles in U. S. 
schools (e.g. Frazier and Sadker, 1973), and in recent years the issue 
of the roles boys and girls are compelled to observe and play in 
school has become prominent nationally (e.g. "The Pinks and the Blues," 
a PBS documentary, 1981). Many have urged the development of "non¬ 
sexist" education in which boys and girls are not educated from the 
perspective of difference but from the perspective of similarity. 
The best non-sexist education attempts to reestablish a balance and 
an equality between the experiences of men and women, boys and girls, 
but in attempting to make the experiences of boys and girls in school 
the same, non—sexist education may be confusing children in a dilInt¬ 
ent way (see below). 
The adult context. In a modern industrial society all adults with 
whom a child comes in contact are, so to speak, lacking in depth. 
Adults are unidimensional — or at best two dimensional figutes 
who fill particular, specialized roles and offer children foci for 
attention that are flat, unreal, and often uninteresting. The child 
rarely, if ever, sees adults responding to a variety of situations 
or playing a number of roles. There are retail clerks, teachers, 
ministers, nurses, etc. Even within the family the parents' work 
(that activity that commands such a great amount of their energy and 
attention) is mysterious to children.* 
Nowhere in the experience of children in modern industrial 
society is this fragmentation and reduction of the meaning of adult 
life more obvious and intensified than it is in the schools — and 
this situation has a negative effect on both the children and the 
adults involved. To begin with, there is no real connection between 
the world of the family and the world of the school, and the adult 
roles children do see their parents play usually have nothing what¬ 
ever to do with the adult roles they see their teachers and other 
school personnel play. Unless parents make an exceptional effort 
to include school life in the life of the home there is virtually 
no relationship between the experiences a child has at home and the 
experiences lie or she has at school. 
The school environment prepares students primarily for the 
school environment and for a very abstracted concept of what adult 
One depressing paradox ol modern life is that children with mothers 
that remain at home have the opportunity to witness an adult func¬ 
tioning in a wide range of situations and environments, but mothers 
who choose to stay at home have increasingly less satisfaciton and 
less status from iheir choice. 
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Life is about. Within the school the adults with whom children come 
in contact are almost without exception people who can serve as models 
for adult behavior in only the most specialized sense. From this 
perspective it is not remarkable that children who do well in school, 
and have the opportunity to do so, stay in school as long as they can. 
This flatness and linearity of the adult focus of attention is 
mitigated to a certain extent in elementary school where children 
spend the entire school year with a single adult or a relatively 
small group of adults, but even here the adults are very specifically 
teachers, counselors, principals, secretaries. However, by the time 
children enter junior high school and have "Mrs. Smith for English" 
and "Mr. Jones for history" the constriction of the adult focus for 
children's attention is suffocating — as is the corresponding boredom 
for Mrs. Smith and Mr. Jones. Unless a child conceives a desire to 
be an English teacher or a history teacher, the adults the child inter¬ 
acts with at school offer only the most narrow view of what the world 
is like, a dangerously false impression of what it takes to be an 
adult in the world and what the responsibilities and privileges of 
adulthood are. 
Judgements of worth, of attractiveness, of meaning are made by 
children on the basis of what they see the adults around them doing, 
not on the basis of what the adults tell them their criteria should 
be. In nomadic foraging societies the adults are visible to the 
children in many roles and in many varied situations, and this pano¬ 
rama of moods, reactions and competencies offers children a model of 
adulthood that is complex, interesting and variable. But the flat 
relationships between children and adults in the modern school 
guaran tee confusion and boredom for both. Adults in the schools are 
able to perform only specific, highly regulated functions for most 
of their working day, and it is not surprising that after a time 
their interest flags. The communication of boredom and routiniza- 
tion to children that results is inevitable, even in the classes of 
the most dedicated teachers. 
Children spend their first 16-18 years observing the fragmented 
activities of their parents, their teachers, and all the other adults 
around them. Then, suddenly, whether it's at 16 years of age for a 
high school dropout, 18 for a high school graduate, 21 for a college 
graduate, etc., children are expected to begin filling adult roles 
for which they have supposedly been preparing in school. The transi¬ 
tion to adulthood in U. S. society is often traumatic (e.g. Henry, 
1965; Hruska, 1970), for children soon discover as they search for 
jobs and wrestle with responsibility that they have been prepared for 
roles that either don't really exist in the society or which exist 
only in the artificial environment of institutions like the school. 
The adult world as presented to children in the schools does not 
provide a consistent or integrated focus of attention for their devel¬ 
opment. Nor does it serve as a model of adult reality. Perhaps the 
critical importance of children's peer groups in modern industLial 
societies — not only as environments for learning but as definers of 
appropriate behavior and arbiters of meaning as well — is related 
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to this fragmentation of the adult world as seen by children. 
Other children. Children in nomadic foraging societies form age- 
peer groups when there are enough individuals close enough in age 
in the same band, but because of the small size of foraging bands the 
formation of these groups is rare and, in any case, is never exclu¬ 
sive. As noted in the previous chapter, in gathering and hunting 
societies younger children learn a great deal from older children 
and older children learn about babies and younger children by obser¬ 
ving them, by playing with them, by seeing them grow and change. 
In the schools children are segregated by age to such an extent 
that often 13- and 14-year-olds encounter one another only before or 
after school, between classes, or at lunch. To be sure many children 
have some contact with other children of different ages within their 
own families, in their neighborhoods, etc., but for the time they are 
in school ( a significant part of their day) they are separated from 
both older and younger children. 
A world in which children are categorized according to age and 
grade is a highly artificial one, and the gradual perception of these 
segregations and hierarchies as "normal" by children makes it all 
the more difficult for them to learn normally. There is no question 
that much of the important learning small children do comes through 
watching and imitating older children. This is as true in neighbor¬ 
hoods today as it was in nomadic foraging societies 1,000,000 years 
ago. By the same token, all higher primates, including humans. 
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need a certain amount of practice in order to be competent parents. 
Surely the schools are contributing to modern confusion about child- 
rearing by fixing children from the age of five or younger in an 
environment in which they are always with age-mates. Older children 
don’t get the opportunities to observe and interact with younger 
children and infants - experiences that will give them valuable in¬ 
formation and practice for their own parenting. 
Discipline: compelling attention. A great many writers who have 
not necessarily had an evolutionary perspective but have observed 
children carefully have described them as curious beings that are 
predisposed to investigate their environment actively. 
The child is curious. • He wants to make sense out of 
things, find out how things work, gain competence and 
control over himself and his environment, do what lie 
can see other people doing. He is open, receptive, 
and perceptive. He does not shut himself off from 
the strange, confused, complicated world around him. 
He observes it closely and sharply, tries to take it 
all in. He is experimental. He does not merely observe 
the world around him, but tastes it, touches it, hefts 
it, bends it, breaks it...(Holt, 1967: 169). 
But children's curiosity, their responses to novelty and 
their motivation to explore are too intemperate for a school environ¬ 
ment. Piaget has shown us that while there is a structure inheicnt 
in the way a child engages its world as it develops this structure 
has evolved in a manner that enables the child to discovei the 
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the environment and his or her place in it. In nomadic foraging 
societies (and in other primate societies) the discoveries made by 
the young about the environment and their relationship to it take 
place within a framework that is intellectually and emotionally rich 
and diversified but is also inevitable in the context of the immediate 
and direct connection with the physical environment. Children in 
nomadic foraging societies are free to direct their attention where- 
ever something is happening that engages it, and the "regulating 
mechanism" of this somewhat random attention is the framework imposed 
by the way of life. Because there is no separation between what 
these children learn and what they will become everything that en¬ 
gages their attention has meaning and contributes to their develop¬ 
ment as competent adults. 
It does not take much imagination to see that the modern educa¬ 
tional environment -- large in size, isolated from family life, spe¬ 
cialized and segregated — cannot tolerate anything like the full 
range of learning styles and activities that constitute the human 
evolutionary heritage. Children in school are trained over the years 
to direct their attention on command, to focus on math when it is 
time for math, on history when it is time for history, and so forth. 
Although the ability to concentrate and direct one's attention at 
will is an important information processing skill in a modern techno¬ 
logical environment it does not follow that this skill is best bevel 
oped through the external discipline of attention children receive in 
most schools. Indeed, many have noted the actual damage that may be 
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done to children by forcing their attention in this manner. If child¬ 
ren are unable to explore their world and exercise their curiosity in 
a way that allows them to control their investment of time and energy 
they may very likely learn to simply stop exploring — particularly 
if they are punished for not making their investigations at acceptable 
times and in acceptable ways (Henry, 1965: Holt, 1964). Such child¬ 
ren may seek refuge in obedience, as noted above, or may simply seek 
to escape the constricted environment of the school as often as 
possible. 
Activities of Learning in the Schools 
The specific activities through which children acquire informa¬ 
tion and gain competence in a gathering and hunting society are appro¬ 
priate to the knowledge and skill they need to be well-functioning 
adults in the society. Even the most formal modes of learning — 
those associated with ritual and the supernatural — occur in a world 
of total involvement and participation, and even when identifiable 
methods of instruction such as repetition are employed, there is no 
separation between the learner and the thing learned. If anything, 
the child's participation is intensified by the dramatic shift to 
more structured learning. All other knowledge and skill, whether 
pertaining to social interaction or subsistence, are acquired almost 
exclusively through observation, imitation, investigation and play. 
There is no formal training in hunting or gathering, tool-making. 
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story telling, dancing, manners, social conventions, or moral obli¬ 
gation, and children in these societies simply acquire their inhuma, 
their intelligence, as they grow through adolescence and assume the 
responsibilities of adulthood. 
In most public schools in the U. S. rote learning is the pre¬ 
dominant mode of learning — particularly in the higher grades. 
The emphasis is on the acquisition of information, and this informa¬ 
tion flows from teacher to student, or from book to student. It is 
then repeated by the student so that his or her acquisition of the 
information may be evaluated. If the way humans learn language is 
an apt metaphor for the way children in nomadic foraging societies 
learn most of what they need to know, the way children learn multi¬ 
plication tables symbolizes much of the overall approach to learning 
in contemporary American public schools: memorization, repetition, 
precision. The fragmentation of children's social relationships in 
the schools has been noted above, and this situation is exacerbated 
by the activities of learning. Children are told to "be silent" in 
the classroom, to "do their own work" (see Chapter 5), even though 
they are constantly motivated internally to talk, to engage one another, 
to explore the classroom and their world outside. 
ITEM: The report card that a well-to-do suburban school 
system uses for kindergartners grades the five-year-olds 
on their "readiness for First Grade Work." 
Readiness involves some seventeen attributes, the first 
three of which read as follows: 
1. Sits still and works at assigned task for 15 to 
20 minutes. 
2. Listens and follows directions. 
3. Displays good work habits (Silberman, 1970: 130). 
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Most classrooms especially at the junior and senior high 
level. are arranged with rows of chairs facing the teacher, and 
though observation and listening skills are usually encouraged, they 
are usually encouraged only in their passive form and within the 
framework set by the teacher, the curriculum or the schedule. More 
active investigation, experimentation or play ( much less certain 
unflattering imitations) are rigorously discouraged in school. Ironi¬ 
cally, most subjects in the schools are connected only by the modes 
in which they are presented to children and in the ways children 
must engage them. There is really little difference between the ways 
in which children learn about American history and the ways in which 
they learn about algebra. Typically there is little or no attempt 
in the public schools to match content and process, but on the con¬ 
trary, an attempt is made to standardize the activities of learning 
as much as possible. This trend may be discerned in the ways in which 
educational technology (teaching machines, computerized instruction) 
has been applied in the schools in recent years (see Chapter 5) . 
Of course the gap that has been described above between the ways 
in which children learn effortlessly and the activities of learning 
in a modern public school does not imply chat formal instruction is 
unnecessary for children growing up in a large industrial society. 
But the perception of this gap does raise certain questions -- among 
them the question asked at the beginning of the second section of 
tliis chapter: Must the schools be the way they are because the new 
skills are best taught in a highly abstracted, narrowly focused 
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environment? 
The view of U. S. schools from the evolutionary perspective 
developed m this study is a bleak one indeed. According to this 
view, the schools are structured in ways that are often diametri¬ 
cally opposed to biological predispositions of children to partici¬ 
pate in and belong to a group, and derive personal satisfaction from 
activities of learning such as play, exploration, and imitation. 
But is this unfortunate learning environment required ? Or have 
the schools simply become mirrors of the larger society in which 
considerations of size, economy and efficiency have come to dominate 
every aspect of social life? Do the schools represent a philosophi¬ 
cal confusion about how and why children learn, or do they repre¬ 
sent someone's well-developed social plan? In this final section 
three major themes of educational thought will be examined in an 
effort to get at these all-important questions. These themes will 
be analyzed in terms of the evolutionary perspective. 
Educational Thought and an Evolutionary Perspective 
Intellectual Development: How Do Children Learn Best? 
Piaget's observations, as noted in Chapter 2, led him to the 
conclusion that a child, like any living organism, seeks interaction 
with its environment. According to Piaget children possess innate 
tendencies or "functional invariants" common to all animals: 
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(1) they act to organize their experience and (2) they adapt in an 
environment through processes Piaget termed "assimilation" and 
accomodation." Assimilating is the incorporation of aspects of the 
environment into the child's own organizational system, while accomo¬ 
dating involves a modification of the child's organizational system 
in response to the environment. "Equilibration" is the effort to 
attain a balance between these two processes of adaptation. Cogni¬ 
tive development in children for Piaget is an interaction between 
the autoregulatory processes of the child (including physical matura¬ 
tion, the tendency to organize and the tendency to adapt) and the 
environment (including the social environment) in which the child 
lives. 
The implication of this "interactionist" view of intellectual 
development for formal education is that: 
the development of intelligence, as is emerges from the 
recent research... is dependent upon natural, or spon¬ 
taneous, processes, in the sense that they may be utili¬ 
zed and accelerated by education at home or in school 
but that they are not derived from that education and, 
on the contrary, constitute the preliminary and neces¬ 
sary condition of efficacity in any form of instruction 
(Piaget, 1971: 36). 
The organic equilibration processes of the child require inter¬ 
action with the environment, according to Piaget, and the activities 
of play, imitation, and investigation are integral elements of these 
processes (Piaget, 1952; 1962). Piaget also insists that social 
interaction, conversation, argument, etc., are extremely important 
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modes of learning, for among other things, they set up disequilibria 
which the child acts to reconcile. This reconciliation results in 
new learning and helps move the dhild from one stage of development 
to the next. Thus, according to Piaget, children need to work things 
through together as they encounter and learn to solve problems 
(Ginsburg and Opper, 1969). 
Another important aspect of Piaget's work for education is that 
the child must be a full participant in the learning process. Since 
children in various stages of development are quite different from 
adults (Piaget, 1971) it follows that they must have a hand in what 
they learn and how they learn it. Adults simply cannot experience 
what a child experiences or think the way a child thinks. Piaget 
emphasizes that although children can be taught to make certain res¬ 
ponses to particular stimuli, in the behaviorist tradition, there is 
no true understanding unless the child is at the stage at which such 
understanding is possible and he or she "invents the principles 
that characterize each stage in his or her own way. 
A student who achieves a certain knowledge through free 
investigation and spontaneous effort will later be able 
to retain it; he will have acquired a methodology that 
can serve him for the rest of his life, which will 
stimulate his curiosity without the risk of exhausting 
it. At the very least, instead of having his memory take 
priority over his reasoning power, or subjugating his 
mind to exercises imposed from outside, he will learn to 
make his reason function by himself and will build his 
own ideas freely (Piaget, 1973: 93). 
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From Piaget's perspective the new skills of the modern world, inclu¬ 
ding logico-mathematical reasoning, are best acquired in an environ¬ 
ment that allows the child plenty of room to experiment and explore. 
Though Jerome Bruner's focus is similarly upon the development 
of children's intellectual faculties and the methods by which this 
might be accomplished, he disagrees with Piaget concerning the inevi¬ 
tability of the relationship between the stages of cognitive develop¬ 
ment and a child's ability to understand. Bruner is interested in 
the effect that culture and the environment of learning can have on 
a child's comprehension. 
...the immediate problem becomes one of converting the 
most powerful ways of knowing into a form that is within 
the grasp of a young learner... Such a view assumes that 
for any knowledge or empowering skill that exists in the 
culture there is a corresponding form that is within the 
grasp of a young learner at the stage of development 
where one finds him — that any subject can be taught to 
anybody at any age in some form that is both interesting 
and honest (Bruner, 1971: 13). 
Even with this disagreement between him and Piaget, Bruner arrives 
at similar conclusions about the activities of learning and the role 
of the child as learner. Bruner, like Piaget, rejects the mechanistic 
view of behaviorism and argues that understanding for a child must 
come as an "act of discovery" (1979) . The child must have a certain 
control over his or her own learning process, must interact with the 
material to be learned, and manipulate it in his or her own way. In 
this manner, according to Bruner, children are able to establish a 
217 
system of intrinsic rewards in place of the extrinsic rewards that 
traditionally characterize children's education. 
The hypothesis I would propose here is that to the 
degree that one is able to approach learning as a 
task of discovering something rather than "learning 
about it, to that degree there will be a tendency 
for the child to work with the autonomy of self¬ 
reward or, more properly, to be rewarded by discovery 
itself (Bruner, 1979: 88). 
The evolutionary perspective developed by Piaget (see Chapter 2) 
focuses almost exclusively on intellectual development as the structure 
of behavior while emotional systems are seen as rather vague forces 
that energize cognitive development. 
All the authors agree that in all behavior the structure 
is cognitive, and the force, or the economy, is affective. 
Therefore, affect cannot be the cause of a cognitive 
structure, any more than intelligence can be the cause 
of affect, because a structure is not the cause of this 
energy, this force and vice versa. Between the two is 
a relation of correspondence, and not of causality 
(quoted in Modgil, 1974: 369). 
But from the point of view of the evolutionary perspective pre¬ 
sented in the previous chapters of this study any question of causal- 
ity in the relationship between emotional systems and cognitive sys¬ 
tems is beside the point. The young primate is motivated to seek con¬ 
tact with its environment and engage in the kinds of equilibrium- 
producing processes Piaget describes by emotional systems that mediate 
not only the direct activities of learning but the entire environment 
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in which learning takes place. 
Although Piaget's work is of inestimable value for the under¬ 
standing of children's cognitive development, his focus on the intel¬ 
lect — and particularly his proposition that what is essentially 
Western, logico-mathematical reasoning is the highest stage of intel¬ 
lectual development — has contributed to the perception of cognitive 
and socio-emotional systems as onLy peripherally related, and the 
sense that the cognitive is more significant than the emotional. For 
example, one logical extension of Piaget's thought lends a certain 
authority to the separation of children into age-groups during their 
educational experiences. If children in a particular stage are 
incapable of understanding certain concepts or performing certain kinds 
of operations, it can be argued that children in school should be 
grouped together in terms of the stages of development that they are 
in so that the world presented to them is neither incomprehensible 
nor boring. Now, surely if our only intent in the education of child¬ 
ren is to develop their intellectual abilities as smoothly and effi¬ 
ciently as possible it makes sense to segregate them on the basis of 
age. However, if we take into consideration a wider range ot human 
activity, including social interactions mediated by emotional needs, 
it may be seen that school environments structured to facilitate 
children's intellectual development only probably inhibit their dev¬ 
elopment in other significant areas oi 1 ilo. 
By the same token, the "intrinsic rewards" Bruner refers to must 
be associated with the emotional systems connected with the activities 
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of learning described in Chapter 2, but it is interesting to note 
that Bruner, like Piaget, does not devote much space to the relation¬ 
ship of cognitive systems to emotional systems. For Bruner a school 
should be an environment in which the activities of the intellect can 
become their own reward. Schools should provide 
more than a continuity with the broader community 
or with everyday experience. It is primarily the 
special community where one experiences discovery 
by the use of intelligence, where one leaps into 
new and unimagined realms of experience, experience 
that is discontinuous with what went before 
(Bruner, 1979: 118). 
But for most of human history intellectual achievement, like 
other forms of achievement, took place in a social environment, and 
it is possible that the movement from extrinsic to intrinsic rewards 
Bruner has observed in the learning process involves other emotional 
systems too. If children are interested in the "growth and mainten¬ 
ance of mastery" (Bruner, 1979: 92) for the intrinsic rewards that 
accompany this acquisition, is it not probable that the perception 
and acknowledgement of this mastery by others — adults and peers — 
is a significant component of the reward? In this connection one 
might offer the same criticism of Bruner as of Piaget: If intellectual 
achievement is the only criterion of importance or status in the so 
ciety of the school a good many children will probably never have the 
opportunity to experience the intrinsic rewards of intellectual in 
They will be blocked by the very emphasis on mind work vestigation. 
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in school if, for one reason or another, they are unable to 
become competent at a time and in a manner the school demands. 
Dewey was aware of the problems associated with abstraction in 
education. In order to avoid the alienation implicit in the focus 
of the school on abstract operations and the acquisition of infor¬ 
mation that had no direct application to a child's out-of-school 
life, he proposed that the personal experience of each child serve 
as the starting place for the formal educational process. Like 
Piaget and Bruner, Dewey concentrated on the importance of the 
development of the individual and insisted that children must have 
an important role in what and how they learn. The methods of 
education that follow from these assumptions are 
first that the pupil have a genuine situation of ex¬ 
perience—that there be a continuous activity in which 
he is interested for its own sake; secondly, that a 
genuine problem develop within this situation as a 
stimulus to thought; third, that he possess the in¬ 
formation and make the observations needed to deal with 
it; fourth, that suggested solutions occur to him which 
he shall be responsible for developing in an orderly 
way; fifth, that he have opportunity and occasion to test 
his ideas by application, to make their meaning clear and 
to discover for himself their validity (Dewey, 191b. 112). 
Once again, the emphasis is on discovery, on interaction with the 
environment. But Dewey also laid a great deal of emphasis on the 
continuity of the experience that such interaction generates and 
on the relationship of the experience to processes of thought. 
Dewey's focus was not only on 
intellectual development but on social 
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development as well — the processes of education-as-socialization 
rather than the development of intellect alone. 
...if an experience arouses curiosity, strengthens 
initiative, and sets up desire and purposes that are 
su^fictly intense to carry a person over dead places 
in the future, continuity works in a very different 
way. Every experience is a moving force. Its value can 
be judged only on the ground of what it moves toward 
and into (Dewey, 1938: 38). 
For Dewey the purposes of formal education were more in¬ 
clusive than they were for either Piaget or Bruner. Through the 
processes of education children should be able to realize their 
full individual potential, should be able to acquire the skills 
necessary to adapt successfully to a changing environment, and 
should become responsible citizens in a democracy. 
Concentrating on the real-life experiences of individuals 
as the starting place in the formal educational process, Dewey 
assumed a powerful and generalized socializing effect for the 
schools which, in a sense, usurped areas of childrearing which had 
formerly been considered the responsibility of parents. But Dewey 
k 
was interested in building a coherent society. The education of 
the young was an opportunity to create a social order which would 
be democratic and participatory because it was founded upon the 
*After all,the title of Dewey's most influential work is Democracy 
and Education. 
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freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation 
and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrin¬ 
sically worthwhile "(1938: 61). According to Dewey if members of 
a society have this freedom and learn the skills of organizing and 
interpreting their experiences, a coherence and intelligibility 
will emerge in the society. There is thus, for Dewey, a clear 
relationship between individual achievement and social good. 
Where we now see only the outward doing and the outward 
product, there, behind all visible results, is the 
readjustment of mental attitude, the enlarged and 
sympathetic vision, the sense of growing power, and the 
willing ability to identify both insight and capacity 
with the interest of the world and man. Unless culture 
be a superficial polish, a veneering of mahogany over 
common wood, it surely is this — the growth of the 
imagination in flexibility, in scope, and sympathy, till 
the life which the individual lives is informed with the 
life of nature and of society (Dewey, 1956: 61-62). 
In Dewey's vision an individual child's sense of growing power and 
mastery could best take place in an "organization in which 
all individuals have an opportunity to contribute something," and 
he thus viewed the school as a society in which children should be 
full participants and in which all would have status because the 
criteria for achievement would be determined by the group itself 
in the context of the real-life experiences of group members. 
It is ironic that Dewey never attempted to identify a 
relationship between children's learning and human evolution, for 
in his philosophical vision of the relationship between learning. 
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experience, and group living Dewey comes closer than any other 
educational thinker to describing those relationships as they 
most probably existed through most of human history. 
The Adult Role in Children's Learning 
Dewey insisted that the "greater maturity of the teacher" 
should "arrange conditions" for learning (1938: 47) and invisioned 
a reciprocal arrangement between teacher and student in which 
the student explores and the teacher experiments in an effort 
to find the best learning process for each individual student. 
The educator is responsible for a knowledge of individuals 
and for a knowledge of subject-matter that will enable 
activities to be selected which lend themselves to 
social organization, an organization in which all in¬ 
dividuals have an opportunity to contribute something and 
in which the activities in which all participate are the 






range of alternative models of education have arisen since 
time, and many of these have gone several steps beyond the 
Dewey recommends between the guidance of the adult teacher 
necessity of the child to be a full participant in his or 
education. In such alternatives children 
learn independently, not in bunches. ...they learn our 
of interest and curiosity, not to please or appease 
the adults in power; and...they ought to be in control 
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of their own learning, deciding for themselves what they 
want to learn and how they want to learn it (Holt 
1967: 169). 
This general concept of children's learning led to the creation 
of the English alternative school, Summerhill, by A.S. Neill (1960). 
Ihe controversy over the kind of education represented by Summer- 
hill was already brewing in Dewey's time, and at least part of 
what Dewey was doing in Experience and Education (1938) was de¬ 
fending his ideas against critics and admonishing progressive 
educators not to lose sight of certain values. 
What is the place and meaning of subject-matter and of 
organization within experience? How does subject- 
matter function? Is there anything inherent in exper¬ 
ience which tends towards progressive organization of its 
contents? What results follow when the materials of 
experience are not progressively organized? A philosophy 
which proceeds on the basis of rejection, of sheer 
opposition, will neglect these questions. It will tend 
to suppose that because the old education was based on 
ready-made organization, therefore it suffices to reject 
the principle of organization Tn toto, instead of striving 
to discover what it means and how it is to be attained on 
the basis of experience (1938: 20-21). 
But Neill, Holt and others have an interest that is a bit 
different from Dewey's. They are interested in establishing an 
emotional reality for children that can compensate for the ne¬ 
gative experiences they have (or may have) in the world at large. 
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Over the years, many children have gone to Summerhill 
who were wholly defeated and demoralized by life, locked 
in their desperate protective strategies of self- 
defense and deliberate failure, filled with fear, sus¬ 
picion, anger, and hatred... Most of the children there 
get well. They get back their strength, confidence, and 
courage, and turn to face life and to move out into it, 
as all healthy children really want to do... (Holt, 1970: 85) 
Neill himself writes: 
Summerhill is possibly the happiest school in the world. 
We have no truants and seldom a case of homesickness. 
We very rarely have fights... I seldom hear a child cry, 
because children when free have much less hate to ex¬ 
press than children who are downtrodden (Neill, 1960: 8). 
The better-reasoned critiques of Summerhill and other al¬ 
ternative schools that are entirely child-directed emphasize the 
isolation of the alternative school environment from the realities 
>'c 
of the rest of the world. 
Perhaps Neill protects his community a few years too 
long, both from the oppressive mechanistic world and from 
adolescent solitude — it is hard to be alone in Summer¬ 
hill. Moreover, it seems to me that there is something in¬ 
authentic in Neill's latitudinarian lack of standards. 
*0nce during the time I was director of the alternative school in 
Fitchburg, a teacher in the school was forced to resign when it was 
learned that he had smoked marajuana with a group of students while 
driving home from a GED testing session. The night this teacher 
resigned he told me that he had been raised "a Summerhill kid" and 
that his parents had provided little direction as he grew up. 
"You know," he said unhappily, "I never know what's appropriate 
because of that." 
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For example, Beethoven and Rock 'n' Roll are considered 
equivalent (though Neill himself prefers Beethoven). 
We are not only free organisms but parts of a mankind 
that historically has made strides with great inspir¬ 
ations and through terrible conflicts. We cannot slough 
off that accumulation of cultures, however burdensome, 
without becoming trivial (Goodman, 1970: 215). 
There is ample evidence that the educational environment need not 
be oppressive in order for children to acquire new and sophisticated 
skills such as reading, writing, computation and synthesis (e.g. 
Smith, et al, 1981), but what happens when there is no or little 
direction from adults? 
We have seen that in both primate societies and nomadic foraging 
societies youngsters grow and learn in a framework of intimate 
relationships between subsistence and sociality. In nomadic 
foraging societies direction from the adults is in everything a 
child seems and does, for the framework itself is the guide for 
all. Children model their behavior on the behavior of adults who 
modeled their behavior on other adults when they were children. 
Children must have adult models, and the point is that they do 
have adult models whether the adults like it or accept the respon¬ 
sibility for serving as these models or not. In nomadic foraging 
societies there is relatively little burden for the socialization 
of children borne by the adults since they need merely go about their 
business and children will observe them, imitate them, play at 
being what they can only become. The problem with Summerhill is 
not so much that children are being socialized for environments 
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that don t really exist in the world outside the alternative 
school but that they are being socialized for no environment at 
all when the adults on whom they must model their behavior are 
engaged only in smoothing the way for children to determine their 
own own interests and involvements. Children need to witness adult 
commitment, tolerance, wisdom, and skill if these are the things we 
would teach them, for the young will not acquire such attributes 
in a social void. 
School as Cultural Institution 
While adult commitment, interest and involvement in nomadic 
foraging societies are, one might say, automatic and appropriate 
to the socialization tasks at hand, they are likely to be fragmented, 
arbitrary and contradictory in a modern industrial society. A 
good deal of educational thought has revolved around how the schools 
function, or might function, as cultural institutions, what ought 
to be taught in them in terms of providing coherent images of 
reality to children, and how they might act as agents of reform 
in the society. 
It is interesting to view the work of educational conservatives 
like R.M. Hutchins in relation to the question of how the school is 
related to other elements of the society, for the attempt to 
prescribe a curriculum rooted in the culture's past is also an 
coherent vision of life that may be pre¬ attempt to generate a 
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sented to children by adults. 
In The Higher Learning in America (1936) Hutchins described an 
idealized version of how the "best" elements of the past might 
inform the present and help stabilize the future. For Hutchins 
the institutions of formal learning in the U.S. should preserve, 
elucidate, and pass on the "highest" achievements and the "finest" 
artifacts of the culture. Understanding the past should provide 
the young with a framework for making decisions in the present and 
planning for the future. Thus, a general education program should 
be 
...a course of study consisting of the greatest books 
of the western world and the arts of reading, writing, 
thinking, and speaking, together with mathematics, the 
best exemplar of the processes of human reason (p. 85). 
These elements of Western culture are, for Hutchins, a legacy, 
a sacred trust which must be transmitted from master to studenc 
with the utmost integrity. 
There is a wistful regret in The Higher Learning, a longing for 
former times. "Those happy days are gone forever," Hutchins 
laments in reference to the middle ages, when European universities 
were "havens" where students could seek the truth (p. A3), and it 
is enlightening to read the most recent edition (1961) of The 
Higher Learning, for in it the aging Hutchins includes a preface 
that acknowledges the profundity of the changes that had taken place 
in U.S. society between 1936 and 1961. 
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This book was written twenty-five years ago, during the 
Great Depression, when Russia was a backward nation, 
when colonialism was in flower... 
This was before television, before World War II, 
before the United Nations, before the Cold War, before 
the Affluent Society, before the Hydrogen Bomb, before 
the forty-hour week, and before the rise and fall of 
the labor unions...(p. ix). 
One of the clearly articulated assumptions of The Higher Learning 
is that any society must have a foundation that is common in all its 
members or it will become fragmented and trivial. That base, for 
Hutchins, was the classical Western tradition, and he believed that 
a comprehensive educational program which taught young people the skills 
of thought and expression in this context would provide the foundation 
for a "rational social order" (p. xix). Certainly the "back to basics" 
movement in public school systems across the country is in this same 
tradition, and it is not surprising that recently the National Commi¬ 
ssion on Excellence (1983) has recommended 
...that State and local high school graduation requirements 
be strengthened and that, at a minimum, all students seeking 
a diploma be required to lay the foundations in the Five 
New Basics by taking the following curriculum during their 
A years of high school: (a) A years of English; (b) 3 years 
of mathematics: (c) 3 years of science; (d) 3 years oi 
social studies; and (e) one-half year of computer science. 
For the college-bound, 2 years of foreign language in high 
school are strongly recommended in addition to those taken 
earlier (A Nation at Risk, 1983: p. 2A). 
In the last twenty years a number of thinkers have come to 
believe that a certain coherence and direction does indeed already 
exist in the public schools and that this direction and the activ¬ 
ities and attitudes that emerge from it in the daily life ot the 
school reflect the educational Institution’s relationship to other 
institutions and traditions in the culture. 
Raymond Callahan’s classic study, education and the Cult of 
Efficiency (1962) describes the development of standardization, 
laige size, 1 outinization, etc. in American education in terms of 
the nation's wholesale adoption of business methods and modes of 
evaluation in the first thirty years of this century. The ways in 
which teachers came to be paid, the ways in which school systems 
were funded, the ways in which books were chosen and materials 
purchased and children instructed all came to reflect an attempt 
to "hedge the bet" with children's education — to obtain the most 
for the least. 
The tragedy itself was fourfold: that educational 
questions were subordinated to business considerations; 
that administrators were produced who were not, in any 
true sense, educators; that a scientific label was put 
on some very unscientific aid dubious methods and prac¬ 
tices; and that an anti-intellectual climate, already 
prevalent, was strengthened. As the business-industrial 
values and procedures spread into the thinking and acting 
of educators, countless educational decisions were made 
on economic or on non-educationa.l grounds (Callahan, 
1962: 246-247). 
This tragedy persists in classrooms across the country in which 
learning is constrained by not only the size ot classes, the mater¬ 
ials available the expectations of administrators and parents, and 
the specialization and fragmentation of subject matter but, 
most of all, by the sense of formal education as a great tabi i 
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cation process through which children move in an orderly manner as 
automobiles move through an assembly line. 
Callahan assumed that this was an unlucky historical trap 
that education in the United States had fallen into, but in the past 
ten or twelve years a growing number of investigations of formal 
education in the U.S. have appeared which insist that the incor¬ 
poration of business methods and models into the formal education 
system in this country was no accident and that from one perspective 
at least the schools are working very well indeed. Because these 
authors urge a revision of old notions about what the purposes and 
achievements of formal education in the U.S. have been they have 
been called "Revisionists." 
According to the Revisionists the schools are socializing 
children into specific, limited roles that are designed to per¬ 
petuate their powerlessness and insure their complicity in main¬ 
taining the status quo. The schools are "sorting machines" 
(Spring, 1976) that separate the elite of the society from those 
who are to do the society's menial tasks. But even the elite 
absorb through their schooling attitudes and behaviors which will 
contribute not at all to their individual fulfillment but which are 
essential to the smooth running of the capitalist enterprise 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1976). 
White, Anglo-Saxon, rich and upper-middle class men formu¬ 
lated the fundamental philosophy and policy of American public 
education, and if there was not an active conspiracy there was at 
least a tacit complicity. Katz (1975), for example, attempts to 
show that "what happened [in the development of American public 
education] represented more than a series of haphazard events 
emerging from countless decisions by local school boards, that 
patterns displayed in various places across the country looked 
remarkably alike and served quite similar purposes" (p. 149). 
The Revisionists argue that the society itself — dominated, 
controlled by a power elite — can simply not tolerate the kind of 
intellectual development Piaget and Bruner advocate or the kind of 
school-community John Dewey dreamed of. As Bowles and Gintis put 
it in an article aptly entitled "If John Dewey Calls...Tell Him 
Things Didn't Work Out," 
The way in which the school system helps to produce a 
stratified and alienated labor force for the capitalist 
enterprise is inconsistent with its serving to further 
individual self-development or equality of opportunity 
(1974: 8). 
The Revisionist critique is not a simple call for reform in 
the schools. Indeed, many Revisionists have concluded that reform 
of public schooling is impossible. These critiques are, instead, 
indictments of the culture itself as it is revealed through an 
examination of one of its most important institutions, formal 
education. From the Revisionist perspective, Hutchins is guilty of, 
at best, well-meaning cultural imperialism, and Dewey is merely 
naive. If the culture itself is unacceptable nothing short of 
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massive social change will do. 
People must choose, and choose to fight for, socialism 
as a positive alternative based on a serious, desirable, 
and feasible vision. This vision must develop in the 
course of struggle, but the struggle will not develop 
without it (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 286). 
Schools cannot at once both socialize to the values of 
an oppressor and toil for the liberation and the potency 
of the oppressed. If innovation is profound, it is 
subversive. If it is subversive, it is incompatible 
with the prime responsibilities of the public school 
(Kozol, 1965: 211). 
But if the Revisionists are more radical than some other 
educational thinkers in their call for social revolution, it is 
interesting to note that most studies of formal education, no matter 
what the political perspective of the authors, share an assumption 
that the society the schools are part of must be improved or 
changed. And many of these studies identify institutions of formal 
education as potential agents of that change. This grand purpose 
for formal education suffuses the work of Dewey, as we have seen, 
and it is also present in Hutchins, who writes that "upon education 
our country must pin its hopes of true progress..." (1936: 119). 
But perhaps the most dramatic articulation of the idea that the 
educational institutions of the society can be important in social 
reform comes from Theodore Brameld who writes that public school 
instructors have an obligation to become "teacher citizens with 
convictions" who are not afraid to "exhibit these in the public 
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square" (1956: 338). 
If most of the Revisionists take a dim view of the ability of 
formal institutions of education to lead a reform of society which 
would include a reform of themselves, they are nonetheless 
passionately committed to social change, to profound modifications 
in the way children are socialized and to critical evaluation of the 
attitudes and relations children acquire through the formal educa¬ 
tional process. 
An evolutionary perspective, too, inevitably calls for changes 
in contemporary society. The United States, and all other societies 
on earth, are torn by rifts, inequalities and contradictions that 
exist on a larger scale (and are thus perhaps more dangerous) than 
ever before in human history. This is a society in which many people 
live but not all belong, a society in which many people are not 
important. In our society the experiences of individuals are so 
diversified that communities can often be formed only around 
abstract commonalities (see Chapter 5),and some members have a 
considerable amount of control over other members. Above all, 
ours is a society in which children must wait in the wings until 
they are pushed out onto the stage of adult life with a jumble of 
lines from a hundred different plays and no idea of who they are 
supposed to be. 
An evolutionary perspective enables one to see that all groups 
and individuals in the U.S. are caught in the same flood of change 
and unknowing, though all are not equally affected by it. Some 
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are luckier than others; some only appear to be lucky. The 
"advantages" themselves arc relative and misleading, and they are 
often meaningful merely because others do not have them at the 
moment. Human beings, as a sgecijes, are adapted to social struc¬ 
tures in which the deep attachments and emotional needs to belong 
are intertwined with (and balanced by) the equally deep needs of 
individuals for personal identity and status in the group. Male 
or female, young or old, need to belong and to be important si- 
multaneously. When these needs are not fulfilled in the context 
of each other, humans suffer ( and often make other humans suffer). 
Human learning evolved ns a way of preparing for and becoming 
competent in this dynamic balance, and the activities of learning 
that characterize the species reflect this ancient purpose- Small 
wonder that in a society that is separated from the physical 
environment, which regularly separates individual importance and 
attachment to a group, and intellect and emotion, the social 
institutions of formal education also demonstrate these separations 
and perpetuate them in children. 
An evolutionary perspective is indeed a perception ot the 
need lor social change, a reconstruction, but there are at least 
two characteristics of the framework for reform that aie also an 
inevitable result of an evolutionary perspective. 
Humans are not infinitely adaptable. One of the most iroublesome 
misunderstandings of educational thought results from dual, 
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contradictory assumptions. On the one hand is the sense that there 
are specifically human ways of being, human capacities, human modes 
of learning; and on the other hand is the sense that humans are not 
constrained by this human-ness in any significant way. Hutchins, for 
example, contends that "one purpose of education is to draw out the 
elements of our common human nature. These elements are the same 
in any time or place" (1936: 66). Yet, as we have seen, he also 
exhorts us to create a "rationally ordered society" which is not 
necessarily founded on our shared understanding of these common 
elements. Bowles and Gintis urge "the development and articulation 
of the vision of a socialist alternative" (1976: 288) as an 
alternative which "people must choose, and choose to fight for" 
(1976: 286). At the same time they assert that 
...the social and economic conditions of socialism will 
facilitate the full development of human capacities. 
These capacities are for cooperative, democratic, equal, 
and participatory human relationships; for cultural, 
emotional, and sensual fulfillment (1976: 266). 
There is the sense here, and in a great many other educational 
works, that all we have to do is try harder to put our intellectual 
visions of a free and well-ordered society into operation and 
we will be able to get the job done. But these human capacities are 
not only capabilities in the sense that they are possibilities 
open to essentially unrestrained human beings. Because they 
developed in the course of human evolution they exert a certain 
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pressure on the behavior of human beings in any environment. 
Tile confusion that exists in educational thought between 
assumptions about the human ability to adapt and the things that 
humans do "naturally" is apparently related to the gap that has 
developed in the course of sedentary living between intellect and 
socio-emotional systems. For many years our focus has been on the 
development of cognitive systems, and,as noted above, when one's 
measurements of achievement are confined to this particular area 
of human activity it appears that there is no end to what we humans 
can do. Indeed, perhaps in one sense there is no end (if the 
species survives). But if the "sample" for our evaluation is 
broadened to include social interactions and emotional needs our 
measurements break down; we see cognitive capacity and performance 
as but one area of human experience, and we see the biologically 
based pressures on human-as-social-being more clearly. 
The necessity for intellectual reconstruction. Unless there is a 
nuclear war we will never become hunter-gatherers again, and although 
it is difficult to avoid, it is a mistake to romanticize the way of 
life that characterizes nomadic foraging societies. It is also 
a mistake to apply the insights derived from the study of these 
societies , the archaeological record, and primate societies too 
idealistically to modern technological societies. Ihe environment 
for subsistence, for social life, and for the acquisition ot 
individual identity today is vastly different from the environment 
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in which these needs were addressed in the human evolutionary 
past. 
The great irony of the evolutionary perspective is that while 
biologically based adaptations acquired in our evolutionary past 
exert pressure on our behavior in the present — regardless of the 
environment we find ourselves in — our time of simply going along 
andd^ing what comes next as animals have done for hundreds of 
millions of years on earth is over. We have had too profound an 
effect on the physical environment; we have gathered ourselves into 
huge societies; we have developed the capacity to determine by our 
behavior which species will survive and which will not; and we also 
have the ability to extinguish ourselves and many other forms of 
life in a single moment. It is precisely because of the separations 
that have developed between the elements of human experience that we 
must reconstruct our world as a whole society. 
But if it is true that we must reconstruct our connection with 
the physical environment and reconceive our social relationships in 
ways that are more whole, better balanced, longer ranged, it is 
likely that those social visions, interventions, and structures which 
seek to close the gap between belonging and importance; extend notions 
of what it valuable, praiseworthy, important; and enable the most 
people to be full participants will be more successful in establish¬ 
ing a framework that can promote balance and well being than those 
that do not. In other words, if we must recreate human society let 
us attempt to do so with as clear an understanding as we can obtain 
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of the biological needs that emerged from the social environments in 
which humans evolved. Otherwise we will be always working, in 
some capacity, against ourselves. 
CHAPTER V 
PUTTING AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE TO WORK 
The term "evolutionary perspective" calls forth a variety 
of responses in people. Some are offended by the term, others 
are intrigued. Some feel that their religious beliefs are com¬ 
promised by an evolutionary frame of reference (i.e. the "crea¬ 
tionists") while others may see our primate past as a justification 
for the existence of hierarchy, aggression and violence in the 
contemporary world. 
We owe much of the confusion about evolution and its rela¬ 
tionship to modern human behavior to Herbert Spencer who applied 
Darwin's description of organic evolution to human history and 
social development. In his Principles of Psychology (1870-1872), 
Spencer invented the term "survival of the fittest" and maintained 
that the selection processes postulated by Darwin for animal 
species were also at work in human societies. That is, human beings, 
as products of the processes of evolution were constrained by 
their biological structures and, like other animals had to 
be part of the "struggle for existence." Spencer saw the struggles 
between different human societies as a reflection of this biological 
heritage and assumed that human history showed that some societies 
are more "fit" than others. This fitness, according to Spencer, 
could be observed in the relative power a given society has in 




Spencer was wrong for a number of reasons that have been 
pointed out numerous times (e.g. Dobzhansky, 1955; Thomas, 1974; 
Gould, 1979). For although there are certainly relationships between 
biological evolution and cultural development, an understanding of 
these relationships requires far more than a simple super imposition 
of the concepts and language of organic evolution onto human history 
and social interaction. 
(1) There is no necessary correlation between social success 
and reproductive success. Being a powerful cultural figure does 
not guarantee a large number of offspring. Indeed, as noted in 
the previous chapter, having children can hinder one's social 
success in a modern technological society. 
(2) The time frame of cultural development and change is so 
short that it can in no way be likened to the time frame of 
biological evolution. When we speak of "evolutionary processes 
we are speaking of processes that take place over hundreds of 
thousands or millions of years. The incorporation of physiological 
and behavioral characteristics into the genetic structure of a 
species must not be confused with phenotypical responses to changing 
environments — even if these responses are cultural themes, customs 
*of course at the most extreme end of the relationship there is 
a correlation: the victims of a genocidal purge by a dominant 
culture will surely reproduce less effectively than the members o 
the dominant culture. 
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conventions, inodes of perception, etc. which exert tremendous 
pressure on human behavior. 
(3) Finally, in the assumption that the survival of some must 
come at the expense of others, social darwinism ignores elements of 
balance and equilibrium that are also associated with biological 
evolution in general and, as we have seen, human evolution in 
particular. 
In spite of the fact that social darwinism is a demonstrably 
false correlation it continues to exert a certain attraction. 
One often reads, for example, that those who do not "adapt" to the 
Information Age will be "left behind." The implication here is that 
there are those who are able to make "adaptations" to new en¬ 
vironmental stresses induced by the Information Age and those who 
are not able to "adapt." A further implication is that those 
who cannot "adapt" are less "fit" than those who can. Although 
this is sheer nonsense in a biological sense and sidesteps important 
questions about opportunity, differing perceptions of what is 
valuable, etc. it is surprisingly common among people who may even 
know something about biological evolution. 
So manifestly dangerous is this simple-minded correllation of 
biological structure with social superiority that the term 
*1 suspect that this unexamined social darwinism is most often found 
in conjunction with the completely contradictory, and likewise un¬ 
examined, assumption that evolution has stopped or in any case 
doesn't apply to humans any longer. 
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evolutionary perspective" can set off a whole series of negative 
responses in those who have seen the abuses and can predict 
potential abuses of such a paradigm. The thought that contemporary 
human behavior and capacity may be "determined” by genetic 
structure or that destructive behavior is "natural" in the 
context of the human evolutionary past is unacceptable to people 
who see the need for profound change in human social interaction 
and organization. For these critics of social darwinism it is 
often easier to ignore the human evolutionary heritage alto¬ 
gether, for the notion that there are "biological constraints" 
on human beings rooted in an evolutionary past conjures up at 
least the potential for justifying attitudes and activities in 
human life that are oppressive, violent and dangerous. 
The problem with this critique is that while legitimately 
condemning social darwinism it is likely to produce intellectual 
models for social change that ignore some of the very real human 
needs that are the product of human evolution. The irony, as 
noted in Chapter 4, is that it seems our most serious problems 
are the result of our losing touch with our evolutionary heritage 
through the development of increasingly sophisticated technological 
cultures. To demand a reform of the culture without acknowledging 
the origin and antiquity of the needs such reforms are supposed 
to address is like heading into the wilderness with neither woodcraft 
skill nor a map. it is likely that we will get lost. 
The evolutionary perspective presented in this study is 
surely in a preliminary stage. It is an attempt to identify the 
character of the pressure exerted by the human evolutionary 
heritage as much as it is an attempt to identify particular elements 
of that heritage. The previous chapters have presented evidence 
for the existence of at least three socio-emotional systems of 
behavioral motivation that are the result of our evolutionary 
past. Humans, like all other social, primates, need to belong and 
be attached to a group. They also need to discover an individual 
identity in the context of the group they belong to. The way in 
which humans effect this delicate balance is through learning, and 
there are activities and environments for human learning that offer 
pleasure and satisfaction because they contribute to the realization 
of this ancient equilibrium. 
But it must be emphasized that the evolutionary perspective 
presented here does not suggest that children's learning is 
determined by these genetically based emotional systems. Indeed, 
children are able to learn in a variety of environments and in 
the most unbalanced situations. The evolutionary heritage is 
subtle in human beings; it may be overridden by cultural demands, 
by environmental change. Children, like laboratory animals, may 
be taught to do any number of things if the reward-punishment 
system is carefully controlled. The point is that when children 
are forced to learn in environments that are foreign to the human 
species or through activities that are not integrated with social 
life a certain amount of distress is generated. In one sense the 
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evolutionary perspective presented here is as simple as the notion 
that when children feel good about their surroundings and themselves 
they learn better, but in another sense it is far more complex and 
demanding. 
Evolutionary processes are made up of the interactions of the 
genotype, the phenotype, and the environment in which individual 
organisms and the deme exist. A successful adaptation represents 
an equilibrium in this process, a stable balance in which an or¬ 
ganism exhibits characteristics that are well-suited to the 
environment in which it lives. The application of an evolutionary 
perspective to the development of social and educational policy 
suggests a search for this stability and balance as well. We are 
now what might be called the "motors of evolution" on the planet, and 
we must make the best choices possible, given our limited under¬ 
standing. These choices should contribute to both survival and 
well being for the planet's inhabitants, to interactions with the 
other creatures of the earth that reflect our connection with 
them, to human social situations in which both attachment to groups 
and individual identity are possible. 
At the same time an evolutionary perspective implies an 
expectation of complexity in the search for these balances, for 
evolution has produced the most intricate relationships between 
genotype, phenotype and environment, balances of whole dimensions of 
activity and experience as well as balances within single dimensions. 
These considerations of balance and complexity may be illustrated 
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by the following example. 
As noted in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 the experiences of men and 
women in all nomadic foraging societies are different; their tasks 
are different, and the ways in which they participate in group life 
are different. There is evidence that these differences between 
men and women reach back in to a hominid and even earlier primate 
past and are therefore deeply canalized in our socio-emotional 
systems. From an evolutionary perspective difference in male- 
female relations is important, and gender identity is a crucial 
constituent of a child's sense of self. 
If the perspective were to stop short here it could provide 
a justification for current sex roles in much the same way that 
Spencer's application of Darwin's ideas served to justify the status 
of the British Empire in his time. It could be said, for example, 
on the basis of this partial perspective, that since a woman's 
sphere of experience, in an evolutionary sense, revolves around the 
bearing and rearing of children, a woman's place, even in a modern 
technological society, is still in the home. But from an evolu¬ 
tionary perspective that seeks balance and expects complexity this 
is foolishness. While the differences between men and women are 
indeed important, they are only important because they have ensured 
cooperation, sharing, survival and equality. During most of human 
existence the differences between men and women made it possible for 
them to survive more effectively in a given environment, be full 
participants in a group and obtain individual status and impor- 
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tance at the same time. It is obvious today that the differences 
between the experience and tasks of men and women in the modern 
world perpetualte inequality rather than equality, and far from 
contributing to cooperation among people they tend to provoke 
confusion, isolation and rage. 
For the educator attempting to apply an evolutionary perspective 
in the design of curriculum (for example) there is a complex dilemma 
here. If it is true that male-female differences are rooted as 
deeply in human biology as an evolutionary perspective indicates, 
then an educational program that attempts to make boys and girls 
equal by making them have the same experiences or making them 
interpret their experiences in the same way will likely cause dis¬ 
tress for a child — and perhaps be dangerous to his or her sense 
of self. On the other hand, it is manifestly harmful, also from 
an evolutionary perspective, to socialize boys and girls into 
different roles and self-perceptions that perpetuate imbalance 
and inequity. 
It is possible that this dilemma is unresolvable and that in 
our time, when the differences between males and females no longer 
contribute to cooperation and equality, either the differences must 
give way to more linear conceptions of equality or the inequalities 
between men and women must persist. It is also possible that the 
differences between men and women will be understood in new ways that 
can again generate the dynamic equivalencies that characterized male- 
female relationships in the human evolutionary past. The work of 
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Gilligan (1982), Friedan (1981) and others may be an important 
step in this direction. 
The answers aren't easy, and, in fact, because the evolutionary 
perspective emphasizes a need for an understanding of the relationship 
between the elements of the epigenetic system, the differences between 
biological evolution and cultural development, etc. it actually 
complicates the issue, whatever it is. This is rather distressing 
I 
itself in a society that is already complex beyond any individual's 
grasp, but an evolutionary perspective can also help us ask the kinds 
of questions that might eventually provide simple answers — answers 
that are farther-sighted, more inclusive and more equitable than 
those with which we have had to be content in the past. 
Principles of Education from an Evolutionary Perspective 
There is a great deal of work to be done before we will be 
able to describe the characteristics of learning common to our 
species in any detail, but it is possible at this time to describe 
some of the factors that should be taken into consideration in any 
decision that affects children's learning. These principles can 
provide some contact points for evaluation and planning in education 
that, unlike the positions taken at the North Middlesex School 
Committee hearings on Humanistic Education, are not mere matters 
of opinion. 
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Humanized criteria for evaluation in education. An evolutionary 
perspective on children's education implies an expansion of the criteria 
for the evaluation of educational programs and for the perfor¬ 
mance of children in these programs. For too many years education 
in the United States has been evaluated on the basis of quanti¬ 
tative measurements, and decisions about how education should be 
funded and structured have been made almost wholly on the basis 
of these measurements (e.g. Callahan, 1962). "Success" for a child in 
an educational program has been defined in many different ways but 
all these measurements of success have attempted to quantify 
achievement. Grades and test scores are only the most obvious 
forms of educational quantification. Success in education has 
been measured by income X years after high school graduation, by 
income in association with the total number of years and level of 
formal education. High schools are often judged successful or 
unsuccessful on the basis of the percentage of the graduating 
class that goes on to college, and public university departments 
are evaluated at least in part on the number of FTE' s the faculty 
are able to generate. Certainly other measurements of success have 
been attempted — or at least invoked — but the numbers game in 
education dominates the decision-making processes currently 
employed by legislators, school committess, school administrators, 
*Ful1 Time Equivalent, a figure obtained by dividing the total 
number of credit hours for which students are registered in 
departmental offerings by the normal full-time student credit load 
(usually 15 credits). 
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teachers, parents, and, inevitably, the children themselves. 
It is unlikely that these quantitative measurements will ever 
be wholly replaced by other criteria for evaluation, but we must 
balance our quantitative assessments of how schools are doing and 
what children are getting out of them with an understanding of 
the social impact of the school environment. If all that children 
took away from their school experience were the specialized skills 
and information they are "supposed" to learn, it would, perhaps, be 
possible to measure their success (and the success of the school) by 
testing. But for six or more hours, five days a week, the schools 
are providing children with examples of adult life, of group life, 
and with countless opportunities for interaction with other children. 
Thus it is important to add to our quantitative evaluations- attempts 
to acquire an understanding of 
a. the extent to which children have a sense of them¬ 
selves as responsible members of a cooperating 
group as a result of their educational experiences. 
b. the extent to which children are empowered to influence 
the decisions that are made concerning them by 
their educational experiences. 
c. the extent to which children make an investment in 
the learning process itself; that is, the enthu¬ 
siasm and willingness to learn that they demonstrate. 
It goes without saying that an evaluation of the achievement 
of children using these additional criteria implies an evaluation 
of the schools or other learning environments children are in. 
The criteria for evaluation of success in education presented 
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above are not new. But an evolut lonary perspective can help us 
understand why they are so important In the assessment of formal 
(and non-formal) education and why so many people in different 
times and circumstances have recommended their adoption. Ii we 
locate the needs ot children to belong, to be important and to learn 
in the biology of the human species they become critical to human 
well being, and this perception can exert some countervailing 
pressure on quantitative measurements that seem so inevitable when 
all that opposes them Is someone’s sense of balance, a teacher’s 
opinion, or a child’s feelings. 
If we were to evaluate the public schools in the U.S. on the 
basis of the criteria suggested above we would find that they have 
failed miserably — regardless of how the graduates of these 
institutions perform on SAT examinations or how much money they 
make X years after graduation. Indeed, others have also claimed 
that the schools are failing, but if we examine the introductory 
paragraph of A Nation at Risk (1983) it becomes obvious that this 
framework for evaluation Is quite different from the one proposed 
here. 
Our Nation is at risk. Our once unchallenged preem- 
inance in commerce, industry, science, and technological 
innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the 
world. This report is concerned with only one ol the many 
causes and dimensions of the problem, but it is the 
one t hat undergirds American prosperity, security, and 
civility. We report to the American people that while we 
can take justifiable pride in what our schools and col¬ 
leges have historically accomplished and contributed to 
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to the United States and the well-being of its people, 
the educational foundations of our society are presently 
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that 
threatens our very future as a Nation and a people. What 
was unimaginable a generation ago has begun to occur — 
others are matching and surpassing our educational attain¬ 
ments . 
An evolutionary perspective helps us see that the reason for 
either failure is not simply that we are not trying hard enough, 
or that our teachers need to be better trained, or that our 
educational methods and materials must be refined, but that there is 
something profoundly non-human about the way children are formally 
educated in our society and that the assumptions and interests 
reflected in reports such as A Nation at Risk are actually part 
of the problem. 
Questions of size. A second principle that may be derived from an 
evolutionary perspective is that questions of size in the learning 
environment can never be reduced to questions of system efficiency, 
or the sophistication of the educational materials or the competence 
of the teachers. The larger the learning environment the more it 
must be managed; the pull toward structure, regularity, predic¬ 
tability, etc. is irresistible. In general it might be said that 
the larger the number of children who are part of a group in a 
class or a school, the less opportunity these children will have to 
satisfy their needs to belong and be important in that particular 
To be sure, children will form their own groups that group. 
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satisfy these needs more directly, but neither the junior high 
school English class nor the junior high school itself can serve 
as a meaningful community to most youngsters if it is large. It 
may be pointed out that many children have positive experiences in 
large schools. But it is important to note that even these exper¬ 
iences most often take place not in the context of the whole school 
or even the whole class, but in small sub-groups such as reading cir¬ 
cles, sports teams, clubs, school plays, etc. A small group makes it 
possible for children to assume more self-management than a large 
group can allow and can at least create the opportunity for children 
to determine to a greater degree the quality and quantity of their 
participation in group activities. Small size does not make self- 
discipline inevitable, but because less management is required on the 
part of the teacher in a small group the possibility of children's 
discovering or inventing on their own is enhanced. 
Another advantage of small learning groups is that within them 
greater diversity can be tolerated than in large, tightly managed 
groups. In Chapter 3 it was noted that in nomadic foraging bands 
all the members of the group were seen as unique individuals 
primarily because they are so well known. The size of the band 
makes this familiarity possible. The same might be said for a 
learning group of young children. In groups of, say, 10 or 15 it is 
almost impossible for children to see classmates of different races, 
religions or ethnic backgrounds as flat representatives of 
classes. Of course the larger the group the more easily 
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stereotypes may be applied, for in general the knowledge of in¬ 
dividuals as individuals is proportionately less. 
Size is not the only factor that affects the quality and 
effectiveness of the learning environment, but it is an important 
one. Children will be members of small groups in order to get 
what they need out of the social environment — whether these groups 
are associated with official groups or not. If educators are to 
accept responsibility for the large-scale socialization that they 
are already engaged in, they would do well to think about how small 
communities may be integrated into the learning process. A small 
class will be able to answer a wider range of human needs for a 
greater diversity of children than will a large class. A small 
school will be more accessible as a community to which one may 
belong than a large school. There is no way to fudge this per¬ 
ception with more efficient structure, more sophisticated edu¬ 
cational materials or better-trained teachers. When there are 
educational decisions to make the size of the learning group should 
be a critical factor in these decisions. 
Power and participation of children. The reason that size is such 
an important variable in the evaluation and planning of educational 
environments is that it is characteristic of human learning for 
children to be full and powerful participants in a group as they 
learn. As noted in the previous chapter, many have observed the 
importance of children's self-motivated interaction with the en- 
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vironment and with other peopie around them to their development. 
Children learn best by doing, by initiating their own discovery 
processes, and this is so because full participation in group life 
allows them to fulfill both the need to belong and the need to 
have importance. Indeed, powerful participation in a group con¬ 
sists of having both these needs met simultaneously. Not only 
must children be able to draw a sense of security from the group they 
3^6 part of, they should also have a sense of their own influence 
in that group as well. They should be part of a group that is 
partly theirs, and learning should be a process through which 
children become competent participants. 
There is no inherent dichotomy between the ancient activities 
of learning (i.e. observing, imitating, playing, exploring) and 
the acquisition of new cognitive skills that are necessary for 
survival and well being in a modern technological environment. 
In fact, there is considerable evidence to show that when children 
are influential participants in their own learning they acquire 
logico-mathematical reasoning skills more thoroughly and in a more 
meaningful way than when these skills are inculcated in educational 
environments in which children must remain passive recipients 
(Piaget, 1973). There is no necessary gap between the processes 
of social development that satisfy biologically based needs and 
the processes of intellectual development that prepare children for 
life in the modern world, but in order to see this clearly it must 
first be recognized that the participatory nature of learning is 
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crucial. 
An example or two of how this perspective might be used to 
question old assumptions about the environment of learning in the 
school might help clarify this important principle. 
(1) A classroom should be quiet. No doubt there are certain 
intellectual activities — reading, writing, computation — which 
may at times be easier for individuals to perform in silence than 
in a noisy room. But if participation in the learning process is 
a critical part of a child's social and cognitive development then 
the choice to be in a quiet place at a particular time ought to be, 
at least in part, the child's own. A learning community, on the 
other other hand, probably should be full of conversation and activ¬ 
ity, play and interaction. We have seen how much talk, banter, 
joking, etc. takes place constantly in nomadic foraging societies, 
and there is no reason to expect that a classroom full of children 
in a modern society would behave any differently if not suppressed. 
(2) Children should do their own work. Why on earth should 
children do their own work if human learning is social and par¬ 
ticipatory in nature? The reasons for requiring children to do their 
own work must be either that the size of the educational environment 
prohibits effective participation or that when the only mode of 
evaluating children's activity in a learning situation is quantitative 
it is easy for them to cheat on tests, thus spoiling the efficacy 
of the evaluations. But what children learn when they learn 
toegether, share notions, challenge one another s perceptions and 
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work out problems as a group is not only the material presented to 
them but the ways in which that material is meaningful in their 
lives and, more generally, how to be competent participants in a 
group of humans. 
From an evolutionary perspective there is absolutely no excuse 
for requiring children to do their own work unless they want to. 
If one vision of the use of computer technology in the learning 
process is of individual students working out computer-generated 
problems, each sitting at his or her own terminal, an alternative 
vision, from an evolutionary perspective, might be of groups of 
three or four children gathered about a terminal taking turns, 
playing, observing, experimenting, kibbitzing, laughing, goofing 
off, showing off, working out computer-generated problems as a 
group. 
All skills are important. As noted in Chapter A, one of the most 
serious obstacles to the full participation of children in their 
own learning has to do with the way in which different skills and 
areas of knowledge are valued in the schools. Certainly this 
valuation reflects biases of the culture at large and reinforces 
a class and caste structure that exists throughout U.S. society. But 
all children are negatively affected by the narrow framework for 
judging their inclinations and productions (and the inclinations and 
productions of others) presented to them by the schools. From the 
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beginning of formal schooling children with particular backgrounds, 
who speak other languages, who have different interests or abil¬ 
ities will automatically have less status than other children in 
school. But children who do have status in school are also un¬ 
fortunate, for in the narrowly hierarchical framework of formal 
education they obtain an unrealistic view of their abilities and 
their worth which may be just as damaging, though not as painful, 
as the alienation and sense of incompetence felt by those who do not 
"measure up" to the school's expectations. 
An evolutionary perspective emphasizes the importance of self- 
confidence and the sense of personal power. The status built by 
success in one area of endeavor builds a more generalized ability 
to engage in new activities successfully. The feeling of competence, 
associated with Bruner's "intrinsic motivation," is an essential 
element in the human learning process, and children who feel 
capable have the courage and confidence to try new things. Thus 
all skills that a child learns and masters are important components 
of his or her learning, and an effort must be made to incorporate 
this perception into our view of what education should be. Does 
this mean that the schools should be responsible for providing 
instruction and experience in everything? Surely this was the trend 
in the public schools until recently when it became obvious that 
the so-called "add-on" programs developed in the schools through the 
1950's and early '60's were too cumbersome and expensive to be 
delivered by institutions of formal education. The school cannot 
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be responsible for providing dozens of "simulated learning 
environments shops, greenhouses, etc. — in addition to basic 
skills instruction, and the "back to basics" movement of the past 
few years reflects an awareness of this fact (among other things). 
But both the add-on movement and the back-to-basics movement missed 
a significant point about human skill and the relationship of 
skill to social importance and personal identity. Having a wide 
range of alternatives available for children to investigate is 
actually counterproductive if those alternatives are hierarchically 
ranked and becoming involved in certain activities automatically 
gives one more or less status than those involved in other activ¬ 
ities. By the same token the back-to-basics focus only further 
constricts the range of achievement open to children in a school. 
We need to recognize the detrimental effects of a learning en¬ 
vironment in which only certain skills and areas of knowledge are 
rewarded and in which other skills and areas of knowledge are ignored 
or punished. 
One possibility might be to engage children in learning ex¬ 
periences that take place in the larger community rather than in the 
school (see below), another might be to emphasize the common ele¬ 
ments of all kinds of competence in the learning children do in 
school. 
Adult models. Children need (and will have, no matter what) adult 
models of behavior which they observe and imitate and which form th 
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core of their understanding of the world. So powerful is the child's 
need to derive meaning through the behavior of adults that he or she 
will follow adults into patterns of activity and attitude that 
make the fulfillment of other crucial needs impossible. As noted 
in the previous chapter, the usual structure of public education, 
especially in the later grades, provides children with pasteboard 
adults, presented to them as experts who demand obedience and 
respect but who rarely demonstrate the competence they supposedly 
possess in a manner children can use. Thus another principle 
of educational thought that may be derived from an evolutionary 
perspective is that children need to see a variety of adults in 
a variety of roles. 
It is common for people who have been through the public school 
system in the U.S. to have had a 1 special teacher, a person who 
brought literature to life or made history accessible. Perhaps it 
was a shop teacher who was able to convey pride of skill in a job 
well done, or a basketball coach who helped athletes conceive of 
the whole sport in addition to teaching them technical skill. 
These adults often become models of behavior that deeply affect 
children's lives.' An evolutionary perspective suggests that at 
least two factors are at work in this powerful interaction between 
a child and the special teacher. First, this person usually dem¬ 
onstrates his or her interest in and concern for the child freely. 
AFor example, the author became an English major m college because 
of Mrs. Nelson, a high school English teacher whose commitment to 
literature was profound and obvious. 
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This is important, of course, in terms of the security and sense 
of belonging children need and also because such attention from 
an adult contributes to the child's sense of importance and personal 
value. Second, this special teacher is always someone who is 
deeply and personally engaged in the material being presented to the 
child. Special teachers are practitioners in their fields — 
whether those fields are reading literature or carpentry. Ac¬ 
knowledgement of the importance of teachers who do what they teach 
underlies Bruner's belief 
that the school must also contain men and women who, 
in their own way, seek and embody excellence. This 
does not mean that we shall have to staff our schools 
with men and women of great genius but that the teacher 
must embody in his own approach to learning a pursuit 
of excellence (1979: 119). 
The model of behavior children receive from the special 
teacher has meaning because it is something the adult chooses to do 
and believes is important. What makes Shakespeare irrelevant to 
children in public schools today is not only the archaic language 
and the unfamiliar dramatic situations and characters, but the 
fact that for many English teachers Shakespeare is also irrelevant. 
These teachers present Shakespeare to children because they must 
he is, after all, a significant part of our cultural lore — but they 
are unable to describe, much less demonstrate, that importance 
because they do not actually feel it themselves. Lhey cannot serve 
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as models for children in this regard and instead often communicate 
their own boredom with the material. The "model” for children becomes 
the adult s response to Shakespeare, not what the adult says about the 
bard, much less Shakespeare's plays themselves. 
But even a school staffed wholly by special teachers would be 
an artificial place if the subjects they engaged in were arranged 
in a specialized, fragmented, and hierarchical manner. If the only 
subject areas available to children are academic areas, and if these 
subjects are offered as they are currently offered in junior and 
senior high schools in the U.S., the best special teachers in the 
world would be able to create at best a kind of "alternate reality" 
for children — one with emotional depth and meaning, perhaps, but 
artificial nonetheless in the context of the world the children will 
have to live in when they get out of school. Children need to see 
a fuller range of adult activity than they are currently exposed 
to in the public schools — whether these schools are vocationally 
or academically oriented. Children need to see a range of work, 
a diversity of attitudes towards the same kind of work, a variety 
of skill levels, and, as noted above, the school cannot provide 
simulations of all these work environments. 
In addition to exposure to special teachers and to a range of 
activities in which adults are purposefully involved, children need 
to see individual adults in a variety of roles. In small commun¬ 
ities children often know teachers in less formal capacities as 
fellow churchmembers, for example, or as neighbors — and an 
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evolutionary perspective suggests that this kind of "extracurricular" 
interaction between the adult who is the teacher and the schoolchild 
contributes to the accuracy of the child's view of the adult world. 
If Ms. Jones the history teacher also acts in the community 
theatre group (in a small community) she exists for many children in 
at least two dimensions simultaneously. If Mr. Smith the librarian 
in the school has a drinking problem it may not be to his advantage 
that word gets around, but knowledge of his problem also contributes 
to the breadth of a child's version of adult reality. In larger 
communities these outside connections become less and less possible, 
and in large schools it is common for both teachers and children 
to exist for one another in very narrow dimensions indeed. 
Other children and the elderly. .The strict age-grade segregation 
that exists in most public schools today is also detrimental to 
a child's preparation for adult life. As noted in Chapters 3 and 
A, younger children learn a great deal from older children, and 
older children learn from younger children what they need to know in 
order to become effective parents. Once again, it can never be the 
responsibility of the school to, say, supply infants for teenagers 
in highschool to observe and learn from, but the problem must 
be addressed in other ways. 
In the same manner, children need to learn about age from the 
aged, for the perception of continuity in living, the knowledge that 
they will someday be old, affects choices that children make as 
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they prepare for adulthood (and thus the choices they make as 
adults). It is arguable that the "cult of youth," so obvious in 
Western society is related to the disenfranchisement of the 
elderly, the hiding away and ignoring of old folks. 
Promising Directions 
There have been significant developments in alternative and 
community education in the last 20 years that offer cause for 
cautious optimism concerning children's learning in the U.S. today 
when they are viewed in the context of an evolutionary perspective. 
Space does not allow a thorough investigation of these educational 
innovations in this study, but it is important to note that they 
exist and to comment briefly upon some of the characteristics through 
which they are related to an evolutionary perspective. 
Alternative education. There is a popular belief, not only among 
people in our society in general but among educators as well, that 
the alternative school is dead, that the experiments in education 
that arose all across the country during the late I960's and early 
1970's are folding one by one, unable to generate the funding ne- 
cessarv to stay open and unable to build support in the communitv. 
While it is certain that the "back to basics" movement in education 
specifically and the general conservative swing of the nation in 
the late '70's and early '80's has directed criticism against 
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alternative education programs (and has spawned the recent report 
of the National Commission on Excellence in Education), it is 
also true that alternative schools and alternative educational 
philosophies have had a profound impact on not only the lives of 
a large number of children but on the educational establishment 
itself. 
What makes alternative schools alternative is usually a 
commitment to providing opportunities for the participation of child¬ 
ren in decision concerning their own learning. To be sure, there 
are all kinds of alternative schools. As noted in Chapter 4, there 
are a number of schools that provide virtually no direction for 
children from adults. These alternatives may offer a sense of 
belonging and importance to children and place them in an atmo¬ 
sphere in which learning is enjoyable, but they may also confuse 
children by not offering reasons to learn in the form of adult 
models of behavior. In addition there are schools organized around 
strict behavior modification programs that are also called alternative 
schools but in which a tremendous amount of structure and direction 
comes from the adults in the school. Indeed, in some ways it 
is possible to conceive of military schools as "alternatives" to 
the public schools. 
*One should hasten to add, however, that in many of these behavior 
modification-oriented alternative schools the goal is the gener 
at ion of self-discipline in the child and the development of his or 
her ability to enter into decision-making processes competently. 
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Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence that in¬ 
dicates that on average children who have been part of alternative 
educational programs (1) do at least as well academically (mea¬ 
sured in traditional quantitative terms) as children in more tra- 
ditional schools (see Smith et al, 1981) and (2) often come out 
of an alternative educational experience with broader-based, more 
generalizable skills and with a heightened sense of personal 
confidence and competence (e.g. Raywid, 1981). The fact that 
children attending alternative schools are often those who have not 
been able to succeed (measured in any way) in a traditional public 
school environment makes this evidence all the more compelling, for 
if an alternative school can generate enthusiasm for learning in 
children who have had negative school experiences there is something 
very valuable to be learned from the alternative process. 
This is not the place for a detailed comparison of the ele¬ 
ments of successful alternative education programs with the prin¬ 
ciples derived from an evolutionary perspective, though this is 
an important study which should be made in the near future. But 
one can’t help noting that successful alternative school programs 
are often those in which students are engaged in many different 
kinds of activities, both "vocational" as well as "academic," 
so that the skills that are learned are varied and the opportunity 
for the acquisition of competence (and thus confidence) is greater 
that it usually is in public schools (e.g. the Channel 1 program in 
Gloucester, MA). At the same time there is evidence that an 
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alternative school in which children not only have some legit¬ 
imate influence on the decisions that are made about their learning 
activities but are also provided with models of real adults who have 
definite skills, opinions, attitudes and personal experiences, is 
more successful at generating confidence and competence than a 
public school in which children have virtually no say in how they 
spend their day and are confronted with unidimensional adults 
whose opinions and attitudes are often hidden behind a curriculum 
(e.g. Holt, 1964; Henry, 1965). Finally, successful alternative 
schools are usually small. 
Although it may be true that a number of alternative schools 
have closed down in recent years, it is also true that a far larger 
number of these schools have been incorporated into public school 
systems as alternatives. 
From [their] beginnings 10 years ago, public alter¬ 
native schools have grown from 100 or so in 1970 to 
more than 10,000 today. Alternatives are found in 
80% of the nation's larger school districts (those 
enrolling 25,000 or more students), and they have begun 
to appear even in the smallest districts: One out of 
every five districts enrolling fewer than 600 students 
now claims one or more alternatives. An estimated three 
million U.S. youngsters are currently enrolled in 
alternative programs (Raywid, 1981, 552). 
This phenomenon can, of course, be seen from different points 
of view depending on one's frame of reference. From one per¬ 
spective the incorporation of the alternative school or the principles 
268 
of alternative education by public schools represents a "co-opting*1 
of the critique of public education that the alternative schools 
embodied. In this view these schools have been absorbed by the 
larger educational culture in much the same way other individuals 
and organizations critical of the cultural establishment have been 
absorbed. In the process of "mainstreaming," these alternative 
critiques have been weakened or deflected, and what is called an 
"alternative program" in a public school may in actuality be 
nothing more than a holding tank for the troublemakers of the public 
system. 
That this occurs is undeniable; however, there is another view 
of the same situation that is more optimistic. The fact that many 
school systems across the country are adopting alternative programs 
and that teachers, administrators, parents and school board mem¬ 
bers are becoming aware that the schools need a wider range of 
options for children may be interpreted as a sign that the edu¬ 
cational establishment itself is in flux. The incorporation of 
alternative programming in the public schools may represent a 
better understanding of the socialization responsibilities of the 
school and as such may serve as a handhold for future critique and 
experimentation. 
But there is another problem associated with many alternative 
schools that is most important in the context of an evolutionary 
perspective. Just as a public school staffed entirely by special 
teachers would perforce be an artificial learning environment, so 
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an alternative school tucked away in the hills o£ Vermont is unable 
to satisy some of the critical principles of children's learning. 
Even if the alternative school is located in an urban setting it will 
have limited effectiveness as a learning environment if the children 
who attend it are isolated from the city they live in while they 
are in school. As noted above, the creation of a learning en- 
vironment which socializes children for a world that can exist only 
in the alternative school can have serious consequences when 
children leave the school. 
Community education. One way of increasing the variety of adult 
behavior models that can inform a child's learning, a way of 
offering children exposure to a greater variety of skill and a way 
of encouraging their participation as active learners and members 
of a group is to expand the concept of "education" to include a 
greater amount of the learning all people do in their communities. 
From a community education perspective any agency, any organization, 
any activity may serve as an educational resource, and anyone in 
the community may be a teacher. 
The notion that learning is a community function has been 
part of American educational thought at least since Dewey's time, 
for, as noted in the previous chapter, he believed that learning 
was best done in a community in which personal experience forms the 
staring point of the learning experience. However, the variety of 
points of view connected with community education today and the 
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plethora of projects and programs with different goals and pro¬ 
cedures that exist under the "community education" rubric testify 
to the complexities involved in defining the community and assessing 
what role it should play in children's learning. 
Fantini, Loughran and Reed (1980) identify three major trends 
in community education that have gained impetus in recent years. 
The first of these trends is the shift from community 
education as "school-community relations" to "education- 
community relations." The movement now sees the school 
as one, but only one, of the educational agencies in 
the community... 
The second trend involves a shift in the purposes 
of community education. The major objective heretofore 
has been individual growth and development. Currently, 
increasing emphasis is being put on community development 
as co-equal in importance... 
The third trend involves conceptualizing community 
education more importantly as a process than as groups 
of programs or products (p. 11). 
From an evolutionary perspective these trends can serve as 
cause for considerable optimism, for a re-integration of the human 
needs to be part of and participate in a community and to be im¬ 
portant as individuals can only contribute to the well being ol all 
those involved in the re—integration. By the same token, conceiving 
of community education as a process with general goals rather than 
specific, quantifiable outcomes or products is precisely what is 
demanded from an evolutionary perspective. 
Firth and Reed (1982) offer a "Lifelong Learning Scale" for 
the assessment of all potential and current educational organizations 
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throughout the community. It will be seen that the left column of 
attributes describes formal educational institutions as they 
currently exist in U.S. society while the right column describes 
community education programs as defined by the trends identified 
by Fantini, Loughran and Reed. 
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THE LIFELONG LEARNING SCALE 
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and more general 
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More Formal Less Formal 
More Structured More Flexible 
More Abstract More Concrete 




12 3 4 5 
Professionals Lay oriented 
A major life aim Ancillary life aim 
Highly trained Short term training 





1 2 3 4 5 
Teacher more Teacher more 
directive facilitating, 
advising, liking 
Teacher more Learner more 
responsible ' responsible 




1 2 3 4 5 
Extrinsic rewards Intrinsic rewards 
More competitive More cooperative 
Evaluation of Evaluation 
knowing performance 










1 2 3 4 5 
Complex technology Simpler technology 
Commercial pro- Local production 
duct ion 






THE LIFELONG LEARNING SCALE (CONTINUED) 
D E S C R I P TORS 
More Formal Less Formal 
More Structured More Flexible 
EDUCATIONAL More Abstract More Concrete N/A; 
VARIABLES More Objective More Subjective COMMENTS 
Financial 
1 2 3 4 5 
Resources Larger expenditures Smaller expendi- 
per learner tures per learner 
Long term Short term 
investment investment 
Mostly government Varied sponsors 
sponsored 
More elaborate Less elaborate 
accounting accounting 
procedures procedures 
Less flexible More flexible 
allocations allocations 
Building 
1 2 3 4 5 
Resources Major permanent Minor temporary 
constructions constructions 
Specific, set spaces Flexible spaces 
High maintenance Less maintenance 
cost cost 
Less often user More often user 
constructed constructed 
Power, 
12 3 4 5 1 
Control & Adherence to rules More personal 
Administra- forms and routines 
tion More hierarchical More horizontal 
Power partly func- Power largely func- 
tion of status 
and resources 
tion of competency 
Decision making Decision making 
by role shared 




Leaders viewed as Leaders viewed as 
managers coordinators J 
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The correlation between the criteria generated for the eval¬ 
uation of community education programs by Firth and Reed and the 
characteristics of human learning identified through an evolutionary 
perspective is striking indeed, and but a few examples need to be 
noted here. The objectives of an institution of formal education are 
"more cognitive" while the objectives of community education activ¬ 
ities are "more psychological and physical." One might substitute 
for "psychological" the term "socio-emotional." 
The content of a community education activity, according to the 
Lifelong Learning Scale is "experiential, psychologically organized 
and interdisciplinary," and the teacher in such an activity serves 
more as a facilitator, an advisor, someone who helps others link 
up and make connections. Learners in a community education activ¬ 
ity are more responsible and active than they are in a formal school 
environment, and the rewards people obtain from being involved in 
community education activities are intrinsic (remember Bruner?) 
rather than extrinsic (in which the learning process is hooked to 
different emotional systems). 
The trends in community education are encouraging and repre¬ 
sent avenues through which an evolutionary perspective may be 
applied and evaluated. But the problems of community education 
programs are many, and in reviewing some of them we may also be 
able to obtain a clearer understanding of the ways in which the 
application of an evolutionary perspective is complicated in 
a modern technological society. 
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One of the most difficult tasks of community education is 
defining the community. As noted in Chapter A, large societies in 
the world today are typically pluralistic confederations in which 
hundreds or even thousands of sub-communities may exist. Does the 
term "community education" imply an identification with a political 
entity — a town or city? Certainly the political unit has 
a great capacity to wield power in large societies, to attract 
funding from larger political entities and to make large-scale 
decisions. But one has the sense from many community educators that 
"community education" implies a wide variety of groups that may 
or may not be permanent, that may have only a single issue in 
common, and may in fact find themselves pitted against the pol¬ 
itical unit. The failure to identify the community for which commun¬ 
ity education programs may be devised can land such programs in one 
of two traps. It is easy for community education programs to 
get caught in the impossible attempt to provide something for every 
need in every community. In this situation either the focus of 
the program becomes hopelessly diffused and the activities frag¬ 
mented or the programs falls prey to the pull towards rigid 
structure and close management. By the same token, if it is per¬ 
ceived by the community at large that a particular program, project 
or activity is "for" a particular sub—community, chances are that 
other sub-groups will withhold their support. 
An evolutionary perspective indicates that beneath the 
apparent dissimilarity of immediate needs and attitudes in am 
277 
society are deep socio-emotional needs that are common to all human 
beings. It suggests that when the structures and attitudes that 
emerge in a community project are formed in the context of these 
more general commonalities, a focus of activity can be generated 
which may elicit emotional investment from individuals in a number 
of disparate groups and provide the basis for community integration 
at a higher level (or, more properly, a re-integration at a 
deeper level). But establishing these broad structures and atti¬ 
tudes is an extremely difficult task. 
The conflict between individual fulfillment and collective 
need that has characterized the community education movement since 
its inception reflects the fundamental separation between belonging 
to a group and being important as an individual noted in the previous 
chapter. From an evolutionary perspective these characteristics 
of human sociality should not be in conflict but in balance, yet 
the emphasis on individual aggrandizement in the modern world in 
general and in the U.S. in particular makes such a cooperation 
especially hard and may affect the success of community education 
projects in several ways. 
(1) The idea of the group. Building a consciousness of 
community, particularly in the U.S., may be more difficult than 
anyone wants to admit and may imply a level of abstraction that most 
community educators would like to avoid. The ideas that unite mem¬ 
bers of a foraging band into The People no doubt exist at a certain 
degree of abstraction. But these ideas are inextricably 
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connected with the natural environment and with blood and marriage 
relationships. There is no separation between the idea and the 
actual people one sees on a day—to—day basis. In larger societies, 
and especially in pluralistic societies like the U.S. the idea of 
community consists of elements that are only vaguely related to 
the natural environment, if at all, and are only distantly 
related to kinship. Large societies have to characterize their 
"groupness" in terms that are increasingly abstract so that 
increasingly larger numbers of unrelated people in different environ¬ 
ments can find some emotional basis of commonality in their often 
gratuitous association. The notions of The People represented by 
Christianity or The Irish are certainly emotionally charged, and 
they may serve to fulfill the fundamental needs of belonging and 
participation — even of importance — but they also require a kind 
of intellectual or metaphysical effort that unites people through 
imagination (see below). 
(2) The importance of individuals. It is probably the invest¬ 
ment of individuals, the participation of individuals from dis¬ 
parate communities who cross over lines to get what they need in 
the larger community that will enable an integrative community ed¬ 
ucation program to be successful. In a society that places a 
primium on individual importance and fulfillment it is unrealistic 
to think that a community education project can begin to work 
positively any other way. 
(3) The danger of individual importance. Because the tradition 
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of individuality is so powerful in modern life, a given community 
education project is often built around the abilities, talents, 
and concerns of a specific individual or small number of individuals 
who, in effect, own the idea. It is discouraging to think of the 
number of times good programs have broken down simply because the 
person or people in whom so much responsibility was located left, 
and those who remained had not had a full share in the vision. 
Charismatic leadership has its advantages and disadvantages in 
community development programs, but at the risk of oversimplifying 
it might be said that the most successful community education 
project, in the long run, will be the one that learns an important 
lesson from nomadic foraging societies. Leadership must be diffused 
and the widest possible participation and sharing of responsibility 
must be encouraged. In this way reliance on specific individuals 
may be reduced and the organization itself may become more like 
a community. 
Education for synthesis. As noted at the end of Chapter A, there 
is an ironic twist in an evolutionary perspective that has to do with 
the relationship between intellectual skill — developed to a highly 
specialized degree in the course of civilization — and socio- 
emotional needs which have often been ignored in the headlong rush 
to implement the productions of our unrestrained minds. This irony 
is present in the above discussion, for it was proposed there that 
a high level of abstraction is necessary in order to help provide 
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for people an emotional focus that can enable them to move away from 
abstraction and linearity into more emotionally sound, inclusive 
activities. At first this may seem an impossible contradiction, 
and it is necessary to investigate this "kink" in the evolutionary 
perspective in more detail. 
Nomadic foraging societies and the societies of other 
primates are well-balanced and provide for the collective and 
individual needs of their members simultaneously because the way 
of life itself maintains the balance. There is nothing inherently 
"good" or "moral" about living life this way, but the intimate 
connection with a fluctuating physical environment makes cooperation 
essential, makes sharing advantageous, and encourages individuals 
to seek status and importance in the context of what is also best 
for the whole group. However, the physical world and our dependence 
on it have changed so dramatically in the past 8,000 - 10,000 
years that the balances characteristic of nomadic foraging societies 
will not simply re-emerge if we construct educational and social 
activities that emphasize emotional needs. Getting people together 
is a commendable activity, but in a sense we have gone so far along 
the line of specialization and abstraction that often people don't 
realize what they're getting together for unless there is an idea 
that all can hold in common. Survival and well being in the modern 
world demand cognitive competence and a command of intellectual 
skills such as reading, writing, logoco-mathematical reasoning, and 
organization. While these skills need not be acquired in a 
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repressive learning environment they nevertheless require considerable 
practice and a certain amount of specialization. It may be that 
humans living in modern technological environments are victims 
of a kind of cognitive hypertrophy, but these over-developed 
intellectual mechanisms,though laid over older social mechanisms, 
are now critical to survival in the new environment. 
If for centuries our intellectual systems have led us away 
from some of the most important characteristics of being human, 
these same intellectual systems must lead us back again. We cannot 
rely on our biological social inclinations though neither can we afford 
to ignore them. An evolutionary perspective suggests that human beings 
are "by nature" neither "bad" nor "good" but carry with them deeply 
rooted needs and inclinations that play out in different ways ac¬ 
cording to the environment in which they must be realized. In the 
environment in which these needs and inclinations developed they 
mediate a social balance between the group and the individual, 
between old and young, between male and female. But in other 
environments there is no telling what they might mediate. 
In the absence of natural direction from the environment we 
must provide our own, and in order for many people in large societies 
to share these understandings they must be in the form of ideas. These 
ideas need not be new or original, and they may not be directly asso¬ 
ciated with specific needs of specific communities, but they must 
be large concepts, what Bruner calls "great organizing ideas, 
ideas that inevitably stem from deeper values and points of 
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view about man and nature" (1979: 120). They muat be thoughts that 
can capture imagination and allow a considerable amount of room 
for individual interpretation and practical application within and 
among sub-groups in a society. 
This is where the schools reenter the picture, and they must 
be included for a number of reasons. First, the schools by law 
already monopolize a considerable amount of a child's time. If 
the time is to be used more humanly, from an evolutionary per¬ 
spective, the schools must be part of any changes that occur. 
Second, the schools are officlal, that is, they offer certificates 
of achievement that are useful in the world. Third, the schools 
already provide focal points for most communities in which there are 
children. Structures that are potentially integrative such as the 
PAC and the PTA are already in place in the overwhelming majority 
of school systems throughout the country. Finally, institutions of 
formal education are traditionally the repository of the kinds of 
selection, synthesizing and expressive skills that are critical to 
the empowerment of individuals and the cohesiveness of communities 
on any level in modern society. 
Currently the schools expose children to ambiguity and un¬ 
certainty without helping them acquire the skills of connection- 
making, linking, and analyzing ideas and experiences. This condemns 
them to fear and mistrust. Any self-reliance that emerges from 
such a learning environment must be of necessity narrow and de¬ 
fensive, a self-reliance that eschews reciprocal obligation and 
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cooperation and contributes to isolation and self—centeredness. 
But perhaps the schools could serve as the coordinators, interpre¬ 
ters and facilitators of experience and skill rather than the 
repository for them. 
This is an old idea which goes back, again, to Dewey and is 
implied in the design of the "Lifelong Learning Scale" mentioned 
above. All areas of endeavor, all experiences generate patterns, 
inter-relationships and methodologies for the solution of problems. 
When a carpenter estimates the cost and timing of a large job, when 
a cook plans a complex meal, when a scholar writes a book, there 
are a number of both cognitive and emotional processes at work. 
Regardless of the particular area in which they are being exercised 
these processes are much alike. They involve the perception and 
interpretation of pattern, the integration of several different 
kinds of information, the identification of problems and the making 
of decisions. Dewey believed that helping children understand 
these systems was the primary function of education in a demo¬ 
cracy and insisted that as children learned about their own 
experiences and the experiences of others a bond of understanding 
would grow in the learning community. Developing a theoretical 
framework for their experiences would enable children to extend 
their skill, to enter into unfamiliar territory with less appre¬ 
hension and to tolerate greater ambiguity and diversity as the 
world changed around them. 
In addition to helping people in a community order and in- 
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terpret their experiences schools may pose the large questions. We 
need to know about the new elements of human interaction that have 
developed with large societies — the acceptance and expectation of 
change, the burgeoning of information systems, the development of 
large-scale competition. Children growing up in a technological 
society need to know what power is and what forms it can take. They 
need to know where rules come from and why it is often easier to 
obey them than fight them. It is important for them to acquire an 
understanding of why they feel bad when they are not acknowledged 
by others and why success is hollow if it is not shared. And most 
of all, children need to get hold of unifying ideas, conceptions 
that link human beings to one another and to the other inhabitants 
of the earth. 
In a community of learners that is attempting to understand 
the commonalities of human experience and the connections of human 
beings with other forms of life, tolerance, cooperation, and an 
appreciation for the experience of others may indeed develop. 
In such a community individuals may gain greater power to influence 
the decisions that are made concerning them by extending their skill 
and competence into new areas and by making connections between 
pieces of information that may have been forbidding and unknown in 
the past. At the same time such a learning community can help 
create individuals who are responsible members of a group, who 
factor into the utilization of any power and influence they might 
have an understanding of the ties that bind and the need for ^vei\onL 
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in the group to belong. Finally, people living and learning in 
such an environment will draw pleasure and satisfaction from the 
learning process itself because the process will be grounded in 
what is important to them: belonging to a group of human beings 
and being important in that group. 
Perhaps it is idealistic to expect or demand the implemen¬ 
tation of social and educational reforms that incorporate an 
evolutionary perspective on a large scale. There are so many 
special interests, so much threat and supposed threat in our 
society at present. But that is what is so appealing about this 
way of looking at things. It may inform our thought on any level, 
in any class, in any community education project, in any univer¬ 
sity. It may form the agenda of a study group or provide a .counter¬ 
point in a school committee meeting. An evolutionary perspective 
knits together a variety of ideas and events from a variety of 
times and places. It locates us and our children in the great 
panorama of life on earth and offers paradigms that can assist our 
attempts to understand our interactions and, from our understanding, 
create environments in which our interactions are more cooperative, 
productive and equitable. There is no going back, but an evo¬ 
lutionary perspective can help us go on. 
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